

THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE 2015 MIGRATION CRISIS IN HUNGARY



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INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

BY BORI SIMONOVITS AND ANIKÓ BERNÁT

In this final report our aim is to provide an in-depth view of the current European refugee crisis and its repercussions in Hungary. In 2015 approximately 390 thousand migrants¹—of which 177 thousand were registered as asylum seekers²—crossed the Hungarian border.

In the summer of 2015, thousands of Hungarian volunteers organised themselves to help the asylum seekers entering the country. This phenomenon may not seem extraordinary in itself, but considering that it happened in a country characterised by extreme xenophobic attitudes, where civic participation is weak, and in a society with low levels of trust in general, exploited by the Government's anti-immigration campaign, it seemed to us reasonable to devote a separate analysis of the role of the volunteers and grassroots organisations that have been active in the relief aid activity since the summer of 2015.

Measuring xenophobic attitudes with opinion polls has a long tradition in Hungary. TÁRKI has been using standard questions in order to assess the majority's welcoming attitudes (xenophilia) and rejection towards asylum seekers (xenophobia) since 1992. According to our very latest results, in January 2016 the level of xenophobia reached an all-time high, and xenophilia practically disappeared.

Mass-migration related fear and scapegoating are central elements of xenophobia. The different aspects of anxiety and fear—connected to asylum seekers and migrants—perceived by the receiving society is worth analysing in today's Europe, especially in light of the recent terror attacks and other incidents in which immigrants play a significant role worldwide. In the framework of the current project we had the opportunity to measure xenophobia and mass-migration related fear at different points in time; what we can see from the time series is that the level of xenophobia in Hungary increased dramatically between October 2015 and January

¹ Data source: Hungarian National Police (ORFK) retrieved from: HVG online, http://hvg.hu/itthon/20160101_391_ezren_leptek_at_tavaly_illegalisan_a

² See the official statistics of the Hungarian Central Office: https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_evkozi/e_wnvn001.html

2016. The data analysed in this paper is derived from a data collection carried out in mid-October 2015 and mid-January 2016 (just before, and two month after the Paris terror attack, 13 November 2015) and right after the series of sexual violations in several German cities on New Year's Eve. The Hungarian context is entirely different from the German one both in terms of the political context (the government's extreme anti-immigration politics) and in terms of the volume of migration, as since the legal and physical closure of the borders (16 October 2015), hardly any asylum seekers have entered Hungary.

In order to understand the analysis of the attitudes of the Hungarian population, and the activities of the aid organizations, a list of milestone events are presented in *Table 1*. These might have had an effect on the activities and opinions of both Hungarian individuals and organizations as well as shaped the political context of the crisis.

Table 1 Milestones in migration flow in Hungary, 2015–2016

Date	Event
11 January 2015	The first relevant official statement related to immigration into Hungary: Prime Minister Orban's speech in Paris after the commemoration ceremony of the victims of the Charlie Hebdo terror attack: economic migration is bad, Hungary will therefore not provide asylum for economic migrants.
April 2015	Preparations begin for the so-called "national consultation" on immigration initiated by the government (mailing a questionnaire to all Hungarian adults to survey their opinion on immigration). Increasing number of anti-immigration communiques by politicians in the government.
May 2015	"National consultation" on immigration.
June 2015	Government sponsored anti-immigration billboard campaign nation-wide; a counter campaign is organised by a fringe political party with pro-immigration messages.
25–30 June 2015	The formation of the new voluntary grassroots organizations.
13 July 2015	The Hungarian government starts building a fence along the Hungarian–Serbian border.
5–8 August 2015	The opening of transit zones at the railway stations in Budapest with the volunteers and grassroots providing street social work and aid for asylum seekers.
8 August 2015	71 dead migrants are found in a van in Austria close to the Hungarian border, obviously en route from Hungary.
25–29 August 2015	Negotiations are underway about a central transit zone in Verseny Street, Budapest, controlled by the Municipality of Budapest.

continue

Date	Event
end of August – early September 2015	Increasing tensions at the Budapest railway stations, where thousands of asylum seekers are waiting for the opportunity to travel on to Germany. Tensions are increased by the hectic reactions of the Hungarian authorities and the state railway company (at one point no asylum seekers are allowed to get on the trains leaving for Germany, including those with valid tickets; later it is again possible to get on the trains for a few hours, but then all international trains leaving for Germany are canceled for a few days; on 3 September a train leaves Budapest Keleti railway station with asylum seekers who were informed that they are heading for Germany; the train, however, is stopped at the Bicske reception camp (Hungary), with asylum seekers feeling cheated and trapped.
3–6 September 2015	Right after the train incident at Bicske on 3 September, asylum seekers at Budapest Keleti railway station set out to walk to Austria on the M1 motorway. In response the government provides buses for the asylum seekers to transport them directly to the Austrian border from the motorway as well as Keleti station. A statement is made by the head of the Catholic Church in Hungary, Cardinal Peter Erdős, justifying the limited involvement of the church in the crisis, in stark contrast to statement made by the Pope.
8 September 2015	Petra László, a camerawoman at a right-wing Hungarian TV channel, trips refugees running from the police in Röszke (Serbian border).
15–16 September 2015	“The battle of Röszke” takes place between police and asylum seekers after the physical and legal closure of the Hungarian–Serbian border. The migration flow heads towards the Hungarian–Croatian border.
17 September 2015	The Hungarian–Serbian border is closed down.
21–23 September 2015	Repercussions of a speech delivered by Prime Minister Orbán, saying “the government has given financial support to the NGOs”; the volunteers and grassroots protest as they have in fact not received any state funds; the Prime Minister meant only those established charity organizations that were commissioned by the government with the aid activities at the Croatian and Austrian borders after 15 September.
16 October 2015	The fence along the Hungarian–Croatian border is completed, the border is closed: the end of mass inflow of asylum seekers and migrants into Hungary.
4 November 2015	FIDESZ starts collecting signatures in order to launch a referendum against the EU’s migrant quota.
12 January 2016	The Hungarian government proposes an amendment of the Fundamental Law of Hungary regarding special rules and measures applicable in case of terror threats; On 5 March 2016 the government withdraws the proposal as it is unable to garner the two-thirds support in the parliament required for the amendment.
24 February 2016	Prime Minister Viktor Orbán announces that the government will initiate a referendum against the EU’s migrant quota.
10 March 2016	The government declares a state of “migration crisis” alleging that the large number of migrants stuck in Greece make the situation unpredictable.

In order to have a comprehensive overview, we have assessed our research questions with the use of various research techniques between September 2015 and January 2016, and present our findings in the following structure:

- ❖ Chapter 1 is devoted to explore and assess changes in the majority’s attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees, and to tackle the level and socio-demographic background

of mass-migration related fear, based on two waves of data collection (October 2015 and January 2016) completed with European-wide and regionally comparative research results;

- ❖ In Chapter 2 we discuss the development and the role of the organisations that have been taking an active role in helping asylum seekers in Hungary. The focus will be placed on those newly established grassroots organizations that organised themselves on Facebook and were based on volunteer citizens' solidarity during their intensive relief work throughout the country. Moreover, the role of established charity organizations and NGOs specialised in providing legal or social assistance to various groups of migrants will also be discussed. The chapter discusses the characteristics, mission and drivers of these organisations, as well as the cooperation and conflicts between them, and provides an overview on their present and future activities in order to assess the sustainability of the solidarity movement emerged during the migrant crisis in 2015.
- ❖ In Chapter 3 we focus our attention on the volunteers working in the field based on focus group discussions and interviews (altogether 37 interviews were carried out between October and December 2015.) The volunteers were the basis of those grassroots analysed in the previous chapter, and this section allows us to observe the individual motivations behind the organization.
- ❖ Chapter 4 analyses the media representation of the organizations involved in relief work during the refugee crisis. The media in general, and the online press in particular had a strong impact on both public opinion and the activities of the aid organisations. This systematic media analysis serves, on the one hand, as a mirror, by showing the impressions the aid organisations and their activities made on the public, and on the other as an information source on how the organisations adopted the use of online media.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In our empirical research our aim was to provide an in-depth view of the current European refugee crisis and of its repercussions in Hungary.

The aim of the research is twofold:

- ❖ to explore and assess changes in the majority's attitudes towards migrants (with a special focus on asylum seekers), based on two waves of data collections (October 2015 and January 2016) on representative samples;
- ❖ to analyse the development and the role of the organisations working in the field. The focus is placed on those—mostly non-governmental—organisations that have been taking an active role in helping asylum seekers in Hungary.

In order to have a comprehensive overview, we have assessed our research questions with the use of various research techniques between September 2015 and January 2016:

1. The quantitative analysis was based on two waves of representative surveys carried out in October 2015 and January 2016 by TÁRKI, completed with a comparative survey implemented by CEORG (Central European Opinion Research Group) partners between August and October 2015 as well as recent Eurobarometer survey results.
2. The qualitative research was based on stakeholder interviews and focus groups with volunteers of grass root organizations.
3. Moreover, a focused media analysis was also part of our project, which was based on the analysis of online and social media sites. The aim was to gain a comprehensive overview on the role of the organizations working in the refugee-related aid work.

In this final report we present our findings in five main chapters. The most important findings are summarised below:

- (1) In the first chapter we explored and assessed changes in the majority's attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees, and measured the level and socio-demographic background of mass-migration related fear, based on two waves of data collection (October 2015 and January 2016) completed with European-wide and regionally comparative research results.
 - As far as the public opinion of the EU member states is concerned in Chapter 1.1 we should highlight here is that most of the EU population (85 per cent) agreed that "additional measures should be taken to fight illegal immigration of people from outside the EU" and three fourth of them would also support "a common European policy on migration". Hungary was one of those countries (next to Denmark and Estonia) a higher proportion of whose population supported additional measures to fight illegal migration than the EU average, and a lower proportion of whose population agreed with the concept of a common migration policy than the EU average.
 - In Chapter 1.2 we analysed the phenomenon of welfare chauvinism as well as the different—general and more specific—elements of fear connected to asylum seekers and migrants. (Welfare chauvinism refers to the concept according to which welfare benefits should be restricted to certain groups, particularly to the natives of a country, as opposed to immigrants.) The complex data analysis have shown that the rejection of the idea of an open society, in which scapegoating takes a central role, as well as fear ridden welfare chauvinism are strongly related, and are inseparable in people's minds. Fears regarding immigration can be explained by the same social and demographic variables (level of education, region of residence, age) as those explaining xenophobia; the main difference is in the explanatory power of age and party preference. While gender does not affect whether someone is found to be a xenophobe or a xenophile, in the combined fear index women on average perceive higher levels of fear than men, especially in responding to questions related to anxiety.
 - In Chapter 1.3 we focused our attention on analysing the main trends of xenophobia that has been measured since 1992 by TÁRKI. Based on the time series, we concluded that comparing recent survey results to 2014—the last data before the start of the government's anti-immigration campaign in early 2015 and the first wave of mass immigration from Kosovo in late 2014—the level of xenophobia in April 2015 immediately jumped to a very high level. This was followed by a period (between July and October) showing a decrease in both xenophobia and xenophilia, and then by a sharp increase in xenophobia and the disappearance of xenophilia: in January 2016 the level of xenophobia reached an all time high, and xenophilia practically disappeared. When focusing

on the “thinkers” (respondents who would need for more information before making their decision, and are inclined to evaluate the pros and the cons) we found that their overwhelming majority would not allow any asylum seeking group to enter Hungary, with the exception of ethnic Hungarians from Ukraine, and—except for Albanians from Kosovo and ethnic Hungarians from Transcarpathia—the rate of their rejection significantly increased between October 2015 and January 2016.

- In Chapter 1.4 we focused our attention on possible reasons for flight (e.g. due to war or civil war, being persecuted on the grounds of religion or ethnicity etc.). With two so-called levels of refusal indices we measured the average number of the rejected *reasons for flight*, by selected socio-demographic indicators. Comparing our data we measured an increased level of refusal in January 2016 as compared to the levels found in October, 2015, in line with the increasing levels of xenophobia. As far as the socio-demographic predictors are concerned, we found similar relationships as in the cases of xenophobic attitudes, meaning that—out of the examined socio-demographic predictors—place of residence (both *type of settlement* as well as *region*), and party preference all play a significant role in welcoming attitudes (level of education had an effect only in the first wave, but neither gender or age had a statistically significant effect at all). What should be highlighted here is the reverse effect of the two types of personal contacts measured by the survey: those who met some kind of migrants (asylum-seekers, refugees or migrants) in the past 12 months reject a significantly higher number of reasons than people who did not meet any.
 - In Chapter 1.5 we carried out a complex analysis in the theoretical framework of integrated threat theory as well as measured public support of the Hungarian immigration policy. Summing up our results with regards to the “law and order” type of Hungarian immigration policy, we found that the overwhelming majority of the respondents agree with the ideas of tightening the Hungarian asylum and immigration policy. The public support for the immigration policy formulated in the spirit of “law and order” is highly correlated with the perceived threats, both realistic (volume and irregularity) and symbolic (cultural and religious aspects). We have measured the perceived level of threat equally and extremely high both in the European and the Hungarian context, with levels of realistic threats somewhat higher than levels of symbolic threats.
- (2) In Chapter 2 we discussed the development and the role of the organisations working in the field, with a special focus on the new grassroots (helping the migrants staying temporarily in Hungary that used Facebook primarily for recruiting activists and organizing their

activities. The main new grassroots are based in Budapest, along with relevant grassroots in some other large cities. These grassroots played a major role in the refugee crisis, and are based on volunteer members and donations from Hungarian—and later foreign—citizens and companies. They grew up rapidly from early summer and thus the organizational development was a major challenge for all of them. The activity of these grassroots were often questioned in terms of professionalism, while other NGOs and in particular the larger charities were often claimed to be poorly involved in the aid work, especially in the first half of the crisis, although many NGOs directly or indirectly linked to the migrants in their original mission were definitely active, in some cases over their capacities. The aid work of the grassroots was solely based on the solidarity of volunteers, and many of them are continuing the relief work both at domestic and at international level targeting the asylum seekers and local vulnerable groups as well. The number of activists has decreased significantly, but the core teams are still in the frontline when relief work is needed.

- (3) In Chapter 3 we focused our attention on the volunteers working in the field based on focus group discussions and interviews (altogether 37 interviews were carried out between October and December 2015). As most of them had no prior experience as a volunteer the crisis might have had a strong mobilizing effect. Three main motivational structures have been identified: those with primarily altruistic motivations, those, who were mainly driven by outrage about the political situation, and lastly the first or second generation immigrants and their relatives who felt they had to get involved. In terms of political motivation, which has been usually attributed to the volunteers as the primary driver of their activity, the analysis found that individuals in all three motivational structures identified themselves as volunteers, and denied the importance of their political motivations, considering the aid work as the most important aspect of their activity. Regarding the possibility of their future mobilization the newly formed volunteer identities and the new social networks have the greatest effect on future involvement, although the allocation of the available resources may have also significant effect on their future involvement.
- (4) In Chapter 4 a focused online media analysis was carried out in order to see the media representation of the various types of aid organizations as well how they used the media during the migration crisis. Despite the intense media attention to the migration crisis for several months generating hundred thousands of articles we could retrieve 276 articles in which any of the aid organizations appears, thus we can conclude that for the mainstream online media the grassroots, and the NGOs had the biggest coverage in terms of the number of articles published by 444.hu, origo.hu and index.hu. On the other hand

as videos were not included in this summary and index.hu and 444.hu published many of them their role might be even more important than the number of articles on the aid organizations suggest. Even though we focused on those articles where aid organisations were present, we found that the Hungarian Government's agenda was the third most prominent even during the opening of the transit zones, where Migration Aid was particularly active. During this period volunteers were present nonstop at the train stations nationwide, and they could easily be interviewed and therefore could have set their own agendas. We found that volunteers and refugees were frequently interviewed but mostly by independent or oppositional media outlets index.hu, hvg.hu or origo.hu and never by the pro-Government public media such as hirado.hu or the right-wing magyarhirlap.hu. The most successful agenda-setters among the NGOs and grassroots were Migration Aid (with its humanitarian framework) and the Helsinki Committee. Charity organisations were often mentioned together in a governmental and/or critical framework (condemning them for being passive during some periods of the crisis).

1 ATTITUDES TOWARDS, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES (QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS)

1.1 SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION ON MIGRANTS AND ASYLUM SEEKERS BY ENDRE SIK AND BLANKA SZEITL

In 2015 two public opinion surveys³ were conducted in all EU countries that contained some questions regarding the refusal or acceptance of migrants, and the opinions concerning policies aiming to tackle the emerging problems of the massive and unexpected inflow of asylum seekers.

In the following we will summarised the results of these two surveys with the intention of providing a context for the in depth analysis of the Hungarian xenophobia surveys. Therefore the main question we raise is: How does the Hungarian public opinion fit into the European public opinion in general.

1.1.1 EARLY REACTIONS – MAY 2015

In June 2013 only 14 per cent,⁴ in September 2014 about the one fourth (24 per cent),⁵ and in May 2015 more than third (38 per cent)⁶ of the EU28 population considered migration as one of the main problems of the EU. In 2015 Hungary belonged to the group of countries a higher proportion of whose population considered migration as the main problem than the EU average (43 per cent), though this number was lower than in the case of the Italians (65 per cent), the Estonians and the Germans (54–55 per cent), or the Danes, the Dutch and the Swedes (48–50 per cent).

³ In May http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_first_en.pdf and in September 2015 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2015/2015parlemeter/eb84_1_synthese_analytique_partie_1_migration_en.pdf.

⁴ Standard Eurobarometer 79.5; Summer 2013


⁵ Standard Eurobarometer 82; Autumn 2014

⁶ Standard Eurobarometer 83; Spring 2015

Most of the EU28 population (85 per cent) agreed that “additional measures should be taken to fight illegal immigration of people from outside the EU” and three fourth of them would also support “a common European policy on migration”. Hungary was one of those countries (next to Denmark and Estonia) a higher proportion of whose population supported additional measures to fight illegal migration than the EU average, and a lower proportion of whose population agreed with the concept of a common migration policy than the EU average (*Chart 1.1.1*).

Chart 1.1.1

The proportion of those who agree to have additional efforts to fight illegal migration from outside of the EU and of those who would like to have a common EU migration policy (in the nine countries⁷ with higher-than-average level of Q11, per cent)



Legend: Q11 – In your opinion, should additional measures be taken to fight illegal immigration of people from outside the EU?


Q18.6 – Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it:
A common European policy on migration.

Compared to those supporting the mixed option or the EU-level option (both were preferred by about a third of the EU28 population) less than a fifth of the EU28 population would prefer national level policies to fight illegal migration (*Chart 1.1.2*).

⁷ In the following Charts we use the country codes of Eurostat. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Country_codes

Chart 1.1.2

The proportion of those who would prefer EU- or national level policies to fight illegal migration from outside of the EU (in the nine countries with higher-than-average level of Q11, per cent)




Legend: The three items to answer Q11 are as follows: Q11.1 – Yes, preferably at an EU level; Q11.2 – Yes, preferably at a national level; Q11.3 – Yes, at both levels. The proportion of “no answer” and “do not know” is the empty space above the top of the columns.

Among the nine countries with above-than-average agreement to fight illegal migration, Hungary—together with Greece, Cyprus, Portugal and Italy—would prefer more freedom to develop national policies.

As for the attitudes towards various groups of migrants, Hungary belongs to the group of those countries with above-the-average (40 per cent of the EU28 population) negative attitudes towards migrants from other EU countries (*Chart 1.1.3*).

Chart 1.1.3

The proportion of those with negative attitudes towards migrants from other EU countries (in the nine countries with higher-than-average level of Q10.1, per cent)




Legend: The question (Q10.1) reads like this: Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you: Immigration of people from other EU Member States. “- -” very negative, “-” negative. The proportion of positive attitudes, “no answer” and “do not know” is the empty space above the top of the columns.

Though above the EU28 average (40 per cent), the Hungarian public has less negative attitudes towards migrants from fellow EU countries than the Czechs, the Cypriots, the Slovaks, the Italians, and the Latvians.

The average rejection of migrants from outside the EU is stronger in the EU28 countries (56 per cent of the EU28 population has negative attitudes towards them) (Chart 1.1.4).

Chart 1.1.4

The proportion of those with negative attitudes towards migrants from countries outside of the EU (in the ten countries with higher-than-average level of Q10.2, per cent)



Legend: The question (Q10.2) reads like this: Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you: Immigration of people from outside the EU. “- -” very negative, “-” negative. The proportion of positive attitudes, “no answer” and “do not know” is the empty space above the top of the columns.

Hungary again is part of the group of countries with a higher than above-the-average level of negative attitudes but is not among those with the highest level (the Czechs, the Greeks, the Latvians, and the Slovaks).

To sum up, in May 2015 the Hungarian public was sensitive to the migration problem, had negative attitudes to migrants both from inside and outside of the EU. Moreover, Hungarians strongly support anti-illegal migration measures, and while they are not against common EU migration policies, they at the same time prefer to have more elbow room at national level.


1.1.2 PUBLIC OPINION ON MIGRATION POLICY – SEPTEMBER 2015

Unsurprisingly by September 2015 almost half (47 per cent) of the EU28 population considered migration as one of the biggest problems⁸ the European Union faces, and Hungary was one of the countries whose population considered immigration as the highest problem of the EU (*Map 1.1.1*).

⁸ Next to unemployment (49%) and terrorism (26%).

Map 1.1.1

The proportion of those considering immigration as one of the main challenges of the EU and its Member States (per cent)



Note: The question (Q29) reads like this: In your opinion, what are the main challenges facing the EU and its Member States in the future? Firstly? And secondly? And thirdly? Immigration. Detailed data in Annex 1.1 (Chart Ann1.1.1).

Immigration as the biggest problem was mentioned in the highest proportion in Malta (83 per cent), followed by the Czech Republic, Italy, Hungary, and Estonia. The portion of the population that considered immigration as a major issue was the lowest in Portugal, and it was below the EU28 average in France, Croatia and Spain as well.

Compared to 2013 the biggest increase of immigration-awareness was in the Czech Republic (+58), closely followed by Italy and Hungary (+57), as well as Germany (+48), Malta (+47), Slovakia (+46), and Estonia (+45). There are no countries where this proportion has not increased, but the smallest change was found in Portugal (+11), France (+12), Belgium, Cyprus, and in the United Kingdom (+15).

Map 1.1.2 shows the distribution of the positive and negative attitudes towards migrants among the EU28 countries.

On average 56 per cent and 51 per cent of the population of the EU28 says that the presence of nationals from other Member States and legal migrants from outside of the EU is good for the economy of their country (Annex 1.1, Chart Ann1.1.2 and Ann1.1.3), and 66 per cent of respondents think that migrants increase cultural diversity (Chart Ann1.1.4).

On *Map 1.1.2* we aggregated the country-specific results of these three questions, and found that in the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries the population tend to agree with all three items, and the same is the case in Germany (and in the case of cultural diversity in the Netherlands). The opposite is the case in Central-European countries and Bulgaria where the population tends not to agree with these three items. While in Portugal and in Greece the economic benefits of legal migrants (irrespective of their origin) is denied, in the Baltic countries and in Poland, and in some Southern-European countries (Slovenia, Croatia and Romania) only legal migrants from outside the EU are seen as economically disadvantageous.


Map 1.1.3 shows how citizens in the EU28 perceive four EU initiatives attempting to cope with the problem of migration. On average two third to three fourth of the EU28 population agrees with these policies.

There is no EU28 country where the population would agree significantly above the average with all four questions,⁹ the most positive attitudes towards EU policies were found in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands followed by Greece, Cyprus and Belgium. The strongest rejections characterised the Czech Republic and Slovakia followed by Estonia, Poland and Romania. Hungary belongs to the group of countries disagreeing with one of the EU immigration policies (in the case of Hungary this is “better distribution of asylum seekers”, Annex 1.1, Chart Ann1.1.7).

⁹ Neither do we find countries with both higher and below the average values.

Map 1.1.2


The proportion of those with positive attitudes towards immigrants in EU28 countries (per cent)



Note: The columns indicate the significantly higher-than-average and the lower-than-average values. In case of countries where none of the three questions deviate from average significantly no column is shown. Detailed data and the questions are in Annex 1.1 (Chart Ann1.1.2 – Ann1.1.4).

Map 1.1.3

The number of significantly higher- (variants of blue) and lower-than-average (variants of orange) attitudes towards the EU policies towards migrants/asylum seekers




Note: The colours indicate the number of significantly higher-than-average and lower-than-average values. Countries where none of the four questions deviate from the average significantly are coloured green. Detailed data and the questions are in Annex 1.1 (Chart Ann1.1.5 – Ann1.1.8)

1.1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF REFUSAL AND ACCEPTANCE

If we arrange into rank order of perception the importance of immigration as the biggest problem of the EU and add to it the cumulative perceptions towards immigrants and EU-policies we find that (1) the rank order of cumulative acceptance of migrants and that of cumulative positive attitudes towards EU immigration policies are usually rather similar, and that (2) there is no clear association between these two attitudes and the perception of immigration as the greatest challenge for the EU (Chart 1.1.5).

Chart 1.1.5 The rank order of cumulative positive attitudes towards common EU immigration policies and immigrants by the importance of migration as the main problem of the EU




Note: The non-cumulative results are in Annex 1.1 (Chart Ann1.1.9 and Chart Ann1.1.10).

The rank order of the countries with regards to the cumulative value of acceptance of migrants and of attitudes towards common EU immigration policies are arranged in increasing order of the perception of the importance of migration for the EU (Q29). The lower value indicates positive attitudes and higher perception of importance.

Focusing only on the association between the two types of attitudes (Chart 1.1.6) we find that there is a positive correlation between and add it the cumulative perceptions towards immigrants and EU-policies: more tolerant countries are more likely to accept EU initiatives as well, and vice versa.

Chart 1.1.6

The correlation between attitudes toward common EU immigration policies and immigrants



Note: The x and y axes indicate the rank order of a particular country among the EU28 countries. The lower value shows a positive attitude toward common EU immigration policies and acceptance of immigrants.

The lowest ranking countries in both dimensions (i.e. where the population is dominantly tolerant and cooperative) are Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and Luxemburg. On the other pole of the typology there are, however, very different constellations:

- ❖ The Czech Republic and Slovakia constitute the clear opposite of the group of tolerant and cooperative countries,
- ❖ Hungary and Bulgaria with intolerant populations who are, however, not strongly opposed to EU immigration policies, and
- ❖ Greece and Cyprus with intolerant populations very much in favour of the common EU immigration policies.

ANNEX 1.1 COMPLEMENTARY DATA FOR CHAPTER 1.1

Chart Ann1.1.1 The proportion of those considering immigration as one of the main challenges of the EU and its Member States




Chart Ann1.1.2 The proportion of those agreeing that “The economy needs migrants from the EU”




Chart Ann1.1.3 The proportion of those agreeing with the statement “The economy needs migrants from outside the EU”




Chart Ann1.1.4 The proportion of those agreeing that “EU migrants increase cultural diversity”




Chart Ann1.1.5 The proportion of those agreeing that “More decisions should be made at EU level”




Chart Ann1.1.6 The proportion of those agreeing that “Binding quotas should be used to distribute migrants”




Chart Ann1.1.7 The proportion of those agreeing that “The asylum seekers should be better distributed”






Chart Ann1.1.8 The proportion of those agreeing that “More financial support should be provided for border control”



Source of Charts Ann1.1.1 to Ann1.1.8: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2015/2015parlemeter/eb84_1_synthese_analytique_partie_1_migration_en.pdf

Chart Ann1.1.9


The rank order of acceptance of immigrants by the importance of migration as the main problem of the EU



Note: The rank order of the countries with regards to acceptance of migrants (Q34.3, 35.1, 35.2) arranged by increasing order of the importance of migration for the EU (Q29). The lower value indicates acceptance and importance.

Chart Ann1.1.10

The rank order of positive attitudes towards common EU immigration policies by the importance of migration as the main problem of the EU



Note: The rank order of the countries with regards to pro- or against common immigration EU policies (Q31, 32, 33.1, 33.2) arranged by increasing order of the importance of migration for the EU (Q29). The lower value indicates positive attitudes.

1.2 MIGRATION-RELATED FEAR AND SCAPEGOATING – COMPARATIVE APPROACH IN THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES BY BORI SIMONOVITS

1.2.1 INTRODUCTION

Scapegoating and rejecting the idea of “open society” are central elements of xenophobia. The different aspects—general and more specific—elements of fear connected to asylum seekers and migrants are also worth analysing in today’s Europe, especially in light of the recent terror attacks worldwide.¹⁰

Welfare chauvinism¹¹ refers to the concept according to which welfare benefits should be restricted to certain groups, particularly to the natives of a country, as opposed to immigrants.¹² The idea of “welfare services should be restricted to our own” has a great impact on public opinion and on asylum policy as well. In the first wave of the present survey a set of items has been developed in order to measure the different elements of fear, as well as the perceived threat according to which immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees pose a serious danger to the country’s welfare system.

1.2.2 FEAR, SCAPEGOATING, AND WELFARE CHAUVINISM IN THE REGION

As our initial plan was to analyse fear factors separately from welfare chauvinism, we grouped the eight statements that were used in all Visegrad countries to measure levels of fear and welfare chauvinism (also connected to symbolic and realistic threats¹³) in relation to immigration during August and October 2015 (*Table 1.2.1*).

¹⁰ It has to be emphasised, however, that this part of the fieldwork was carried out before the Paris terror attack (13 November 2015) in all the examined countries.

¹¹ In recent empiric research not only the economic aspect of welfare chauvinism has been assessed but the social and cultural aspects as well. See for example the development of the DERE index on right wing extremism more information on this can be found at: <http://derexindex.eu/>. In this broader context therefore all together three items were aimed to assess the attitudes on welfare chauvinism in our questionnaire.

¹² The term was first used by Jørgen Goul Andersen and Tor Bjørklund in Denmark and Norway in the 1990s.

¹³ See more on the idea of symbolic and realistic threat in Chapter 1.5 of the present paper.

Table 1.2.1
Elements of fear and welfare
chauvinism

Rather abstract fear	Rather realistic fear	Elements of welfare chauvinism
Interacting with immigrants makes me uneasy	Immigrants cause an increase in crimes	Immigrants take jobs from people who are already here
Immigration in our country is out of control	I worry that immigrants may spread unusual diseases	With increased immigration I fear that our way of life will change for the worse
	I am afraid that in case of war or political tension immigrants will be loyal to their country of origin	I am afraid that our own culture will be lost with the increase in immigration


Chart 1.2.1 shows the different levels of fear in the examined four countries. Apparently the level of fear was very high in all examined countries, and it was not in close connection to the number of asylum seekers present in the country at the time of the fieldwork. The only exception to some extent is Poland, where the level of fear, especially in response to the statement “interaction with refugees makes me uneasy”, was considerably lower.

Levels of fear were significantly higher in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic than in Hungary, except for one item related to the control of immigration. In Hungary—where the presence of asylum seekers and refugees was significant all throughout the summer—every second respondent agreed that “immigration in our country is out of control,” whereas this number was 44 per cent in the Czech Republic, 33 per cent in Poland, and 24 per cent in Slovakia.

The proportion of those agreeing with the two more specific fears—the one connected to the increase in crimes and the other to the spread of diseases—varied to a large extent by country. The statement connected to the threat of disloyalty in case of war or political tension was approved by roughly two third of the respondents, except in Poland.

Chart 1.2.1


The different levels of fear in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary; the proportion of those who 'totally' or 'rather' agree that... (N = cca 1000, per cent)



The level of welfare chauvinism was assessed from an economic, cultural and social perspective. (See the specific items and the rankings by country in *Chart 1.2.2*)

Chart 1.2.2

The level of the different aspects of welfare chauvinism in the Visegrad countries: the proportion of those who 'totally' or 'rather' agree that... (per cent)



The level of fear connected to welfare chauvinism was the highest in the Czech Republic and the lowest in Poland. The data from Slovakia and Hungary show almost the same results. The ranking of the different aspects is the same in all countries except for Poland: while the threat

connected to the way of life (social aspect) was perceived to be the largest, the threat connected to labour shortage (economic aspect) was the lowest in Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic as well.

1.2.3 HOW DIFFERENT TYPES OF FEARS CONCERNING MIGRATION ARE RELATED TO EACH OTHER? THE HUNGARIAN CASE

Although our initial plan was to analyse fear factors separately from welfare chauvinism, the analysis of the empirical data proved the separation of these two latent factors impossible.¹⁴

As a second step we did a principal component analysis of seven statements, having dropped one of the elements measuring fear (“Immigration in our country is out of control”).¹⁵ The principal component analysis verified that the fear items in our analysis are strongly interrelated, so that the principal component derived from the seven varieties describes the perceived fear well (the explained variance of the 7-item principal component was 69 per cent). The principal component of fear thus derived contains strongly all items; the communality of the individual items can be found in the Annex 1.2 (see Table Ann1.2.2).

Once we have verified that the theoretical concept¹⁶ and the “fear elements” based on previous research experience are strongly related (although they measure different aspects of fear and welfare chauvinism), we have created a combined index whose values are between 0 and 7, where the larger the value the stronger the fear.¹⁷ The average of the combined “perceived fear” among those who had answered all seven questions was 3.7; we must however emphasise the fact that the index contains answers from only those who on the scale of six picked “agree strongly” or “agree,” those who picked “somewhat agree,” because of the skewed distribution of the answer categories, were not counted (see Annex 1.2, Table Ann1.2.1).

The averages of the “fear index” can be found in Table Ann1.2.3 of the Annex 1.2 (and the explained variance belonging to them) by the most important explanatory variables. In the

¹⁴ Running a factor analysis (ML) on 9 statements did not verify the presence of either two or three latent factors, even after dropping items of low communalities and rotating. The analysis of the data made it clear that “all variables depend on a single factor,” and the fitting factor structures were not satisfying.

¹⁵ We had to leave out from our analysis the variable because of its low communality (0.24), as this low value indicates that we could not capture well the information content of the originally measured variable with the principal component.

¹⁶ The specific questions were worked out by members of the research team within the CEORG research cooperation.

¹⁷ We only calculated the combined index in the case of respondents who gave substantial answers to all seven questions, thus the number of elements dropped to 753 persons.

following we will draw conclusions from the means analysis of the combined index of perceived fear.

The Socio-Demographic Background

Among the basic socio-demographic variables it is the respondent's region of residence that shows the strongest correlation with his or her perceived fear: while respondents living in regions where the likelihood of encountering migrants was higher during the period preceding the gathering of data (Central Hungary, Southern Great Plain, Southern Transdanubia)¹⁸ indicated greater levels of fear, those living in regions with less likelihood of encountering migrants (Western Transdanubia, Northern Great Plain) perceived fear related to migrants were below the national average. There was no significant correlation found between types of settlement and the combined fear index. However, so much was clear that respondents living in Budapest indicated higher levels of perceived fear than the average.

Besides regional effects it is worth mentioning the effects educational level and age group. As well known in attitudinal studies on minority-majority relations, while higher levels of education were correlated with lower levels of fear (with an average of 2.9 among those with a college degree), among respondents with a lower than average level of education indicated levels of fear were significantly higher than average (3.9 in the case of respondents with a maximum of 8 years of elementary education, and 4.0 in the case of those with a vocational school education). In the combined fear index, we find significant differences between genders: women in average perceive a higher level of fear than men (3.9 and 3.5 respectively).

Political Participation and Party Preference

With regards to political activity we can say on the one hand that among non-voters the level of perceived fear was higher (4.4), and on the other that among those unwilling to say which party they would vote for the level of perceived fear was significantly lower (2.9) in the Fall of 2015. Moreover, Fidesz and Jobbik sympathisers perceive a significantly higher level of fear with regards to migrants than the average (4.3 and 4.4 respectively). Among left wing parties, because of their low level of popular support, we only have workable data on MSZP support-

¹⁸ These numbers might first seem to be unusually high: perhaps they are related to the fact that in the beginning of August the government announced the building of two temporary reception centers in Martonfa (Baranya county) és Sormás (Zala county).

ers: sympathisers of the strongest left wing party indicated significantly lower levels of fear concerning immigration than the average (3.0).

The Effect of “Social Contact”

Speaking about the role of social contact in the interaction between minority and majority is inevitable in our view. (On the contact hypothesis see Allport, 1954.) On the analysed questionnaires we measured whether the respondent has come into contact with migrants in two ways. Interestingly, the two different types of contact had strong effects on indicators of xenophobia, but in contrary directions. Those who had come into contact with migrants, refugees or asylum seekers in the 12 months period prior to the data gathering were more dismissive towards them, as well as indicated higher levels of fear than average. (For more details see: Bernát et al., 2015.)

At the same time those who personally know any kind of a migrant person indicated less than half (1.7) of the average combined level of fear (3.7): i.e. out of the seven different statements related to fear they expressed a strong agreement in less than two cases on average. Similarly to our previous results,¹⁹ this finding has confirmed on this representative sample the thesis of the contact hypothesis according to which personal contact decreases the level of perceived xenophobia, whether we measure it through social distance, or perceived fear.

1.2.4 CONCLUSION

In this paper we have shown the different types of fear related to immigration, and mapped their structure by dimension diminishing methods: the failure of factor analysis and the success of principal component analysis have shown that the rejection of the idea of an open society, in which scapegoating takes a central role, as well as fear ridden welfare chauvinism are strongly related, and are inseparable in people’s minds. Fears regarding immigration can be explained by the same social and demographic variables (level of education, region of residence, age) as those explaining xenophobia; the main difference is in the explanatory power of age and party preference. While gender does not affect whether someone is found to be a xenophobe or a xenophile, in the combined fear index women on average perceive higher levels of fear than men, especially in responding to questions related to anxiety. As far as party

¹⁹ We have conducted similar research on a 3000 sample in 2011. For details see: Sik–Simonovits, 2012; Simonovits–Szalai, 2013. See also Dencső–Sik, 2007.

preference goes we can say that while being an MSZP supporter lessens the likelihood of someone being a xenophile (see the multi-variable model in Chapter 1.3), MSZP supporters also perceived less fear on average concerning immigration in the fall of 2015. Being politically inactive, however, increases the chance of someone being both a xenophobic and having higher levels of fear concerning immigration.

ANNEX 1.2 COMPLEMENTARY DATA FOR CHAPTER 1.2

Table Ann1.2.1 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? ($N = 1003$, per cent)

	Disagree strongly	Disagree	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree	Agree strongly	Don't answer	Don't know	Total
Immigration in our country is out of control (a)	3	8	13	19	22	31	0	3	100
Immigrants cause increase in crimes (b)	7	9	15	24	18	20	0	8	100
Immigrants take jobs from people who are here already (c)	9	10	15	21	16	24	0	5	100
Interacting with immigrants makes me uneasy (d)	11	9	12	17	17	22	1	11	100
I worry that immigrants may spread unusual diseases (e)	4	8	9	19	19	41	0	1	100
I am afraid that in case of war or political tension immigrants will be loyal to their country of origin (f)	2	5	8	19	24	38	0	5	100
With increased immigration I fear that our way of life will change for the worse (g)	4	6	11	21	22	33	0	3	100
I am afraid that our own culture will be lost with increase in immigration (i)	8	10	13	19	20	26	0	5	100

Note: CEORG questions; asked also in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland.

Table Ann1.2.2
Communalities of the
principal component
analysis

	Communalities
Immigrants cause increase in crimes (b)	0.708
Immigrants take jobs from people who are here already (c)	0.661
Interacting with immigrants makes me uneasy (d)	0.610
I worry that immigrants may spread unusual diseases (e)	0.744
I am afraid that in case of war or political tension immigrants will be loyal to their country of origin (f)	0.663
With increased immigration I fear that our way of life will change for the worse (g)	0.768
I am afraid that our own culture will be lost with increase in immigration (i)	0.687

Table Ann1.2.3 Average of the fear index (0–7) by selected socio-demographic indicators (average, *N* and standard deviation)

	Average	<i>N</i>	St deviation
Total	753	3.68	2.71
Level of education			
Elementary school at most	157	3.88	2.70
Vocational school	218	4.03	2.64
High school	236	3.68	2.73
College degree	141	2.92	2.68
Sign (F probe)	5.33 (0.001)**		
Age group			
18–27 years old	103	3.5	2.7
28–37 years old	137	4.0	2.7
38–47 years old	140	4.1	2.8
48–57 years old	132	3.5	2.7
58–67 years old	138	3.2	2.7
68–77 years old	73	3.6	2.6
77 years old or older	(30)	4.3	2.5
Sign (F probe)	2.16 (0.045)*		
Gender			
Male	353	3.5	2.7
Female	400	3.9	2.7
Sign (F probe)	4.509 (0.034)*		

continue

	Average	N	St deviation
Personal contact			
Personally know asylum seeker, refugee or migrant	28	1.7	2.1
Do not know Personally know asylum seeker, refugee or migrant	725	3.8	2.7
Sign (F probe)	15.578 (0.000)***		
Have met asylum seeker, refugee or migrant in Hungary in the past 12 month?			
Yes	212	4.3	2.8
No	541	3.5	2.6
Sign (F probe)	13.303 (0.000)***		
Region			
Central Hungary	242	3.9	2.9
Central Trans-Danubia	84	3.4	2.7
Western Trans-Danubia	79	2.4	2.8
Southern Trans-Danubia	60	4.3	2.2
Northern Hungary	78	4.0	2.2
Northern Great Plain	101	3.2	2.6
Southern Great Plain	109	4.2	2.6
Sign (F probe)	5.660 (0.000)***		
Type of settlement			
Budapest	133	4.1	2.4
County seat	273	3.4	2.8
City	209	3.8	2.6
Town	138	3.7	3.0
Sign (F probe)	2.192 (0.088)		
Party preference			
Fidesz voters	224	4.3	2.6
MSZP voters	56	3.0	2.9
Jobbik voters	102	4.4	2.7
Refuse to answer	110	2.9	2.7
Do not know	206	3.7	2.6
Sign (F probe)	7.21 (0.000)***		

continue

	Average	N	St deviation
Political activity			
Would definitely participate at the elections	324	3.9	2.8
Would probably participate at the elections	232	3.1	2.6
Probably would not participate at the elections	54	3.8	2.6
Definitely would not participate at the elections	120	4.4	2.6
Do not know, undecided	(19)	3.2	3.2
Sign (F probe)	7.75 (0.000)***		

(): N is below 30

* Significant relationship according to the F probe ($p < 0.05$)

** Significant relationship according to the F probe ($p < 0.01$)

*** Significant relationship according to the F probe ($p < 0.001$)

1.3 THE SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC BASIS OF XENOPHOBIA IN CONTEMPORARY HUNGARY BY ENDRE SIK


1.3.1 THE LEVEL OF XENOPHOBIA IN HUNGARY (TIME SERIES OF 1992–2016)

The level of xenophobia rose sharply between 1992 and 1995 (*Chart 1.3.1*). This era was followed first by an oscillation period between 1996 and 2001, and a relatively stable period between 2002 and 2011 when the level of xenophobia fluctuated between 24–34 per cent and still the “thinker” attitude²⁰ dominated (57–70 per cent) the scene. Since 2012 the level of xenophobia has been rising at the expense of the “thinker” attitude, but lately (since 2015) the xenophile attitude has also been shrinking. In January 2016 the level of xenophobia reached an all time high, and xenophilia practically disappeared.

²⁰ We call “thinkers” those respondents who select the item: “it depends...”, i.e. they express a need for more information before making their decision, and are inclined to evaluate the pros and the cons.

Chart 1.3.1

The proportion of xenophiles, xenophobes, and "thinkers" in Hungary 1992–2016 (per cent)




Source: TÁRKI Omnibus 1992–2016.

Note: The question asked was the following: "Should Hungary accept asylum seekers... (all of them/ some of them/non of them)?"

As for the three monthly results of our research, in 2015 and 2016 we found that compared to 2014 (the last data before the start of the government's anti-immigration campaign in early 2015 and the first wave of mass immigration from Kosovo in late 2014) the level of xenophobia in April 2015 immediately jumped to a very high level (Chart 1.3.2). This was followed by a period (between July and October) showing a decrease in both xenophobia and xenophilia, and then by a sharp increase in xenophobia and the disappearance of xenophilia in 2016.

Chart 1.3.2

The proportion of xenophiles, xenophobes, and “thinkers” in Hungary 2014–2016 (per cent)



Source: TÁRKI Omnibus 2014–2016.

The high level of xenophobia in April 2015 did not come as a surprise since in the beginning of 2015 the government launched a nationwide heavy handed anti-immigration campaign, among other things, scapegoating migrants for the Paris terror attack in January (see also Bernáth–Messing, 2015), followed by the government’s “national consultation” and poster campaigns.²¹ In Appendix 1. we illustrate the main messages of these campaigns, e.g. immigration and terrorism walk hand in hand, migrants are likely to cause job losses for the native population and an increase in levels of crime.

Since the anti-immigration campaign continued after April 2015 and also large masses of migrants/asylum seekers started to cross Hungary, we assumed that the level of xenophobia would further increase – but we were wrong. The unforeseen simultaneous decrease of xenophobia and xenophilia in July and October 2015 therefore need explanation. We assume that since migrants in large numbers crossed the border on a daily basis after May 2015, and both this flow as well as the government’s and the civil society’s reactions to it became highly visible in the media, the attitude of the population shifted towards that of a “thinker”, i.e. since the

²¹ Preparations for the national consultation campaign already started in March, and the results were published in July. The poster campaign started in June 2015. Since late spring 2015 the main target of the new anti-immigration campaign has been the compulsory migrant quota system.


migrants are present but neither constitute an actual threat nor intend to stay, a consequently more subtle evaluation might have become desirable. In other words, both radical options (xenophobia and xenophilia) somewhat lost their credibility. Moreover, the slow and bureaucratic EU actions and the debates following them also gave ammunition to the “thinkers” whose proportion consequently increased at the expense of the two extreme alternatives.²²

Since October 2015, however, because of the fence built along the southern border of Hungary, the inflow of migrants into Hungary has ceased, yet at the same time the government’s anti-immigrant campaign is still going strong (with the second Paris terrorist attack supplying the campaign with new ammunition); it is therefore not surprising that by 2016 the “thinkers” lost to the xenophobes, and the xenophiles all but disappeared.

When focusing on the “thinkers” we found that their overwhelming majority would not allow any asylum seeking group to enter Hungary with the exception of ethnic Hungarians from Ukraine, and—except for Albanians from Kosovo and ethnic Hungarians from Ukraine (Transcarpathia)—the rate of their rejection significantly increased between October 2015 and January 2016 (*Chart 1.3.3*).

Chart 1.3.3

The proportion of those “thinkers” who would allow migrants to enter Hungary by their origin (October 2015 and January 2016, per cent)



²² This hypothesis is reinforced by the data from the Eurobarometer September 2015 (Annex 1.5 of the preliminary report Bernát et al., 2015), which shows that in September social distance based xenophobia and policy sensitive “thinking” simultaneously characterised the public opinion in Hungary.

1.3.2 THE SOCIAL BASIS OF XENOPHOBIA AND XENOPHILIA

The following two models were developed to answer the question: "What are the social bases of xenophobia and xenophilia?" (Table 1.3.1)

Table 1.3.1 The model of xenophobia and xenophilia

	Xenophilia, pseudo R-square = 19%		Xenophobia, pseudo R-square = 7%	
	Odds ratio	Level of significance	Odds ratio	Level of significance
Political parties				
Fidesz	0.21	0.000	1.54	0.000
Jobbik	0.14	0.000	2.43	0.000
MSZP	0.56	0.05		
Democratic Coalition			0.46	0.002
Political activity				
Would not vote in the next election			1.83	0.000
Would vote in the next election	1.56	0.02		
Place of residence				
Major city (county seats)	0.41	0.003	1.35	0.007
Northern Hungary	0.29	0.003	0.55	0.006
Western Hungary	2.48	0.004		
Southeastern Hungary	0.32	0.008		
Education				
University	3.48	0.002	0.39	0.001
Primary school			1.76	0.002
Vocational school			1.59	0.004
Wave				
April 2015	1.55	0.03	1.40	0.001
January 2016	0.20	0.000	1.87	0.000
Age				
18–28 years old	0.46	0.04		
65– years old	0.58	0.04		
Roma	1.85	0.05		
Intends to emigrate	2.17	0.05		
Visits church on a weekly basis			0.69	0.000
Fears economic deterioration of the household			1.26	0.05

Note: Pooled database of four waves between April 2015 and January 2016, $N = 3628$, logistic regression. The table shows only independent variables with significant odds ratios. Reference values are: region: Central Hungary, settlement: village, age: 75– years old, education: upper vocational education, wave July 2015.

Political affiliation and activity have a strong impact on xenophobia and xenophilia:

- ❖ being the potential voter of a nationalist/rightwing party (and especially of Jobbik) increases the probability of xenophobia and reduces the probability of xenophilia significantly,
- ❖ being a potential voter of the two leftwing parties has a less strong but still significant impact: MSZP sympathisers are less likely to be xenophiles, and DK sympathisers less likely to be xenophobes,
- ❖ while potential non-voters tend to be xenophobes, potential voters are just the opposite.

Place of residence has a strong impact on xenophobia and xenophilia as well:

- ❖ living in a major city that is the centre of local power (but not in Budapest) increases the probability of being a xenophobe and decreases the probability of turning into a xenophile,
- ❖ while living in Northern Hungary is likely to make you a “thinker,” being a resident in Western Hungary (only temporarily affected by the migration flow and with a lasting experience of commuting migration to Austria) increases, being an inhabitant of Southeastern Hungary (the most and longest involved region of mass migration) decreases the likelihood of xenophilia.

As for education, having a university diploma makes you likely to be a xenophile and inhibits you from becoming a xenophobe; on the other hand a lower level of education increases the probability of one becoming a xenophobe.

The first shock (i.e. the first wave in April 2015) decreased the probability of one becoming a “thinker” since it increased the probability of both extreme attitudes. The last period of our research, however, shows xenophobia winning over xenophilia, i.e. the probability of xenophobia significantly increased, and that of xenophilia decreased.

As for the remaining strong socio-demographic impacts: while being young and old decreases, being Roma or planning to emigrate from Hungary increases the probability of xenophilia; at the same time while being religious decreases, fear increases the likelihood of xenophobia.

1.3.3 CONCLUSION

To sum up, compared to 2014 (the last data before the start of the government's anti-immigration campaign in early 2015 and the first wave of mass immigration from Kosovo in late 2014) the level of xenophobia in April 2015 immediately jumped to a very high level. This was followed by a period (between July and October) showing a decrease in both xenophobia and xenophilia, and then by a sharp increase in xenophobia and the disappearance of xenophilia: in January 2016 the level of xenophobia reached an all time high, and xenophilia practically disappeared. When focusing on "thinkers" (respondents who would need for more information before making their decision, and are inclined to evaluate the pros and the cons) we found that their overwhelming majority would not allow any asylum seeking group to enter Hungary with the exception of ethnic Hungarians from Ukraine, and—except for Albanians from Kosovo and ethnic Hungarians from Ukraine (Transcarpathia)—the rate of their rejection significantly increased between October 2015 and January 2016.

As for the social bases of xenophobia and xenophilia we found that being the potential voter of a nationalist/rightwing party (and especially of Jobbik) increases the probability of xenophobia and reduces the probability of xenophilia significantly and while potential non-voters tend to be xenophobes, potential voters are just the opposite. Living in a major city (in a county seat) increases the probability of being a xenophobe and decreases the probability of turning into a xenophile and being an inhabitant of Southeastern Hungary (the most and longest involved region of mass migration) decreases the likelihood of xenophilia. Having a university diploma makes you likely to be a xenophile and inhibits you from becoming a xenophobe; on the other hand a lower level of education increases the probability of one becoming a xenophobe.

1.4 REASONS FOR FLIGHT: DOES IT MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

BY DANIELLA BODA AND BORIS SIMONOVITS

With regards to the refugee crisis one of the key questions is where all these people are coming from and why? The public has always been interested in knowing why refugees have left their country of origin, whether they have done so on well-founded grounds, such as fear of persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality, or being members of a particular social group, or having certain political opinions. Presumably people are more tolerant with asylum seekers who are escaping from war-zones, as they can be easily seen as people in extreme deprivation.

1.4.1 REASONS FOR REFUSAL: COMPARATIVE RESULTS FROM OCTOBER 2015 AND JANUARY 2016

Chart 1.4.1 shows attitudes and changes in attitudes towards asylum seekers' different reasons for flight, in the order of how welcomed a given group is. It is clear that respondents made a clear distinction both in October 2015 and January 2016 between those on the one hand who had left their country due to war or civil war, or had fled due to hunger or natural catastrophe, or with the aim of family reunion, and on the other hand those claiming asylum for other reasons (such as being part of an oppressed ethnic, national or religious minority); the level of acceptance of this second group is lower. In the case of those who have left their home country due to lack of work, the percentage of acceptance is very low, which means the great majority of the Hungarian adult population is not welcoming towards them at all, in line with both the Hungarian government and the European Union's current asylum policy.


Furthermore, it is clear that welcoming attitudes dropped dramatically between October 2015 and January 2016, in most cases by half, regardless of whether the refugees' reason for flight was war or religion. While in October 2015 more than half (52 per cent) of the population would have accepted asylum seekers who left their country due to war or civil war, in January only one third (34 per cent) of the population had a welcoming attitude towards them. The numbers are similar in the case of hunger and natural catastrophe as well (where the level of acceptance dropped from 50 to 35 per cent), and family reunion (from 48 to 38 per cent.) Moreover, the level of acceptance in the case of being persecuted due to one's ethnic or national origin dropped by half, from 33 to 17 per cent, as well as in the case of being persecuted due to one's political activity (from 27 to 13 per cent). The level of acceptance in the case of lack of work was almost non-existent in January 2016 (only 5 per cent), while in October it was

twice as high: 10 per cent. (This is perfectly in line with the Hungarian government and the European Union's current asylum policy.)

In the first wave (October 2015), there was a separate item for Islamic State as a cause for leaving, in which case 35 per cent of the population was welcoming. In the second wave (January 2016), religious affiliation was divided into two separate questions (Christians and Muslims) in order to see if there is a difference in response to each. While roughly every fourth (23 per cent) of the respondents would welcome asylum seekers who are being persecuted due to belonging to a Christian sect, only 9 per cent responded positively in the case of Muslims (Chart 1.4.1).

Chart 1.4.1

Acceptance of different reasons for flight, in order of being welcomed (From among the asylum seekers, should Hungary admit those...? answered "yes", in per cent)



1.4.2 THE SOCIAL PREDICTORS OF REFUSING ASYLUM SEEKERS ON MULTIPLE GROUNDS

With two so-called levels of refusal indices (based on the October 2015 and the January 2016 surveys) we measured the average number of the rejected *reasons for flight*, by selected socio-demographic indicators. The indices contain all of the items except for lack of work, as it is not a legitimate basis for an asylum claim. With the two indices of the same range (0 to 7 scale), a comparison could be made between the attitudes surveyed in October and in January; however, the items included in the indices were not identical. Based on the comparison of the average in the analysis presented in Annex 4, Table Ann1.4.1 and Table Ann1.4.2, we have created a profile on more welcoming people as well as on those less welcoming towards asylum seekers with different reasons for flight.

The following set of socio-demographic indicators were tested in both waves whether they have an effect on attitudes toward asylum seekers, refugees and migrants or not: level of education, age, gender, personal contact with asylum seekers/refugees/migrants, whether one met them or not, region, type of settlement, party preference, and political activity.


In October 2015, the level of education played a significant role in refusing attitudes: people with a higher educational levels (at least college degree, with the average index points of 3.6 out of 7) were more welcoming than people with elementary, vocational or high school degrees (total average on the index: 4.2). But this difference disappeared in January, which means level of education lost its effect on attitudes toward asylum seekers, refugees and migrants.

Region as a socio-demographic indicator was significant in both waves, as well as type of settlement. People who living in Western Trans-Danubia are the most welcoming based on the survey of October 2015 (in average, they rejected only 3.6 reasons for flight), while people living in Northern Hungary are the most refusing, with an average level of 4.9 rejected reasons.

Based on the January data, the least refusing group lives in the Northern Great Plain, with index points of 4.5 (which is almost one point higher than in October), and the most refusing population lives in Central Trans-Danubia (index points: 5.9 compared to 4.9 in October). Type of settlement had an effect as well in both waves: people from small towns were less refusing in October, with 3.8 points of refusal on average, while in January this average slightly increased to 4.2. This trend was visible in January also; in January, however, the level increased by more than one point, from 3.8 to 5.2, which is much closer to the average (5.4 refused reasons for flight).


What should be highlighted here is the reverse effect of the two types of personal contacts measured by the survey. While those who met some kind of migrants (asylum seekers, refugees or migrants) in the past 12 months reject a significantly higher number of reasons than people who did not meet any of them (averages from the first wave: 4.7 rejected reasons in the case of those who met an asylum seeker, refugee or migrant, compared to 4.1 in the case of those who did not). In January, both groups of people refused a significantly higher number of reasons; the trend, however, was the same: those who met asylum seekers, refugees or migrants refused more reasons (5.65 compared to 5.27 who did not meet any migrants) (*Chart 1.4.2*).

Chart 1.4.2
Level of refusal by
“encounter of migrants”
(average on the 0–7 index)



With another question attitudes were surveyed based on personal knowledge of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants, and levels changed dramatically between October 2015 and January 2016. Those who personally knew refugees, rejected on average only 1.67 reasons; this number, however, more than doubled in January (4.53), which is a surprising degree of difference. However, only a small difference was measured in the case of those who do not know anyone personally (*Chart 1.4.3*).

Chart 1.4.3
Level of refusal by personal
acquaintance (average on
the 0–7 index)




It has to be mentioned, however, that the proportion of those who personally know migrants was very low (3 per cent of the sample in October 2015, and 4 per cent in January 2016), while the proportion of those who met some kind of migrants in the past 12 months was surprisingly high (24 per cent in October and 27 per cent in January), suggesting that people interpreted this question broadly.²³

In January we also asked if the respondents personally know any Africans, Chinese people or Arabs who live in Hungary. The proportion of those Hungarians who know Africans (5.6 per cent) and Arabs (8.3 per cent) are quite low compared to those who know Chinese people. (19.7 per cent). The averages of refused causes for flight have analysed, there is clearly a significant difference between those who know and those who do not know any Africans, Chinese people and Arabs. Those who know anybody from the mentioned groups tend to be more welcoming toward asylum seekers, refugees and migrants. People who have contact with Africans, refuse only 4,6 reasons for flight, while those who do not have contact with them, refuse significantly higher number of causes: 5.4. This trend seems to be true for the other groups as well, those who know Chinese people refuse 4.9 causes, and those who are in contact with Arabs, reject 4.7 reasons (*Chart 1.4.4*).

Chart 1.4.4


Level of refusal by personal acquaintance with Africans, Chinese people and Arabs (average on the 0–7 index)



²³ Presumably even those who only “saw” or “passed by” migrants in the past year answered “yes” to this question.

Political activity and party preference was analysed both in October and January. Political activity did not have a significant effect on attitudes either in the first or in the second wave. On the other hand, party preference did have an effect, and the effect increased in January for every group. Both in October and January, MSZP voters were the most welcoming, while Jobbik voters and Fidesz voters had very similar averages for refused number of reasons for flight, one significantly higher than for MSZP voters (*Chart 1.4.5*).

Chart 1.4.5
Level of refusal based on
party preference (average on
the 0–7 index, $N = 422$)



Finally, we analysed of how the above mentioned reasons correlate with each other. (Lack of work as a reason for leaving one's country was but back into the analysis to see how it connects to other reasons.) The strongest correlation is between "hunger and natural catastrophes" and "due to war or civil war" as a reason for flight, which means that those welcoming towards asylum seekers, refugees or migrants from countries where there is (civil) war, are welcoming towards those from countries afflicted by hunger or natural catastrophes with an even higher probability. "Lack of work" is very weakly connected to the other reasons; which is not surprising, taken into consideration that it is not a legitimate basis for an asylum claim in Hungary.

Most of the items correlate with each other positively and rather strongly. For instance, (civil) war as a reason strongly correlates with all of the other causes, but lack of work and being persecuted due to belonging to a Christian denomination correlate the strongest with ethnic and national origin. Family reunion connects to most of the items only loosely, and correlates the

strongest with (civil) war as a cause. Being persecuted due to belonging to an Islamic sect correlates strongly with most of the items except for hunger and natural catastrophes, and family reunion (Table Ann1.4.2, correlations can be found in Annex 1.4).

1.4.3 CONCLUSION

To sum up, we measured an increased level of refusal in January 2016 as compared to the levels found in October 2015, in line with the increasing levels of xenophobia presented in Chapter 1.3 of the present report.

As far as the socio-demographic predictors are concerned, we found similar relationships as in the cases of xenophobic attitudes, meaning that—out of the examined socio-demographic predictors—place of residence (both *type of settlement* as well as *region*), and party preference all play a significant role in welcoming attitudes (level of education had an effect only in the first wave, but neither gender or age had a statistically significant effect at all). What should be highlighted here is the reverse effect of the two types of personal contacts measured by the survey: those who met some kind of migrants (asylum seekers, refugees or migrants) in the past 12 months reject a significantly higher number of reasons than people who did not meet any. The effects of personal contacts on perceived fear of mass migration is analysed in more detail in Chapter 1.2 and 1.5 of the present report.

Annex 1.4 Complementary Data for Chapter 1.4

Table Ann1.4.1 The number of rejected reasons for flight, by selected socio-demographic indicators (average) October 2015

	Average	N	St deviation
Level of education			
Elementary school at most	4.36	140	2.63
Vocational school	4.53	220	2.47
High school	4.17	266	2.69
College degree	3.64	107	2.59
Total	4.237	733	2.61
Sign (F probe)		0.032	

continue

	Average	N	St deviation
Type of settlement			
County seat	5.17	117	2.07
City	4.26	253	2.64
Town	3.81	217	2.69
Budapest	4.10	146	2.63
Total	4.24	733	2.61
Sign (F probe)	0.000		
Personal contact			
Personally know asylum seeker, refugee or migrant	1.67	(24)	2.20
Do not know Personally know asylum seeker, refugee or migrant	4.32	709	2.58
Total	4.24	733	2.61
Sign (F probe)	0.000		
Have met asylum seeker, refugee or migrant in Hungary in the past 12 month?			
Yes, have met	4.74	200	2.65
Have not met	4.05	532	2.57
Total	4.24	732	2.61
Sign (F probe)	0.001		
Region			
Central Hungary	4.14	244	2.68
Central Trans-Danubia	4.54	65	2.78
Western Trans-Danubia	3.62	76	2.71
Southern Trans-Danubia	4.62	63	2.17
Northern Hungary	4.93	86	2.28
Northern Great Plain	3.81	104	2.58
Southern Great Plain	4.36	95	2.66
Total	4.24	733	2.61
Sign (F probe)	0.014		
Party preference			
Fidesz voters	4.88	225	2.40
MSZP voters	3.28	58	2.71
Jobbik voters	4.66	104	2.43
Total	4.27	441	2.61

Note: Only those indicators are presented whose effect was significant on a 0.05 level.

(): N is below 30.

Table Ann1.4.2 The number of rejected reasons for flight, by selected socio-demographic indicators (average) January 2016

	Average	N	St deviation
Personal contact			
Personally know asylum seeker, refugee or migrant	4.53	30	2.37
Do not know personally asylum seeker, refugee or migrant	5.40	750	1.9
Total	5.37	780	1.93
Sign (F probe)	0.016		
Have met asylum seeker, refugee or migrant in Hungary in the past 12 month?			
Yes	5.65	213	1.99
No	5.27	567	1.90
Total	5.37	780	1.93
Sign (F probe)	0.014		
Region			
Central Hungary	5.45	237	1.99
Central Trans-Danubia	5.87	86	1.64
Western Trans-Danubia	5.69	62	2.01
Southern Trans-Danubia	5.22	77	1.68
Northern Hungary	5.32	104	1.68
Northern Great Plain	4.49	102	2.11
Southern Great Plain	5.59	114	1.95
Total	5.37	782	1.93
Sign (F probe)	0.000		
Type of settlement			
County seat	5.77	114	1.66
City	5.32	269	1.91
Town	5.18	248	1.97
Budapest	5.47	151	2.06
Total	5.37	782	1.93
Sign (F probe)	0.047		
Party preference			
Fidesz voters	5.74	261	1.73
MSZP voters	4.67	60	1.97
Jobbik voters	5.70	101	1.64
Total	5.58	422	1.78
Sign (F probe)	0.000		

Note: Only those indicators are presented whose effect was significant on a 0.05 level.

Table Ann1.4.3 Correlations between the items of reasons for flight (Pearson's R) January 2016

	Civil war	Lack of work	Hunger	Political activity	Christian	Islamic	Ethnicity	Reunion
Civil war	1	0.213	0.546	0.396	0.461	0.314	0.416	0.465
Lack of work	0.213	1	0.251	0.229	0.239	0.315	0.289	0.128
Hunger	0.546	0.251	1	0.240	0.336	0.219	0.415	0.391
Political activity	0.396	0.229	0.240	1	0.408	0.388	0.413	0.255
Christian	0.461	0.239	0.336	0.408	1	0.386	0.477	0.279
Islamic	0.314	0.315	0.219	0.388	0.386	1	0.357	0.188
Ethnicity	0.416	0.289	0.415	0.413	0.477	0.357	1	0.325
Reunion	0.465	0.128	0.391	0.255	0.279	0.188	0.325	1

Note: All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level.

1.5 MASS-MIGRATION RELATED FEAR IN CONTEMPORARY HUNGARY: THE SOCIAL BASIS OF REALISTIC AND SYMBOLIC THREATS BY BORI SIMONOVITS

1.5.1 INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Due to the recent terrorist attacks in Europe²⁴ and worldwide, and the New Year's Eve sexual assaults Europe-wide, but most importantly in Germany²⁵, we devoted a separate block of question on migration related threats in our current survey. Scholars argue (Velasco Gonzalez et al., 2008) that it is worth separating symbolic and realistic threats in relation to migration related attitudes. While *symbolic threats* are based on perceived group differences in values, norms, and beliefs, realistic threats can be understood on the material, economic and political level, and the focus is on competition over material and economic group interests (see more on so-called "integrated threat theory": Stephan-Ybarra-Bachman, 1999). The main idea

²⁴ As the most recently one the effects of Paris terror attack should be mentioned here (13 November 2015), but also a series of terror attacks were committed in Turkey in 2015 (the deadliest one in Turkey's history was committed on 10 October 2015 when at least 95 people were killed and around 250 wounded after two bombings targeted a peace rally in the centre of Ankara), which influenced public opinion in Europe. Source: *The Guardian*, 11 October 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/10/turkey-suicide-bomb-killed-in-ankara>

²⁵ Cologne, Germany: Hundreds of sexual assault charges from New Year's Eve are available online at CNN: <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/10/europe/cologne-germany-new-year-s-eve-charges/>

of the former one (*symbolic threats*)—namely that the out-group (in our case the migrants in Europe) that has a different worldview can be seen as threatening the cultural identity of the in-group (in our case “European culture”)—has a special significance in today’s European context.

The core element in the latter one (realistic threats) is the perceived competition over insufficient resources, whose primary area is the labour market and access to social services, with the perception that these resources are threatened by outsiders (in our case by migrants). We already discussed (see Chapter 1.2 of the present report) that migration related fear and scapegoating was measured to be very high in Hungary as well as in Hungary’s neighbouring countries, despite the low proportion of migrants in these countries compared to that in Western European ones. Focusing on migration related cultural and realistic threats, the two extreme cases in this regard are, interestingly, Slovakia and the Czech Republic (among the four Visegrad countries), the two countries that have not been effected by the recent migration crisis at all.

The research results presented in this paper²⁶ are derived from the second wave of fieldwork carried out in Mid-January, two months after the Paris terror attack (13 November 2015), and right after the series of sexual violations in several German cities on New Year’s Eve. The Hungarian context is totally different from the German one both in terms of the political context (the government’s extreme anti-immigration politics) and in terms of the volume of migration, as since the legal and physical closure of the borders (16 October 2015) hardly any asylum seekers entered Hungary in the last two and half months of 2015 (as opposed to the period of 1 April to 15 September 2015 when at least 170 thousand migrants and asylum seekers crossed the Hungarian borders²⁷).

1.5.2 MEASURING MASS-MIGRATION RELATED FEARS AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION POLICY

Our main goal in the present paper is assessing the level of the perceived migration-related threat and anxiety in today’s Hungary, and examining how the different components of migration related fears and policy related attitudes are linked to each other.

²⁶ Here I want to thank Professor Joseph P. Forgas for consulting us in formulating the hypothesis and operationalising the specific questions, as well as Professor Endre Sik for helping me in setting up the analytical framework.

²⁷ „After Hungary completed a fence on its border with Serbia in September, the flow of migrants shifted to Croatia. In all of 2015, the region recorded 764 000 detections, a 16-fold rise from 2014. The top-ranking nationality was Syrian, followed by Iraqis and Afghans.” Source: FRONTEX. <http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/western-balkan-route/>

As far as mass-migration related fears and anxiety is concerned we aimed to distinguish the two types of threats mentioned above, by using a simple set of anxiety related questions (summarised in Table 1.5.1):

- (1) **Realistic threat:** we used two questions to measure the majority's perceived anxiety related to the volume and irregularity (i.e. being undocumented) of the current migration flow arriving to (i) Hungary and (ii) to Europe. As these two components (volume and irregularity) were asked together, their partial effects cannot be measured here.
- (2) **Symbolic threat:** we also used two separate questions to assess perceived anxiety related to the different cultural and religious background of migrants arriving to (i) Hungary and (ii) to Europe.

Furthermore, we also incorporated three items related to the Hungarian immigration policy. We formulated the statements—partly in line with a German survey²⁸—introducing a set of measures of immigration policy in the spirit of “law and order.”

The set of questions analysed in this paper from the January 2016 survey is summarised below (Table 1.5.1).

Table 1.5.1 Elements of mass migration related fears and attitudes towards tightening immigration policy in Hungary (in the spirit of “law and order”)

Mass-migration related fears		Attitudes towards tightening immigration policy in Hungary (in the spirit of “law and order”)
Realistic threat: volume and irregularity	Symbolic threat: cultural and religious background	
Seeing the great number of undocumented refugees and migrants entering Hungary without control makes me worried.	Seeing the arrival of refugees and migrants to Hungary of cultures and religions that are different from ours makes me worried.	Making the control of the Hungarian borders stricter.
Seeing the great number of undocumented refugees and migrants entering Europe without control makes me worried.	Seeing the arrival of refugees and migrants to Europe of cultures and religions that are different from ours makes me worried.	Introducing a law that would make it compulsory for migrants to respect fundamental Hungarian values.
		Controlling the number of refugees arriving in Hungary by setting an upper limit.

²⁸ See the original questions in ARD Infratest January 2016. Source: <http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2016/januar/>


1.5.3 HOW MASS-MIGRATION RELATED FEARS AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION POLICY INTERACT WITH EACH OTHER

Our hypothesis was that (1) the perceived realistic and symbolic threat related to the current mass-migration on the one hand and (2) attitudes towards policy questions on migration on the other hand could be separated from each other, and two latent factors might be identified.

Chart 1.5.1 indicates that (i) the level of perceived threat is very high in all measured aspects and (ii) the levels of fear are somewhat higher related to the irregularity and volume of the current migration flow (realistic threat: 92–93 per cent) than the level of fear related to the different cultural and religious background of the migrants (level of symbolic threat: 89–90 per cent).

Chart 1.5.1

The different aspects of the perceived threat towards the current migration flow into Europe and Hungary ($N = \text{cca } 980$, per cent)




We also incorporated three items related to the Hungarian immigration policy (*Chart 1.5.2*).

The overwhelming majority of the respondents agreed with the idea of tightening the Hungarian border control (three fourth of the respondents strongly agreed, and one fifth somewhat agreed), the other two statements on “law and order” type of asylum policy was also supported by the great majority of the Hungarian respondents, if a bit less strongly.

Using the German results—also gathered in January 2016,²⁹ right after the sexual assaults on New Year's Eve—as a benchmark, we saw very high rates of approval in both countries in case of both similarly formulated statements on the Hungarian and the German asylum-migration policy. In Germany 75 per cent of the respondents somewhat or strongly agreed with introducing a law that would make respecting German values compulsory; the proportion of those who supported this idea in Hungary's case was even higher (84 per cent). Controlling the number of refugees arriving in Germany/Hungary by setting an upper limit was also supported more strongly by the Hungarians than by the Germans (82 per cent v. 61 per cent respectively).

Chart 1.5.2
Attitudes towards tightening immigration policy in Hungary (in the spirit of "law and order")
(*N* = cca 950, per cent)



As a next step we checked how these items are correlated with each other. The correlation matrix presented in Annex 1.5 (Table Ann1.5.1) summarises the two-way correlations among the 4 anxiety and the 3 immigration policy related items.

- ❖ First of all, it is obvious that there is a strong two-way correlation among all the examined aspects of mass-migration related anxiety.
- ❖ Secondly, not surprisingly we measured even higher correlations between items connected to each other more (differing only in their territorial aspect) compared to those that

²⁹ See: ARD Infratest January 2016. Source: <http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2016/januar/>

measure the different aspects of anxiety towards mass migration (indicated by dark shading in the correlation matrix).

- ❖ Thirdly, we measured weak—though still significant—two-way correlations among the “law and order” type of migration policy related attitudes and mass-migration related anxiety (indicated by light shading in the correlation matrix).
- ❖ Fourthly, items on mass-migration related anxiety (both related to Europe and Hungary) are strongly correlated with attitudes towards policy questions on tightening Hungarian border control.

Based on the results of the correlations it seemed reasonable to carry out a factor analysis to tackle the two different factors behind the examined attitudinal set.³⁰ Though the factor loads were relatively high, and the goodness of fit level of the model met the required criteria, the two separate factors could not be tackled. (The results are presented in the Annex 1.5, Table Ann1.5.2)

Carrying out principal component analyses underlined that the two types of mass-migration related threats are strongly related, and are seldom separable in people’s minds. (The results are presented in the Annex 1.5, Table Ann1.5.3.)

1.5.4 THE SOCIAL BASIS OF REALISTIC AND SYMBOLIC THREATS

Our initial hypothesis was that we will measure higher levels of fears related to the volume of irregular migration flows (*realistic threat*), and that this fear can be separated from that stemming from symbolic threats.

Here we present those multivariable models which we derived from the four interrelated aspects of mass-migration related anxiety. The aim of these models were to further examine our initial hypothesis: is it possible to separate out certain groups that are very worried about the realistic threat (the irregularity and volume) of the current immigration flow, but on the other

³⁰ We decided to focus our further analysis on only 5 statements out of the seven original ones, due to the following two reasons: on the one hand the four statements assessing anxiety towards mass migration measure almost the same idea (this is underlined by the extremely high partial correlations), on the other hand we preferred to focus our analysis on Hungary, therefore it seemed reasonable at this point to exclude the two questions addressing migration at the European level. Therefore, all together five statements—all of them measured on the same Likert scale—were incorporated into the factor analysis.

hand worry less or not at all about its cultural or religious aspects (symbolic threat)? And who are those that worry about both aspects of mass migration to Hungary and Europe?

The four types of groups we have constructed in order to identify different types of threats are as follows:

- ❖ Type 1: worried a lot about the *irregularity and volume* and worry only to a certain extent or not at all about the *cultural or religious aspect* of the current flow of mass migration related to **Hungary**; to be called **“rather worry about the realistic than symbolic threat of migration related to Hungary”** (12.7 per cent of the total population).
- ❖ Type 2: worried a lot about the *irregularity and volume* and worry only to a certain extent or not at all about the *cultural or religious aspect* of the current flow of mass migration related to **Europe**; to be called **“rather worry about the realistic than symbolic threat of migration related to Europe”** (11.2 per cent of the total population).
- ❖ Type 3: Worried a lot about the *irregularity and volume* as well as about the *cultural or religious aspect* of the current flow of mass migration related to **Hungary**; to be called **“worry a lot both about the realistic and symbolic threat of migration related to Hungary”** (60 per cent of the total population).
- ❖ Type 4: Worried a lot about the *irregularity and volume* as well as about the *cultural or religious aspect* of the current flow of mass migration related to **Europe**; to be called **“worry a lot both about the realistic and symbolic threats of migration related to Europe”** (59 per cent of the total population).

As far as the explanatory variables are concerned we built in the following predictors into our model, making sure that we did not include variables which are correlated to each other to a large extent (in order to avoid unintended effects of multicollinearity):

1. Social demographic predictors (reference categories are in brackets):

- ❖ level of education (elementary school at most)
- ❖ age group (18–27 years)
- ❖ gender (female)
- ❖ place of residence: region (Central Hungary) and type of settlement (county seat)

2. Political attitudes:

- ❖ political activity (would definitely vote in the next elections)
- ❖ party preference (only MSZP, Fidesz and Jobbik voters are included, due to the low number of cases for other parties)

3. Selected indicators of social psychology³¹:

- ❖ level of general trust: trusting people in general (do not trust)
- ❖ levels of institutional trust³²: trusting the Hungarian police and trusting religious organisations and churches (do not trust)³³

4. Migration related experiences and migration potential:

- ❖ migration potential: intention to emigrate (do not intend to emigrate)³⁴
- ❖ someone lives in the household who spent at least 12 months abroad in the past 10 years
- ❖ personally knows foreigners living in Hungary (Chinese, Arab or African origin)
- ❖ has met asylum seekers, refugees or migrants in Hungary in the past 12 months

As for the explained variance of the models, we found that the predictors' overall effect on the perceived threat is much higher in case of type 3 and type 4 (the adjusted R-squares are around 20 per cent), than in case of type 1 and type 2 (the adjusted R-squares are only around 10 per cent), meaning that we managed to predict more successfully the factors working behind the attitude of "worrying a lot" both about the realistic and the symbolic threats of migration compared to other types of anxiety (type 1 and 2). The significant relationships of the multivariable models of threat are presented in *Tables 1.5.2 and 1.5.3*.

³¹ Attitudes on the "law and order" type of migration politics play a crucial role in the perceived threat (see correlations in Annex 5, Table Ann1.5.1 and Ann1.5.4 for the communalities of the PC); these indicators were in the end left out of the explanatory model, due to their high correlation with party preference and distrust of institutions.

³² Trusting the Hungarian government was eliminated from the explanatory variables due to its high correlation with Fidesz voters.

³³ The frequency of visiting church was omitted as well, due to the high correlation with trust in church.

³⁴ Two other indicators of migration potential (short term and long term migration potential) were both omitted from the model, due to their high correlation with each other, and with the intention to emigrate.

Table 1.5.2 The multivariable models of threat: type 1 and 2 – logistic regression models (N = 851)

Predictors	The perceived threat is rather realistic than symbolic – Hungary (TYPE 1) Adjusted R-square= 9.2%		The perceived threat is rather realistic than symbolic – Europe (TYPE 2) Adjusted R-square= 10.4%	
	Level of significance	Odds ratio	Level of significance	Odds ratio
Level of education (elementary school at most)				
Trade school	0.030	0.507		
High school	0.061	0.548		
Age group (18–27 years old)				
77 years old or older			0.021	4.632
Region (Central Hungary)				
Southern Trans-Danubia	0.004	0.111		
Trust (tend not trust or distrust)				
Trust people in general			0.003	2.095
Trust the churches and religious organisations	0.003	0.434	0.001	0.370
Trust the Hungarian police	0.051	1.619	0.046	1.704
Fidesz voters	0.001	0.403		
MSZP voters	0.046	0.360		
Political activity (would definitely vote in the next elections)	0.070			
Probably would not vote in the next election	0.029	0.213		
Has met asylum seekers, refugees or migrants in Hungary in the past 12 months	0.05	0.566		
Someone lives in the household who spent at least 12 months abroad in the past 10 years			0.008	2.468

Note: The table shows only independent variables with significant odds ratios.

Table 1.5.3 The multivariable models of threat: type 3 and 4 – logistic regression models (N = 861)

Predictors	Both realistic and symbolic threats are strongly perceived –Hungary (Type 3) Adjusted R-square = 19.0%		Both realistic and symbolic threats are strongly perceived – Europe (Type 4) Adjusted R-square = 20.6%	
	Level of significance	Odds ratio	Level of significance	Odds ratio
Level of education (elementary school at most)				
Trade school	0.05	1.576		
High school	0.33	1.272		
Age group (18–27 years old)				
28–37 years old	0.035	0.531	0.00	0.32
48–57 years old			0.01	0.44
58–67 years old	0.038	0.512	0.01	0.41
68–77 years old	0.020	0.444	0.00	0.30
77 years old or older	0.029	0.301	0.00	0.15
Region (Central Hungary)				
Western Trans-Danubia	0.405	0.742	0.036	0.464
Southern Trans-Danubia	0.001	3.601	0.000	4.744
Northern Hungary	0.000	3.354	0.001	3.068
Northern Great Plain	0.044	1.941	0.059	1.869
Trust (tend not trust or distrust)				
Trust the church	0.012	1.632		
Trust the Hungarian police	0.034	0.679		
Political party preference				
Jobbik voters	0.041	1.739		
Fidesz voters	0.000	2.153	0.000	2.193
MSZP voters	0.047	0.525		
Political activity (would definitely vote in the next elections)				
Would probably vote in the next election	0.000	0.499	0.001	0.537
Personal contact with foreigners (don't have contact)				
Personally knows foreigners living in Hungary (Chinese, Arab or African origin)	0.010	0.597	0.003	0.555
Has met asylum seekers, Refugees or migrants in Hungary in the past 12 month	0.000	2.989	0	3.102

Note: The full logistic regression models can be found in Annex 1.5. The table shows only independent variables with significant odds ratios.

The most important results of the multivariable models of threat (based on the significance of Wald statistics and odds ratios presented in Table 1.5.2 and 1.5.3) are summarised below:

Social Demographic Predictors:

- ❖ **level of education:** those who have a trade school level education are less likely to be more anxious about the realistic than the symbolic threat compared to those who have an elementary school level education at most, and are more like to worry a lot both about the realistic and the symbolic aspects of mass migration related to Hungary (Type 3)
- ❖ **age group:** belonging to the older age groups decreases the probability of being very anxious about the symbolic and the realistic threats of the current flow of mass migration related both to Hungary and **Europe** compared to the youngest age group (18–27 years)
- ❖ **gender:** being male or female does not have an impact on any of the examined threat variables
- ❖ **place of residence:** while settlement type does not, regional differences do play a significant role in being anxious about the effects of mass migration
- ❖ **regional differences** have a strong impact in both examined domains (Hungary and Europe) on having extreme anxiety about the effect of mass migration: More precisely, compared to Central Hungary, being an inhabitant of Southern Trans-Danubia or the Northern part of Hungary (Northern Hungary and Northern Great Plain) increases the likelihood of being extremely anxious about the effects of mass migration to both Hungary and Europe (type 3 and 4)

Political affiliation and activity have a strong impact in case of the attitudes toward mass migration related to Hungary:

- ❖ being the potential voter of a right-wing party (both Fidesz and Jobbik) increases the probability of being extremely anxious about symbolic and realistic threats in relation to Hungary (Type 3); Fidesz sympathisers are also more likely to be anxious about symbolic and realistic threats in relation to Europe (type 4)
- ❖ being a potential voter of the left-wing party (MSZP) has a less pronounced but still significant impact: MSZP sympathisers are less likely to feel extremely threatened by the possible realistic and symbolic effects of mass migration to Hungary (type 3)

- ❖ potential non-voters tend to be less likely to be anxious only about the irregularity and volume of mass migration related to Hungary (type 1)

Levels of trust effect mass migration related anxiety in a complex way:

- ❖ **trusting people in general** increases the likelihood of being rather worried about the irregularity rather than the cultural aspect of mass migration related to Europe, but does not significantly effect this type of anxiety related to Hungary, trusting **churches and religious organisations** significantly decreases these two types of anxiety patterns (type 1 and 2)
- ❖ as far as the other types of anxiety are concerned (type 3 and 4) general trust in people does not play a significant role, only the effects of institutional trust could be shown and only related to Hungary, and not Europe: trusting the churches increases the likelihood of being anxious about both the irregularity and the cultural aspects of mass migration related to Hungary

Migration Related Experiences and Personal Contact:

As we have already argued (see Chapter 1.5.2) personal contact seems to be a very important factor in analysing interactions between minority and majority (see Allport, 1954 on the original idea of Intergroup Contact Theory³⁵ and a comprehensive review of more than 200 empirical studies examining contact hypothesis, carried out by Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Many studies found that intergroup contact has a positive effect on negative stereotyping, and scholars draw attention to the effect that the quantity of intergroup contacts has on reducing prejudices, as frequency of contact helps the decategorization of the out-group members and diminishes stereotypical ways of thinking (Velasco Gonzalez et al., 2008).

On the analysed questionnaires we measured whether the respondent has come into contact with migrants in two ways (see the questions in Appendix 1). In line with both what we have found in analysing the the levels of fear (Chapter 1.5.2) and reasons for refusal (Chapter 1.5.4) as well as with the related literature, we see strong and contradictory effects on mass migration related anxiety. Moreover, we see the same tendency both in relation to Europe and Hungary: the “quality type” of personal contact (personally knowing a migrant living in Hungary) significantly decreases the chance of being extremely anxious, while having met some kind of mi-

³⁵ The basic idea of Allport’s Intergroup Contact Theory is that under appropriate conditions interpersonal contact is one of the most effective ways of reducing prejudice between majority and minority group members.

grants in the past 12 months increases the chance of being extremely anxious about both the realistic and the symbolic threats (type 3 and type 4).

Finally, people in whose household there is someone living who spent at least 12 months abroad in the past 10 years are more likely to be less anxious about the cultural aspect of mass migration than about its irregular manner in the European context (type 2).

1.5.5 CONCLUSION

Summing up our results with regards to the “law and order” type of Hungarian immigration policy, we found that the overwhelming majority of the respondents agree with the ideas of tightening the Hungarian asylum and immigration policy. The public support for the immigration policy formulated in the spirit of “law and order” is highly correlated with the perceived threats, both realistic (volume and irregularity) and symbolic (cultural and religious aspects).

We have measured the perceived level of threat equally and extremely high both in the European and the Hungarian context, with levels of realistic threats somewhat higher than levels of symbolic threats.

Using different types of dimension diminishing methods, we were not able to separate factors working behind the perception of threats and support for “law and order” types of immigration policies by the factor analysis. Carrying out a principal component analysis underlined that the two types of mass-migration related threats are strongly related, and are seldom separable in people’s minds.

As far as our initial hypothesis is concerned we managed to identify only a small subsample of people who worry more about the realistic than about the symbolic aspect of mass migration (around 11–12 per cent of our sample), and found that the majority of the respondents worry a lot about both the realistic and the symbolic threat of migration (around 59–60 per cent of our sample).

As far as the most important predictors are concerned, it can be argued that migration related experiences play a key role in the perceived anxiety both at in the European and the national context. Those who have had real personal contact with any kind of migrants or have had indirect migratory experiences are less anxious about the cultural aspect of mass migration than about its irregularity. On the other hand, quite interestingly, personal migration potential does

not play a significant role in perceiving any of the examined threat types. Finally, beyond certain socio-demographic and residential predictors, levels of trust (in different ways) and political affiliations play an important role in the type of perceived threats.

ANNEX 1.5 COMPLEMENTARY TABLES AND ANALYSIS FOR CHAPTER 1.5

Table Ann1.5.1 The correlation matrix of the different aspects of fear ($N = \text{min } 919$) (Pearson correlation)

	Anxiety related to the volume and irregularity of the migration flow towards Hungary (4a)	Anxiety related to the volume and irregularity of the migration flow towards Europe (4b)	Anxiety related to the different cultural and religious background of migrants arriving in Hungary (4c)	Anxiety related to the different cultural and religious background of migrants arriving in Europe (4d)	Tightening the Hungarian border control (5a)	Forcing migrants to follow basic "Hungarian values" (5b)	Limiting the number of refugees arriving in Hungary (5c)
Anxiety related to the volume and irregularity (lack of documents) of the migration flow towards Hungary (4a)	1	0.806**	0.640**	0.626**	0.499**	0.240**	0.225**
Anxiety related to the volume and irregularity (lack of documents) of the migration flow towards Europe (4b)	0.806**	1	0.635**	0.688**	0.513**	0.226**	0.215**
Anxiety related to the different cultural and religious background of migrants arriving in Hungary (4c)	0.640**	0.635**	1	0.808**	0.445**	0.124**	0.127**
Anxiety related to the different cultural and religious background of migrants arriving in Europe (4d)	0.626**	0.688**	0.808**	1	0.441**	0.134**	0.134**
Tightening the Hungarian border control (5a)	0.499**	0.513**	0.445**	0.441**	1	0.206**	0.224**
Forcing migrants to follow basic "Hungarian values" (5b)	0.240**	0.226**	0.124**	0.134**	0.206**	1	0.653**
Limiting the number of refugees arriving in Hungary (5c)	0.225**	0.215**	0.127**	0.134**	0.224**	0.653**	1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table Ann1.5.2 Factor analysis: the level of the perceived threats and attitudes towards the Hungarian immigration policy in the spirit of “law and order”

	(Factor 1)	(Factor 2)
1. realistic threat: anxiety related to the volume and irregularity (lack of documents) of the migration flow towards Hungary	0.729	0.466
2. symbolic threat: anxiety related to the different cultural and religious background of migrants arriving in Hungary	0.547	0.463
3. tightening the Hungarian border control	0.523	0.229
4. introducing legislation forcing immigrants to follow basic “Hungarian values”	0.561	-0.472
5. limiting the number of refugees arriving in Hungary	0.622	-0.600
Explained variance (Cumulative) 57.5 per cent		
KMO = 0.621, Bartlett’s Test = 1209, df = 10, sign = 0.000		
Goodness-of-fit Test: Chi square = 2.9, df = 1, sign = 0.088		

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

A 2 factors extracted. 6 iterations required.

Table Ann1.5.3 Principal component analysis of realistic and symbolic threats ($N = 982$). Explained variance = 77.7 per cent

Communalities	Extraction
Realistic threat 1: anxiety related to the volume and irregularity (lack of documents) of the migration flow towards Hungary	0.765
Realistic threat 2: anxiety related to the volume and irregularity (lack of documents) of the migration flow towards Europe	0.790
Symbolic threat 1: anxiety related to the different cultural and religious background of migrants arriving in Hungary	0.764
Symbolic threat 2: anxiety related to the different cultural and religious background of migrants arriving in Europe	0.788

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Table Ann1.5.4

Principal components analysis of items of immigration policy in the spirit of “law and order” ($N = 982$). Explained variance = 59.1 per cent

Communalities for the items	Extraction
Tightening the Hungarian border control.	0.235*
Introducing legislation forcing migrants to follow basic Hungarian values.	0.761
Controlling the number of refugees arriving in Hungary by setting an upper limit.	0.777

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

* Low communality.

2 HOSTS IN HOSTILITY: THE NEW FORMS OF SOLIDARITY AND THE ROLE OF VOLUNTEER AND CIVILIAN ORGANISATIONS IN THE MIGRATION CRISIS IN HUNGARY BY ANIKÓ BERNÁT

2.1 THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

This qualitative research aims at documenting and understanding the dynamics and the evolution of the organisations that have been active in helping refugees³⁶ crossing Hungary. This inquiry involves several aspects to be examined including how the new, Facebook-based volunteer grassroots groups emerged and developed; the work of the new and established NGOs and aid organisations (i.e. traditional charity organisations, and partially those related to churches); their cooperation, the conflicts within and between the organisations, and their activities after the main phase of the refugee crisis in Hungary.

The methodological framework comprises of a comprehensive mix of qualitative methods. The majority of the information collected is based on different types of interviews: (1) individual interviews with leaders and active members of the new grassroots and established NGOs and charity organisations representing mainly the organisation's opinion; (2) individual interviews with volunteers of the new grassroots groups representing mainly their personal opinion; and (3) focus group discussions with leaders and active members of the new grassroots groups in three major cities where the refugee crisis was acute (Szeged, Budapest and Debrecen) representing mainly their organisation's opinion. Apart from interviews, qualitative information was gathered on public events (organised not by TÁRKI, but by other actors,) where leaders or major activists of new and established organisations took part and shared

³⁶ Although the migrants crossing Hungary and Europe are fleeing from various countries and for different reasons—and thus their legal statuses are different (asylum seekers, refugees, regular and irregular immigrants, etc.), we are mostly using the terms “refugee” or “asylum seekers” in this report only for the sake of simplicity in order to make the reading of the report easier.

their experiences and opinion with a wider audience. Altogether 21 interviews³⁷ and 3 focus groups (with 21 participants) were carried out by TÁRKI and 4 additional discussions on public events (organised not by TÁRKI, but by others) were visited and summarised by the TÁRKI staff.

Besides the interviews the analysis uses evidence discovered through the activity of selected Facebook groups that played a central role in the establishment and operation of the new, volunteer-based grassroots organisations. The analysis of the various Facebook groups' activities, the media representation of and the motivation and activity of individual volunteers are limited to observations related to the specific topics discussed in this chapter. Separate chapters are devoted to the individual volunteers (Chapter 3) and to the media representation of the new and established help organisations (Chapter 4).

The brief analysis on the activities of the organisations below will be discussed along several lines that are focusing on the specific values, choices, attitudes, ethics and some other characteristics that had an impact on the actual behaviour of the organisations. Prior to the analysis, however, the context of refugee crisis along political, social, media and other relevant aspects will be outlined, as these have fundamentally influenced the crisis, as well as the activities of the aid workers.

2.2 THE GLOBAL AND LOCAL CONTEXT: CIVILIAN INITIATIVES ASSISTING ASYLUM SEEKERS

2.2.1 THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

In order to understand the evolution of the civilian initiatives the very complex political and public contexts surrounding the refugee crisis in the summer and fall of 2015 should be outlined briefly. Our analysis is focusing on the intense period of the migration flow in Hungary, i.e. from June to October 2015. Since mid-October 2015 masses of asylum seekers have not been

³⁷ Apart from the focus groups individual interviews were carried out with 2 leaders and 8 volunteers of new grassroots; with leaders of 5 established charity organisations, 4 Hungarian NGOs working in the field of migration; 1 interview with a former senior official of an international refugee organisation and 1 leader of a major Hungarian news website between October 2015 and January 2016. Some other organisations also provided information about their activity in the public events, which we have used in our analysis.

able to enter Hungary due to the legal and physical closure of the Hungarian borders with Serbia and Croatia.

The most important contextual element is the fact that the goal of almost all refugees crossing Hungary was reaching certain countries in Western Europe (mainly Germany and Sweden), and not to settle down in Hungary. Although it was clear for all stakeholders and actors that Hungary is not a destination country for them at all, the Government's main message in its anti-migration campaign was that Hungary does not want and is not able to receive any immigrants as a hosting country, by this consciously spreading the assumption that large masses of refugees are targeting Hungary.

On a political level the Hungarian public experienced a massive tension between the rhetoric of the European and that of the Hungarian leaders. The mainstream attitude of the EU and that of the majority of the target countries was welcoming in its rhetorics (especially in the beginning of the migration flow), but the EU and its institutions were unable to handle the refugee crisis with effective policies and legislation accepted by all the member states. The relevant member states, which are also the destination countries of most asylum seekers and refugees, were also very welcoming, and received all the asylum seekers during the summer and fall, but were less able to cope with the increasingly larger masses, which led to vigorous political discourses and debates within their respective countries.

Hungary, however, in this regard was clearly an outlier from the European mainstream from the very beginning of the crisis. The Hungarian Government's anti-immigration policy was clear from early 2015 (Viktor Orbán's speech a few days after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris can be seen as a milestone³⁸); however, at the same time the Hungarian Government was claiming to be abiding by the European laws and regulations and protecting Schengen borders by introducing new regulations and building fences to the Southern borders of Hungary. Although the attitude and the activities of the various state bodies were following the government's strand both in word and deed during the mass migration flow crossing Hungary, the picture is mixed (e.g. in many cases policemen were friendly and helpful with refugees). The general rejection of immigrants by the Hungarian Government was carefully planned and showed a clear evolution from rhetorics to action. The communique of the Hungarian Government was straightforward from early 2015 (see Bernát–Messing, 2015) and intensified from the spring of 2015; it started with some strong messages via speeches and interviews with Prime Minister

Orbán and relevant government officials, and has reached one of its peaks in the so called “National Consultation on Immigration” (see Appendix 1.3) and the anti-migrant billboard campaign. It was followed by a massive oppositional movement with the impairment of the billboards and a remarkable counter-campaign by an independent opposition organisation, a frivolous political party (Kétfarkú Kutya Párt³⁹) also on billboards, rejecting the attitude of the government and welcoming the asylum seekers and refugees (presented also in Appendix 1.3). Basically the clear rejection of refugees and asylum seekers—and thus a lack of any relevant activities of any state body (along with the also less active established charity organisations)—gave the floor to the volunteers who could not remain a passive audience of the masses of refugees without providing any assistance and support their basic needs. The lack of intervention by the EU and the Hungarian Government also led to a heyday for human traffickers who very intensively took part in the crisis from the beginning, by transporting the refugees towards Austria and providing accommodation for a few nights before they travelled further.

Meanwhile, the parliamentary opposition of the Hungarian government seemed to have almost disappeared, apart from a few weak initiatives of sending out irrelevant messages to the public and futile actions taken by both the left and the extreme right-wing opposition of the government. The inactivity of the official opposition was based on different reasons related to the left and the extreme-right oppositions: the left-wing is in general very weak in reacting to the government’s actions with strong and viable messages in the past years, and this paralysis remained in relation to the migration flow, while the extreme-right opposition has the same attitude towards immigration as the government, but the successful communication strategy of the governing parties blocked the extreme-right’s political messages and left no opportunity to them for any effective anti-immigration campaign.⁴⁰

Apart from all the politicians’ inability to handle the refugee crisis, this situation was unprecedented in magnitude and intensity; although it might still be compared to some events in the past (the inflow of asylum seeker Hungarians from Transylvania at the end of 1980s, and beginning of 90s; or asylum seekers from the Balkan wars during the early 1990s). Because of their lack of experience in such inflow of refugees, the crisis presented all the actors and stake-

³⁹ See the website of the party: <http://mkkp.hu/wordpress/>.

⁴⁰ Some violent incidents against immigrants should be mentioned here, when extreme-right paramilitary groups organised to catch and in some cases attacked immigrants, but it could not be linked directly to the extreme-right oppositional party, although the perpetrators are most probably sympathizing with this party. For example on the very same day of the „Hope of March” on the 4 September football hooligans assaulted and injured refugees at Budapest railway station and dozens of them were arrested by the Hungarian police. Source: <http://www.romea.cz/en/news/world/hungary-football-hooligans-assault-and-injure-refugees-at-budapest-train-station>

holders with a completely new situation, including even those who are experienced in social policy and social work.

The refugee crisis and the evolution of volunteer civilian initiatives cannot be understood without highlighting the role of the media in general either, especially that of social media and the online press. Social media in Hungary, predominantly Facebook, was fundamental for both refugees and volunteers. For the volunteers Facebook was the core platform for establishing their groups, and it had a central role in sharing information, developing contacts and groups, organizing activities, and collecting and distributing donations during the entire crisis. For refugees and asylum seekers Facebook, Twitter and a number of new and old mobile phone applications were extremely helpful in their course of flight. All in all: without Facebook, the other social media sites, and mobile applications the whole story and its intensity would have been completely different. (See more on that, especially in case of the Migration Aid: Dessewffy–Nagy, 2015.)

Besides social media and user-driven mobile applications, the online media also had a major role during the entire crisis, even greater than usual. The number of constantly updated news items, articles, and publications on the development of the crisis appearing on the mainstream online media sites (and on TV, the radio, and in the print media as well) was much larger in its intensity even when compared to other times of crisis. The online media and mainstream TV channels in general were very much focused on the refugee crisis, and it also included the new civilian grassroots organisations that helped the asylum seekers and refugees, as they were also using the media in a conscious and professional way in order to facilitate solidarity in society. (For more on the online media representation of the new grassroots and the established aid organisations see Chapter 4.)

Building solidarity is an especially important factor in Hungary due to the heavily xenophobic attitudes of the Hungarian population (see Chapter 1 on the survey results). The basic attitude towards any kind of immigrants has been very negative as well as towards other outliers for decades in Hungary (especially the Roma minority), which has been the basis of the anti-migration communiques of the Hungarian Government. Not only xenophobia but a lack of trust in general, and a very weak civil sphere have been characterizing the Hungarian society for decades which has also led to a lack of solidarity and unwelcoming attitude towards strangers and outliers.

There were also some notable specific characteristics in the context of the refugee crisis related to the fact that the crisis emerged during summer. Summer weather was basically favourable to new waves of asylum seekers, although the migration flow has not decreased significantly from late autumn and during the winter against all expectations. From the aspects of the hosting society, summer also offers special conditions, such as the workforce available for the various stakeholders. The work of both governmental and non-governmental organisation might have been influenced by staff members and decision makers being on vacation leading to a lack of workforce, while for the new grassroots summer offered plenty of workforce by people who are usually more flexible on summer (e.g. student volunteers, especially teachers but also others are more likely to be on holidays).

2.2.2 THE LOCAL CONTEXT

The local environment that asylum seekers and refugees arrived to and received help from differed a lot in the three major cities where refugees showed up in great numbers, but for different reasons. The scale of how welcoming the atmosphere was by cities ranges from Szeged as friendliest to Debrecen as presenting the most hostile environment for the refugees.

Being on the most popular inland flight route (through the Balkans), from the beginning by mid-September most refugees and asylum seekers were crossing the Serbian–Hungarian border at Röszke, to which Szeged is the closest major city to travel to on one's way towards Western Europe. Therefore volunteers in Szeged were first to notice the increasing number of refugees with unmet needs and also this was the first Hungarian city that faced the refugee crisis on its streets this summer. Most refugees only spent a short period of time (less than a day) in Szeged, and although they were going to move on in a few hours, they were exhausted and needed basic help after the tough leg of their journey; thus they received basic care (food, drink, hygienic appliances and clothes) as well as basic legal and travelling information from MigSzol Szeged, a Facebook-based volunteer group on the railway station. The local government, which is one (and the largest) of the few opposition municipalities that are run by the Socialist Party was very helpful, partly in order to express their oppositional political views by behaving in a welcoming manner towards refugees and providing volunteers with fast and effective help. The local citizens in Szeged were partly friendly (as indirectly reflected by the great number of volunteers) or neutral: no major incident related to refugees was reported from Szeged although initially tensions between volunteers and taxi drivers were strong (as the volunteers provided information to the refugees on their rights to use public transporta-

tion, i.e. trains for free with proper documentation and this limited the business of the smugglers, i.e. very often taxi drivers; later in the summer these tensions decreased).

Budapest constitutes a mixed type of environment in terms of the disposition of the local government; a wide range of attitudes were shown by its citizens from the extreme xenophobic to the enthusiastically helpful, and the most visible civilian activity with a surprisingly great number of volunteers and donations. The refugees arriving to Budapest travelled on within 1–5 days, and received care and information from volunteers on railway stations intended to be tailored to their basic needs within this time frame, as well as to their special needs, such as family reunification or organizing their travelling on. The municipality of Budapest, led by the governmental party followed the Government's anti-migrant rhetoric in word and in deed; it, however, still provided certain infrastructural help, which was unexpected after their statements on asylum seekers.

On the other end of the scale of hospitality is Debrecen. This Eastern-Hungarian city is in the opposite direction of that leading to the Western European destinations of most refugees; those who ended up in the Debrecen refugee camp were therefore from among the more vulnerable, as they were less able to follow their goals, travelling to the reception camp in Debrecen despite their desire—according to the state authorities—to go on to Western Europe. The city has been host to the camp for a long time, thus local people got used to both the camp and the presence of asylum seekers; still it was this city where the atmosphere seemed to be the most hostile both from the part of the local government, as well as the locals. Although volunteers also formed an effective group and helped the refugees arriving to the railway station with their basic needs, this city provided less volunteers and less solidarity from its citizens, so much so that even some atrocities—local people being hostile to asylum seekers on streets or public transportation—were reported from Debrecen.

A unique element of the migrant crisis to be noted is besides the exceptional number of people arriving is their presence in urban setting which is also analysed by Kallius, Monterescu and Rajaram (2016) from an anthropological point of view in their recent paper. They use the concepts 'horizontal' and 'vertical politics', that make it easier to distinguish the relevant levels of politics and publicity and to understand the difference between the reactions to the migrant crisis among the various levels of politics: "vertical politics and intervention displace violence, naming the problem as a threat to the political actor or as a moral mission for the aid worker. Vertical politics can isolate the complex structure of violence that affects migrants in Europe today, depoliticizing and dehistoricising 'cases' for charitable or political intervention.

Against these forms of vertical politics, and in a dialectical relationship with them, the crisis was also marked by unexpected horizontal solidarities involving private citizens working with migrants, standing with them in their protests, sheltering people, and transporting them to the western border. We suggest that these are horizontal modes of solidarity to the extent that they call into question the acted- on dichotomy of vertical politics. (...) Horizontal solidarities then seem to us to work on the basis of human solidarity: they seek to question distinctions between citizen and migrant or refugee and the way political agency is constricted" (ibid., p. 3–4).

We can add to it that the presence of immigrants on the streets and public spheres of cities, especially in the hubs of the capital city made them very visible in contrast to the previous practice when asylum seekers were directed to reception camps or crossed the country towards Western Europe with public or private transportation without stopping in any city which made them invisible. In the summer of 2015, however, crowds of migrants gathered in very visible public areas such as busy railway stations of major cities (Szeged, Debrecen, Budapest, Győr) as well as in parks and squares in downtown Budapest. The visibility of poor and vulnerable people, especially families with small children automatically triggers solidarity i.e. horizontal solidarity from those locals who are just passing by the asylum seekers. The urban presence of the masses, city centres with hundreds and thousands of migrants waiting in public places for days or sometimes a week is a threat for the vertical politics that should react in a way that restores the original setting and make immigrants invisible again (according to the anti-immigration approach of the state), but the Hungarian government and the established large charities reacted slowly and ineffectively that created a niche for horizontal solidarity.

Meanwhile, over the summer the migrants themselves changed their attitudes and the way they could be seen from the position of vulnerable victims to more active actors who demonstrate on the street to let them leave Hungary and continue their journey towards their target countries (Kallius–Monterescu–Rajaram, 2016).

2.3 A BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF THE ORGANISATIONS ANALYSED AND THE SERVICES AND DONATIONS PROVIDED

The organisations that actively took part in the relief work can be divided into four main groups: (1) the established charity or aid organisations; (2) NGOs with a mission linked directly or indirectly to asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants; (3) brand new grassroots recruited volunteers from Facebook groups and (4) international organisations. The analysis regarding these organisations is primarily based on the interviews carried out with the leaders or prominent members of these organisations between October 2015 and January 2016, and almost all of the are limited to those organisation that shared their opinion and experiences with us, while findings on other organisations' activities will be articulated only in a few cases and based on the interviews with other organisations or other sources (information gathered during the desk research from the online media or Facebook).

2.3.1 ESTABLISHED CHARITIES

Almost all of the established charities that were active to some extent for any (shorter or longer) time period during the refugee crisis share the following features:

- ❖ they are a member of international charity organisations;
- ❖ well-known by the population especially as aid organisations;
- ❖ have operated in Hungary for decades ;
- ❖ working with a large professional (paid) staff but also have an experienced volunteer basis country-wide;
- ❖ all of the charities (except for one) in our analysis have direct links to different churches;
- ❖ incorporated into the Hungarian welfare system by providing social services in various fields (i.e. disability, elderly or homeless care, temporary shelters for families) on behalf of the state they are receiving normative state grants as a compensation for the activity in their institutions. It also means that these charities have a special connection with the state, which is also crystallised in their membership in the Charity Council that has been established by the state in 2000 with invited members;⁴¹

⁴¹ See the official website of the Charity Council (available in Hungarian): <http://karitativtanacs.kormany.hu/a-karitativ-tanacs-mukodese>

- ❖ most of these charities have been active regarding the asylum seekers or refugees, some of them for decades, by providing donations and services in reception camps or offering temporary accommodation, but usually it is a small scale activity and is not the main focus of the organisation.

The report will focus on the largest established charities working in Hungary as well as some smaller organisations:

- ❖ Hungarian Red Cross (Magyar Vöröskereszt)⁴²
- ❖ Hungarian Maltese Charity Service (Magyar Máltai Szeretetszolgálat)⁴³
- ❖ Hungarian Interchurch Aid (Magyar Ökumenikus Segélyszervezet)⁴⁴
- ❖ Hungarian Baptist Aid (Baptista Szeretetszolgálat)⁴⁵
- ❖ Evangelical-Lutheran Church in Hungary (Magyarországi Evangélikus Egyház)⁴⁶

These charities have been active especially later in the Hungarian phase of the migration flow, i.e. from September 2015 and lacked or were invisible during the summer months from the main hubs where immigrants showed up. The absence or insufficient presence of the charities was an increasingly widespread claim by the grassroots volunteers and also in some online media putting the insufficient involvement of the large charities into a political context (i.e. they tried to accommodate to the government's passive approach). Albeit most of these charities reject the assumption that they were absent from the field in the summer, especially for political reasons and state that they have provided donations and medical assistance at a sufficient level while tried to avoid the oversupply of donations and services, thus claiming that the level of their involvement was proportional to the task. The situation has completely changed from early September, when the large charities became more visible at the hubs of the events by distributing food, drinks and medical assistance. Simultaneously some of the major charities received a substantial state grant from the government entitled to provide assistance to migrants at the border of Croatia and Austria right after the Serbian-Hungarian border has been closed on 15 September. The masses of asylum seekers immediately changed their routes towards Croatia where only the three selected charities were let to provide help for the

⁴² <http://www.voroskereszt.hu/in-english.html>

⁴³ <http://www.maltai.hu/>

⁴⁴ <http://www.segelyszervezet.hu/en>

⁴⁵ <http://www.hbaid.org/hungarian-baptist-aid>

⁴⁶ <http://www.evangelikus.hu/?language=en>

newcomers. Between 16 September and 16 October, by the closure of the Croatian–Hungarian border mostly these charities provided help at the Southern border at the entry points and together with some volunteer grassroots at the Austrian border at the exit point.

2.3.2 ESTABLISHED NGOS WITH PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE RELATED TO MIGRANTS

The NGOs with a mission linked directly or indirectly to immigrants or refugees is a more heterogeneous group in terms of their main fields of interest, type of activities and history of operation. Some of these NGOs have a clear mission to help the integration of refugees and migrants or providing legal aid to them. There are others with a mainly housing focus offering temporary accommodation for the vulnerable. The NGOs we have interviewed and analysed are:

- ❖ Hungarian Helsinki Committee (Magyar Helsinki Bizottság)⁴⁷
- ❖ Menedék – Migránsokat Segítő Egyesület (Menedék – Hungarian Association for Migrants)⁴⁸
- ❖ Magyarországi Evangéliumi Testvérközösség – Oltalom Egyesület (Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship – Oltalom Charity Society)⁴⁹
- ❖ Shelter Foundations (Menhely Alapítvány)⁵⁰
- ❖ MigSzol Migrant Solidarity (MigSzol Migráns Szolidaritás)⁵¹

The NGOs interviewed in our research have been operating for decades, apart from for MigSzol Group, that was founded in 2012. Except for MigSzol Migrant Solidarity these NGOs are working with a smaller paid staff supplemented by volunteers in many cases. Besides these NGOs many other civil organisations were active in the field during the migrant crisis and some of our observations may be applicable to any of the other NGOs.

It is however important to note that some of the NGOs originally working on the field of immigrant aid were less active or visible or more active in words but less active in deeds than what some of their peers expected. Although our interviews do not cover all the possible NGOs of

⁴⁷ <http://www.helsinki.hu/en/>

⁴⁸ <http://menedek.hu/en>

⁴⁹ <http://www.metegyhaz.hu/>

⁵⁰ <http://www.menhely.hu/index.php/english/our-mission>

⁵¹ <https://www.migszol.com/>

its kind and thus our findings may be limited, it is clear that these NGOs encountered an enormous challenge on how to serve their mission with the very limited sources available and with a working structure that has been set up for a much smaller scale of intervention. Those NGOs that were expected to be more active in the field but were absent might have had the same difficulty.

Those NGOs which are working directly with this target group by default have experienced the intensifying migration flow already from the beginning of the year 2015, therefore their workload has been growing before the masses of migrants became visible on the railway stations and in the city centres. The work of these NGOs was implemented in reception and refugee camps in many cases, and this makes their work less visible.

2.3.3 NEWLY EMERGED VOLUNTEER-BASED GRASSROOTS

The newly established grassroots groups unlike the previous types of organisations were solely based on volunteers, i.e. no paid staff were involved in their activities at all. These groups were formed in the early summer 2015 specifically for the purpose of helping asylum seekers crossing through Hungary. They claim that they were fulfilling a task originally belonging to the inactive government as well as the large established charities. There are three main grassroots groups with their affiliates that dominated the street-based social aid during the Hungarian wave of the refugee crisis, and all of them were formed as a Facebook group:

- ❖ the Migration Aid (MA) is one of the largest and the most complex group as it consists of a main *open* Facebook page⁵² with approximately 35,000 likes⁵³ and a main Facebook *closed group*⁵⁴ typically with around 10,000 members, and *closed subgroups* linked to Budapest railway stations:
 - MA Keleti (2500 members)⁵⁵, later a new subgroup was created with overlapping membership: Keleti Csoport (Keleti Group)⁵⁶

⁵² <https://www.facebook.com/migrationaid.org/?fref=ts>

⁵³ The number of members of the groups is as of 30 November 2015, which is after the closure of the Southern borders of Hungary thus the mass volumes of the asylum-seeker are not crossing the country for more than a month at this time. It suggests that these numbers are below the largest memberships, and shrinking as the migration flow is not a vivid phenomenon in every day life in Hungary anymore.

⁵⁴ <https://www.facebook.com/groups/1602563053360018/?fref=ts>

⁵⁵ <https://www.facebook.com/groups/835984696454826/?fref=ts>

⁵⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/groups/1482547708718071/?fref=ts>

- MA Nyugati (2900 members)⁵⁷
 - MA Déli (1200 members), later renamed to Déli Csillagszálló (Déli Starhotel)⁵⁸
 - and also some in other cities which were to some extent affected by the migration flow; out of them we have included the most affected MA Debrecen group⁵⁹ (600 members) which has been operating in the second largest Hungarian city and where one of the most important refugee camp was at that time.
- ❖ Segítsünk Együtt a Menekülteknek (Let's Help the Refugees Together, SEM, cca 10,000 members) is the other largest Budapest-based volunteer grassroots group, which has provided help at Budapest Keleti railway station in the early phase of the crisis but left it due to the crowd and parallel activities, but continued to provide food and information at other public places in the vicinity (II. János Pál Pápa square, which was renamed by the migrants as "Afghan park") as well as in their base venue, which was located very near to the most important hub, Keleti railway station in Budapest. SEM also founded a Facebook group for English speaking foreign activists based both in Hungary and in other countries (Let's Help Refugees in Hungary and Europe – English wing of SEM⁶⁰), as many of their volunteers and donors were foreign citizens living in Hungary therefore another group in English was also needed.
- ❖ MigSzol⁶¹ Szeged (cca 2500 members) is a separate group⁶² operating in the railway station of Szeged that is the closest city to the Serbian–Hungarian border and thus the first station where masses of asylum seekers showed up after crossing the border.

These grassroots groups were established on Facebook from late June 2015 (the first group was MigSzol Szeged from 25 June) and started growing very rapidly, for example the number of supporters of MA main open group increased to cca 8000 likes within a few weeks. All the groups achieved rapid popularity along with the also rapidly growing number of asylum seekers arriving and faced thus the challenge how to serve their mission without clear-cut rules and established infrastructure but with a promptly growing number of motivated volunteers

⁵⁷ <https://www.facebook.com/groups/490046001145489/?fref=ts>

⁵⁸ <https://www.facebook.com/groups/1612866438993255/?fref=ts>

⁵⁹ <https://www.facebook.com/groups/1516263871999915/?fref=ts>

⁶⁰ <https://www.facebook.com/groups/1481045622191344/?fref=ts>

⁶¹ The name MigSzol is identical to the name of the NGO MigSzol Migrant Solidarity and means the same, and although there is real connection between the groups, it is only a coincidence.

⁶² <https://www.facebook.com/groups/378084205735188/>

who are very much after meaningful help and looking forward specific tasks and instructions both via Facebook and on the field. (For more on the Facebook-based grassroots groups, from the aspect of their social media use.

The oversupply of the volunteer workforce in the grassroots is a particularly interesting aspect of this topic, especially in contrast to the lack or insufficient number of volunteers on the charities' side. Although the large charities also have an established system of volunteer staff in many cases they were insufficient or unavailable for the organisations, while recruiting and training new volunteers takes much longer for established organisations than for the less developed and thus more flexible grassroots; a possible reason might be that it is much easier to join to a new organisation with lower level of requirements for affiliation (i.e. joining to the grassroots with only a pack of donations bought in the supermarket and accommodating to more loose rules vs. participation in long trainings and adapting to stricter rules of the established charities).

Similar volunteer movements and grassroots emerged in almost all the countries along the Balkan route from Greece to Germany,⁶³ many of them were also organised solely through social media. Their activity can differ according to the specific local situation, e.g. refugees arriving in boats on sea and stepping to land requires different helping activity on the Greek islands than in case of those who are in Serbia or Hungary and exhausted after days of walking without proper nutrition and clothing and have wounds or other illnesses related to fleeing and there are also other needs of those who arrive to one of the destination countries and waiting for permanent provision. Nevertheless, the basic needs are almost the same at most stages of the route: food suitable for the religion and tradition of the migrant as well as fitting to the infrastructural setting of the venue where the donations are provided; clothes suitable to the weather and appropriate for walking and using them for a couple of weeks or even months; basic hygienic kits and necessary information for their current legal status and possibilities to continue their journey. Along the Balkan route the grassroots started to help as they witnessed state agencies failing to fulfil the basic needs of the masses of refugees

⁶³ A summary on some of these groups: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2015/09/volunteers-help-refugees-survive-while-europes-leaders-still-search-for-solutions/>

2.3.4 INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND VOLUNTEERS

There were also several international organisations, both UN and other affiliations that were active at some point of the refugee crisis in Hungary, although they were less visible for various reasons. A major stakeholder related to asylum seekers and refugees worldwide was the UNHCR, which operates an office in Hungary since 1989⁶⁴ and since 2005 the Budapest office hosts the Regional Representation for Central Europe (RRCE). Their activity during the Hungarian crisis was, however, less visible and limited partly due to the lack of possibility to cooperate with the state (although UNHCR offered their assistance in the crisis for the Hungarian Government), despite the fact that their mission for the Central European region is “promoting and ensuring access to safe territory, fair asylum procedures, decent reception conditions and facilitating integration and resettlement.”⁶⁵ There were some points during the crisis when UNHCR took more visible steps, e.g. in Röszke at early September when the inflow of migrants was on the top, but at other times it remained rather in the background or was involved in a less visible way.

Other international organisations and actors were also involved into the Hungarian relief work, but most of them simply popped up in the hubs of the events especially during the “rush hours” when most of the asylum seekers crossed the country from late August and early September, mainly in Budapest and Röszke (Serbian border) at the peak of the inflow, where they were hardly identified due to the crowd. In many cases international activists did not belong to any organisations but were rather a group of friends, who gathered donations and travelled to Hungary by car to distribute their donations or help to transport asylum seekers towards Western Europe. These actions typically lasted for a short period, especially in early September as a consequence of international media attention on the Hungarian situation. Many of them were less organised, but as the number of volunteers and organisations offering relief for the asylum seekers became too high, these less organised humanitarian aid groups and individuals moved to assist the upset crowd in Röszke in early September, when some of the major volunteer grassroots and other aid organisations left that area as it was impossible to provide help effectively in such circumstances (in a small area without any infrastructure where dozens of organisations and crowds of Hungarians and foreign volunteers and aid workers line up and providing too much donations without any control leading to a chaotic situation). On the other hand, many foreign donors supported the work of the Hungarian relief organisations and

⁶⁴ <http://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/hu/index.html>

⁶⁵ <http://www.unhcr-centraleurope.org/en/about-us.html>

especially the new grassroots' work by sending financial donations or food, clothes and other goods to be distributed among the migrants.

2.3.5 DONATIONS AND SERVICES PROVIDED

Summarizing and turning into statistics the quantity of the donations, services and other kinds of help provided by the Hungarian grassroots, charities and NGOs are very challenging. Considering it impossible some grassroots rejected by default to compile any kind of statistics as they have not recorded the donations received and distributed as well as the working hours of the volunteers (both front and back office work) from the beginnings and also claimed that such a statistic cannot be realistic due to the very hectic way of how helping activity has been performed on the field. However, most of the organisations tried to estimate and published (or provided on demand) their summaries.

Since these summary documents apply various approaches on how to count the donations and workload, plus the nature of donations and other kinds of services ranged widely among organisations, a proper comparison is impossible to make. Moreover, a comparison might be also very uncertain due to various types of incompatibility between the different summaries: the time frame covered ranges greatly, the organisations' activity were realised in different locations with very diverse settings and infrastructural possibilities and most importantly, all of these statistics are estimations based on very different methodology. Therefore only a few specific characteristics of the donations collected and workload invested should be highlighted: most of the donations were food and water that can be distributed and consumed easily on the spot and suits to the religious and cultural traditions of the receivers; all the organisations which compiled a donation summary indicated clothes, hygienic and medical products to be distributed as well. Not all the organisations provided information of the estimated workload invested. Some of the summaries also include the donations or workload used out of Hungary (in neighbouring countries).

The donations were provided by individuals and companies for both the grassroots and the established charities and NGOs. A major and obvious difference between the donors of the new and old organisations was that the old ones had the opportunity to mobilise their donors in order to provide more support during the refugee crisis while the new organisations had to set up the donation scheme and collect donors starting from scratch. Therefore, in the beginning the new grassroots could rely mainly on individual donors (predominantly through Facebook) who could provide smaller amounts and later could address companies with larger sup-

ports, while the established charities and NGOs could use their established networks of donors that is more efficient and provides more support.

2.4 ACTIVITIES AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS HELPING REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED

The activities, values, attitudes, realisations of solidarity and aid ethics of organisations involved in the refugee crisis in the summer and fall of 2015 has been analysed in a framework of controversial dichotomies, which represent ideal types of possible behaviours, attitudes, actions and reactions by volunteers and professional charity organisations. While in many cases these clear-cut types of behaviour can be more or less discovered in any of the examined organisations, sometimes these dichotomies only serve as a conceptual framework without clearly corresponding examples among the organisations. The aim of this conceptual framework in general is to capture the distinguishing characteristics of the fieldwork and attitudes of the organisations that were active in the refugee crisis within, and in some cases, beyond Hungary's borders during the summer and fall of 2015. In the following the findings will be based mainly on the evidence and opinions from individual and organisational interviews, as well as focus groups, including opinions on their own work, as well as on the activities of other actors in the field during the refugee crisis in Hungary. Additional sources, such as and the representation of the organisations in the online media are also used to some extent in this analysis, but will be discussed more in depth in the Chapter 4.

2.4.1 HUMANITARIAN AID VS ABIDING BY THE RULE OF LAW

Ideally there should be no conflict between a humanitarian and a law-driven attitude when helping refugees; the conflict, however, arose from the Government's, the NGOs' and volunteers' differing interpretations of the law with regards to the status of asylum seekers and refugees passing through the country. For each actor there was a constant question mark with regard to this issue, with ensuing conflicts within even the new NGOs about how to adapt, if at all, to the legal context. This dichotomy was an ever-present problem for the established organisations during the refugee crisis, either for volunteers, smaller NGOs or larger aid organisations, irrespectively of their distance from, and therefore their general attitudes towards, the government. On the other hand state bodies that basically followed the Government's principles were also affected by this dichotomy.

As a part of this issue, there is also disagreement between organisations, as well as within organisations, on the quantity and quality of the help and donations people in need should be provided with, along the fault lines of “providing for” people in need vs. collecting excess donations. As opinions regarding the vulnerability of the refugees crossing the country and Europe varied largely among the organisations and aid workers, the responses to their needs, if any, also varied greatly. One typical attitude was that only a part, but not the majority, let alone all, of the “migrants” are in need: a substantial part of them seem to be able to pay for their food, clothing, travel costs etc. According to another typical opinion these “asylum seekers or refugees” are fleeing from war zones or other kinds of desperate situations indeed without enough money, and even if they can afford to buy food or services on their own, they are spending from the little wealth they could better use to establish their new lives in Europe; they, therefore, are very much in need of donations.

Most of the volunteer-based grassroots organisations as well as many established organisations were in favour of providing “general help,” including providing donations to all who ask for it, while some larger aid organisations expressed manifestly or in latent way that they were to avoid giving donations and help to “middle class” or “wealthier” migrants who do not actually need it, or to those that might need it but have already received sufficient help from the grassroots groups. In general, some of the larger charities stated clearly that they have limited their donations and aid activities by adapting to the needs in the wake of the work done by the new volunteers; in order to avoid “over donating” or “over pampering” the migrants, they decided not to provide for needs that are already covered by the grassroots groups, but to search out a niche where help is still lacking. Along this track some of these organisations decided that this niche was providing medical assistance.

The above issue is closely linked to the questions of “whose job is it to help in a crisis like this,” “what do regulations allow and prescribe,” and “who is responsible for what?” Most of the stakeholders agree that some kind of mixture of help coordinated between state bodies, NGOs, charities and also the new volunteer-based grassroots organisations would be ideal. While some of the large aid organisations in particular expressed an opinion according to which more central (for example state run) coordination would have been needed between actors to better cope with the refugee crisis this year, the smaller NGOs, and especially the new grassroots organisations, condemned the Government’s, as well as the major charity organisations’, passivity during the crisis in unambiguous terms.

2.4.2 INNER MOTIVATION (COMMITMENT) VS RED TAPE AND GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS

As our analysis mainly focuses on organisations, we must also examine what kind of organisational characteristics played a role in the activities of the stakeholders. The situation seems to be clear at first sight: the new grassroots groups are more committed to their work, whereas the old professional aid organisations have a lot of red tape, and although they are also committed to their original mission to help those in need, there are some actors who are just going through the motions. This basic setup was different to some extent during the 2015 refugee crisis, as some professional aid workers (especially in the beginning) were, although active to some extent, almost invisible in the field, especially when we take into consideration their capacities; at the same time the new grassroots groups became bureaucratised while working in the field, going through all the childhood problems of young organisations with fundamental debates about aid work and the processes of establishing working routines. Behavioural deviations produced strong inner conflicts that took their toll on both the new and the established organisation, sometimes leading to a restructuring of the whole organisation.

Almost everyone is blaming someone else for providing suboptimal levels of help during the crisis, i.e. implicitly blaming each other that their activity is too amateurish and thus they should not be active in this field or that they are not fulfilling their mission. Some of the professional aid workers expressed their concerns that the volunteers were at times too amateurish and made a number of basic mistakes (e.g. giving out too many donations) while helping. On the contrary, volunteers and grassroots organisations usually accused the professional organisations (long-established smaller and larger organisations) of doing too little (compared to the level that would have been expected from the organisation in terms of its mission, size, capacity, resources, etc.). There are several possible reasons why these established NGOs and charity organisations received so much criticism: perhaps their activities were indeed virtually invisible; they might have responded to the challenges too slowly; they provided indeed little or no help at some stage during the crisis; there was a lack of sufficient capacities in terms of financial resources, staff, volunteers and donations available; organisations were looking after their own interests, and they did not find a way to participate more effectively without harming their own organisation; perhaps a simple lack of commitment might also have played a role in their poor participation. On the other hand, most of the charities and NGOs themselves, who were accused of insufficient level of involvement in the refugee crisis considered their own contribution as sufficient and adequate to the situation (saying that more donations and services would have led to an excess of donation and that their involvement was proportionate to their capacities in terms of paid and volunteer staff available, resources, mission etc.

Only a few organisations admitted that they should have done more, but they also mentioned the obstacles that hindered them.

This also leads to the question whether the aid activities of the volunteers and their organisations were amateurish or professional. It would seem obvious that the established NGOs and charity organisations were the professional actors, while the new grassroots groups played the role of amateurs. However, the issue is not that clear-cut as people were often moving between the organisations. New NGOs were often founded or headed by professionals, and many active members were also professionals in social work or in the relevant fields, while professionals often moved over to the new grassroots organisations (because they did not feel they could be effective in the old organisation). All in all, although social workers, medical people, interpreters and other relevant professionals were highly represented in the activities of the amateur grassroots groups, these new initiatives basically remained amateurish, especially in the early stages of the crisis, due to the very nature of newly established grassroots organisations.

On the contrary, professional charities were sometimes also accused with non-professionalism by the grassroots, typically in relation to some technical issues of donation distribution in the field. Although these claims might be based on less objective observations, the uncertain and rapidly changing conditions might have led to less professional actions on the side of the professional organisations as well.

These kinds of accusations from any side, however, might have originated also from the competitive situation that emerged at some localities where more organisations provided aid simultaneously. The competitive attitude implicitly can be discerned in almost all the organisations, both between the established and new grassroots groups, and also within these two types of organisations.

2.4.3 RELATIONS BETWEEN AID ORGANISATIONS WITH A MIGRANT FOCUS AND OTHER DISADVANTAGED GROUPS

The question whether the aid provided to refugees was professional enough leads directly to a broader aspect of the relation between helping refugees versus helping the local poor, and how the activities of the activists during the refugee crisis related to the local vulnerable people in general.

As many professional aid organisations and NGOs actively took part in the aid work for asylum seekers, the answer is seemingly easy. In addition, as mentioned above, many professional aid workers participated in the work of voluntary organisations on their own, not linked to their current professional work, using only their expertise and sometimes network in the same or other areas of social work. Still, the bulk of the activists were volunteers, either without any relevant experience, or with only loose links to some former voluntary or professional aid work.

There were also some examples when NGOs experienced in helping migrants shared their knowledge with the amateurish grassroots. Although the helping attitude from the experienced NGOs was clear, many of these examples was realised ad hoc: e.g. there were accidental, not planned meetings with the representatives of the NGO and the grassroots group or personal network helped the actors to get in touch. There were, however, some other examples when an NGO was approached by the grassroots without previous personal contact or coincidental encounter.

Among the several possible examples, the activity of professionals from the area of homeless care was seemingly the most remarkable in the aid work related to refugees. One of the largest volunteer-based grassroots organisations was led by a social worker from a homeless shelter, and the shelter where he works also provided help there (giving refugees a chance to wash themselves). Other professionals, including the deputy director of the central homeless care of Budapest Municipality was also active as an individual volunteer, as the leader of homeless care institutions, and also as the director of the board of a homeless care foundation.

Regarding the relation between helping refugees and local vulnerable people the real motion of debate within and between organisations was whether the food, clothing and other goods and services donated to the refugees should be shared with the local poor, e.g. homeless people who showed up around the refugees in transit zones, or whether the leftover from the refugee crisis should be given later to the local homeless or the poor? What was the aim of the donors: providing help only to refugees, or to any vulnerable people? During the “rush hours” of the crisis, when the amount of donations (food, drink, blankets, clothes etc.) is not sufficient for the refugees, which is more fair ethically: sharing the already insufficient amounts with the homeless lining up with the refugees, or rejecting them? The answers to these very acute questions varied in the field and depended more on the actual person in charge at the moment than on some general ethos of the group; however, most grassroots decided that theoretically all the vulnerable should be helped.

And these questions lead to a more general but still relevant aspect to consider: is there the same amount of or less sympathy for helping other disadvantaged groups in Hungary (the poor, large families, the Roma, the homeless), and are there similar numbers of or fewer volunteers to help these groups? Some of the interviewees told us bluntly that the local poor enjoy less sympathy and receive less help. One volunteer doctor expressed her experience with the emergency medical system, which is often less sympathetic with the local poor, too. One grassroots leader summed up this question in an explicit way: *"no matter whom you help, it will hurt someone for sure"*.⁶⁶

The background of it was aptly summed up by the executive of an aid organisation *"If it had turned out that everybody wanted to stay in Hungary, and we would have to take care of them, integrate them, and not simply provide them with food for two days, dress their wounds and then wave goodbye to them as they get on the trains... that would have been a different story"*.

So why were Hungarian citizens so ready to help the refugees, and why are they less active when it comes to the Hungarian poor? According to the same executive quoted above, there were some distinctive features with regards to the refugee crisis that increased civilian sympathy and activity. First of all, the task was not trying to solve all the problems of the refugees: what they needed was immediate help. Moreover, the task was not hopeless: refugees just had to be helped to move on. And last but not least, helping refugees who were rejected by the Government was indeed an act against the Government's policies. Thus this refugee crisis was something different and sometimes a special adventure: *"it was exciting to take a baby buggy to the freeway in the middle of the night"* (executive of an aid organisation).

2.4.4 PLAYING A POLITICAL ROLE VS BEING APOLITICAL

One of the most often highlighted aspects behind the refugee aid is the political commitment behind the organisations. More precisely according to widespread opinion the emergence of the civilian activity was solely driven by an oppositional commitment (however, these opinions also allowed some organisations to remain apolitical or independent), while it is also very often mentioned that some established NGOs, and especially some larger charities, were active along the Government's policies, directly or indirectly. Both opinions are too generalizing; a more detailed picture can be outlined along the role of political commitments, if any, in the activity of the organisations. In general most actors (besides the Government and state bodies)

⁶⁶ „mindegy, hogy kinek segítesz, az valakinek fájni fog”

claim to be politically neutral, other actors can, however, be categorised in the following way by their words and deeds: some are neutral (or seem to be neutral) both in word and deed; some others are neutral in word, but mixed in deed (divided internally); there might be some that are neutral in word, but clearly following certain political values in deed, and also there might be some clearly committed politically both in word and deed. Discovering the role of political commitments behind the activities of the various organisations along the above aspects requires more analysis, as the interviews might only give an incomplete picture about it.

Although the new volunteers and grassroots per se were usually identified as oppositional actors (and the amendment of the asylum legislation stressed even more the political motivation as the new legislation made possible to criminalise those who help the migrants by accusing them as human traffickers or smugglers, see Kallius–Monterescu–Rajaram, 2016), this cannot be extended to all volunteers, even though many of them acted with more or less political motivations, more specifically with opposition views, but many others' activity was based only on solidarity and humanity. Moreover, those volunteers who took part in the relief work with any political motivation identified their activity as primarily a humanitarian act with a focus on the aid work, and the political commitment is only in the background. (For more on this see Chapter 3.) The political status of the new organisations, however, was unclear for many reasons and it became even more complex by the fact that these organisations are especially exposed to external political lures from the left-wing opposition (and in some cases also felt to be exposed to threat from the extreme right political activists) simply because they are new-born. These lures necessarily led to internal debates on political commitment or being apolitical, as there were no crystallised routines on who to cooperate with and who not to cooperate with, and these debates sometimes led to tensions.

The complex and debated political context around the refugee crisis and the aid work however took a toll on every type of organisation: internal debates concerning political motivations or independence emerged in a manifest or latent way in quite many of the organisations we have interviewed.

2.4.5 THE USE OF THE MEDIA AND ITS PROFESSIONALISM (SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE PRESS)

The use of social media with an intensity and effectiveness never seen before in Hungary (both by asylum seekers and helpers) was a really big hit during the crisis, and one of the most relevant lessons to be learnt for the Hungarian civil society. (For more on the representation of the organizations in the online media see Chapter 4.) However, the very strong impact of on-

line media and especially the social media was no surprise at all: Hungarians themselves have never before experienced such a great influence on contemporary events just next door or on the street, as they witnessed the emergence of such active and influential Facebook groups. Such emerging groups might be able to turn the wheel of history far away from Hungary, for example in the Arab Spring, but surely not here and now. In brief: without Facebook the events related to the refugee crisis would have certainly been quite different.

Not only social media, which means Facebook in Hungary (as Twitter and other sites have very little impact), but also television channels and the online press was even more influential than usual, even though the power of online media in general is stronger everyday. Based on the commonly acknowledged power of social media and the online press, almost all the actors in the crisis used these channels in a very conscious way, and they also showed an example to all the other stakeholders of how to use the media in the future. In this the new grassroots certainly had a leading role.

Although typically all parties used the media in a carefully calculated way (including the conscious decision of not using it), this has become automatic later with less control on the media, as the processes related to the media became more and more path dependent (information flow, news items and articles about events and actors, the use of Facebook groups by an increasing number of people with various motivations, etc.).

As said above all parties used the media according to their goals: the Government, via its own media outlets, only gave voice to its own point of view; major media outlets, the online and offline press of the left wing opposition, as well as the major commercial TV channels were dominated by both the new and the established NGOs and organisations; the major aid organisations were initially invisible by the media, but having received a barrage of criticism they increased their media presence, and last but not least, the media was also effectively used by bellwethers among the refugees, even demanding its presence on occasion (e.g. the march on the freeway on September 4, or at “the battle of Röszke” on September 16, etc.).

2.4.6 THE PLANS AND POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE MOBILISATION OF THE ORGANISATIONS

Our last, but one of the most exciting questions is whether the current civilian activity related to the refugees is an indicator of new appearance of solidarity, and whether solidarity and civil participation is on the rise in Hungary, or this sudden outburst will only remain an exceptional

case with no long-term impact? To what extent can we expect the volunteers active in helping the refugees to be active in some other, similar situation?

The answer first seems to be simple: as some people in the new grassroots organisations were professional or voluntary aid workers even before the refugee crisis, there is no doubt that they are committed to helping those in need and most probably they continue this activity. Volunteers without similar backgrounds might also be activated later, as their motivation was strong social sensitivity that led them to the field to help in the first place. (For more on the volunteers future plans see Chapter 3.) However, it should be also noted that the number of active members of the grassroots decreased significantly after the migration inflow disappeared from Hungary and only a core team remained mobilised in the activities of these groups later.

More importantly, the major volunteer-based grassroots organisations seems to plan for a longer future, as they continue their aid activities several months after the masses of refugees disappeared from Hungary. Internal discussions on possible further activity started in most organisations (new and established ones as well), immediately following the refugee crisis in Hungary: How shall we go on? Right after the migrants disappeared from Hungary due to the physical and legal closure of the Southern borders, the organisations, grassroots and charities followed different strategies. Some of them kept continue their aid activity in neighbouring countries where the migration flow reached its top. Some grassroots stopped their activity officially, while other grassroots, charities and NGOs are preparing themselves for a possible new migration wave reaching Hungary but at the same time focusing on other local activities. As this brief outline suggests, there are very different answers to this question along different approaches and the answers are also very different by their level of elaboration.

❖ One of the largest grassroots organisations, Migration Aid, became a registered NGO in the UK (due to administrative reasons), and continues to work with refugees with an international focus and has very ambitious plans. Three main projects were drafted by the end of November 2015 and only the first one started to operate fully by February 2016: (1) the project “*Sirius help*”⁶⁷ is active in saving lives on the Aegean sea by boats and ships with the work of volunteers from many countries; (2) an information centre will be set up accompanied by a mobile phone application in order to gather reliable information on refugee flows worldwide to provide sufficient input for aid activity and (3) in the framework of “*Sirius.one*” (International Volunteer Eco-Village)⁶⁸ villages for refugees are planned to

⁶⁷ <http://migaid.org/sirius-help/>

⁶⁸ <http://migaid.org/sirius-one/>

be established in Turkey (or in other countries) to substitute refugee camps and provide a more liveable environment for refugees than the camps offer and where refugees can live together with local and other foreign people. Their current activity partly linked to other volunteer organisations in Greece.

- ❖ Other groups of former or current Migration Aid volunteers start focusing on the refugees settling in Hungary and the local poor, rename themselves “Keleti Group,” plan to be present nationwide.
- ❖ The same applies to the other largest grassroots “Let’s Help Refugees Together” (Segítsünk Együtt a Menekülteknek), which is continuing its activity regarding refugees in other countries (from autumn in Croatia and Slovenia, from December 2015 in Athens, which requires continuous donations, and medical and aid worker volunteers) and also assisting those, who settled in Hungary or living in a camp or in Budapest. Their activity outside Hungary is partly a joint effort with other European volunteers and organisations. In addition, they also established a new Facebook group with a focus on helping the local poor and homeless named “Let’s Help Together”⁶⁹. SEM remained very active despite the difficulties of lack of sufficient donations and their portfolio is covering a wide range of activity, e.g. providing several hundreds of portions of hot meals occasionally for homeless and poor people in Budapest; collecting and distributing food donations for poor families, emergency help for vulnerable families to improve the heating of their accommodation, volunteer trainings for teenagers in high schools, providing venue for Hungarian language classes organised by MigSzol for refugees for free, etc.
- ❖ Some grassroots groups, such as Migszol Szeged, are not continuing their activity and officially announced the closing of the group as the target group of their mission has disappeared from Szeged; however, they were distributing the remaining donations either to refugees in other countries on the Balkan route or to local poor. Although the group per se stopped its operation, some of their members (independently of their former MigSzol Szeged membership) started forming new organisations (with the local poor families and children in focus).
- ❖ Members of some grassroots groups continue to keep in touch informally.
- ❖ Major aid organisations are preparing to meet new challenges in migration aid (their operations are in preparatory phases), and meanwhile returning to their original tasks, managing institutions etc., like Red Cross, Maltese Charity, Hungarian Interchurch Aid or Baptist Aid.

⁶⁹ <https://www.facebook.com/bk41segitsunkegyutt/>

- ❖ Those NGOs which have originally worked with migrants keep on serving their mission and related activities, i.e. returning to their regular work by helping the integration or providing legal aid for refugees in reception or refugee camps as well as in other locations out of the camps, like Menedék, Helsinki Committee or Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship – Oltalom Charity Society.

2.5 CONCLUSION

The migration flow crossing Hungary by the summer of 2015 escalated to such a level that the country has never witnessed before. The rapidly rising number of asylum seekers arrived temporarily to a country, which is characterised in general by a low level of trust, solidarity and civil activity as well as widespread xenophobia. These features were exploited by the Government's anti-immigration politics that has been promoted by an intensive communicational campaign, including billboards with anti-immigration messages.

Surprisingly, new forms of solidarity emerged to fill the niche in helping the migrants on their route to their target countries. The volume of refugees became more and more visible as the hundreds and thousands of asylum seekers gathered in public spaces especially at railway stations in downtown Budapest. Volunteer citizens formed grassroots groups (the most influential ones became Migration Aid, Let's Help the Refugees Together and MigSzol Szeged) via Facebook from late June in order to provide help (food, clothes, information etc.) for the asylum seekers in need. These volunteers claimed that this kind of service should be fulfilled by the state and the registered charities, but both remained inactive or hardly visible during the summer. Their low level of involvement was justified by the state and the charities in different ways. As for the state, it was in accordance with the Government's anti-immigration policy, while the charities claimed that they intended to avoid the collection of excess aid to the migrants and provided help on a sufficient level, as the migration flow has not reached that extent that would have needed a large-scale intervention. Civilians and volunteers claimed however that there might have been political motivations behind the invisibility of the large aid organisations. Later from September these charities became suddenly active supported by a substantial state grant to provide donations and help for migrants entering at the Croatian and leaving at the Austrian borders of Hungary and with this intervention the role of volunteers and grassroots decreased significantly.

The emergence of a volunteer movement was based on the solidarity of the participants, who used their private resources for the sake of helping migrants in need, but to some extent it also reflected criticism towards the anti-immigration approach of the Government. Nevertheless, describing the volunteers and grassroots as purely oppositional actors might be misleading and decreasing the significance of the solidarity as a main driver of their voluntarism. As other stakeholders were also active on the field but with varying degree of visibility and involvement, including established NGOs specialised in supporting migrants or related social work and the established aid charities, a recurring question was the nature of their motivations: is it a real inner commitment or more likely a kind of “red tape and going through the motions” that drove the organisations. Although almost all organisations were satisfied with their contribution (*vis-à-vis* their capacities), the grassroots often claimed that the large established charities performed poorly, especially during the first half of the refugee crisis in Hungary. A more and more open debate started to emerge on this topic, namely “which organisations did their best and which provided less compared to their capacities?” Usually the grassroots accused the large charities with underperformance, while the large charities assessed the work of grassroots as non-professional, which thus provided an excess in donations to the migrants. The activity of these new grassroots, indeed, bore all the childhood illnesses of any newborn organisations with the lack of rules, infrastructure etc., which led to less smooth field work, and although many of the leaders and members of these groups had professional background in social work, the majority were still amateur.

The role of media was extraordinary in the grassroots’ movement. The inevitable role of the social media, especially Facebook is among the most important tools in the evolution of the movement, as the grassroots groups popped up in Facebook as well as organised and promoted their daily activity via this site. Online press monitored the migration crisis as well as the new grassroots’ helping activity with a growing intensity and it contributed to the resupply of the donations and the newly joining volunteers. Nevertheless, the media representation of the refugee crisis and of the grassroots was divided along political lines and it was very difficult to report on the events independently as the reception of news on this topic was highly polarised politically. Anyway, online media, besides social media played an extremely influential role both from a pro and an anti-immigration approach.

The question whether the emerging grassroots expressed only occasional solidarity or their activity might be long-lasting and will lead to a permanent solidarity movement can be answered only partially due to the relatively short time since the migrant inflow reached Hungary. There are grassroots that seemingly survived in the short-term at least and work for

the refugees staying in Hungary as well as support them with donations and volunteer work in other countries (in the Balkans and Greece) since the inflow to Hungary stopped. Their resources and the number of their activists are shrinking though. Looking at the three major grassroots' present and future activity, Migration Aid has the most ambitious plans and activity on international level in the form of various projects; Let's Help the Refugees Together! group shares its decreasing resources between their activity in Greece and Hungary with a comprehensive domestic relief work targeting the Hungarian poor and vulnerable refugees as well, while MigSzol Szeged terminated its activity after distributing their stocks of donations to Hungarians in need as well as to asylum seekers travelling on the Balkan route. Besides, some of the grassroots and individual volunteers continue their volunteer relief work in other organisations or independently, while many of them became inactive, although judging from the still relatively high membership of migrant-helping Facebook groups, their attention and sensibility might have remained.

3 BEYOND THE HUMANITARIAN MIRACLE – VOLUNTEERS’ ROLE DURING THE REFUGEE CRISIS BY FRUZZINA MÁRTA TÓTH AND ANNA KERTÉSZ

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2015, thousands of Hungarian volunteers organised themselves to help the asylum seekers that crossed the country. According to quantitative findings, 3 per cent of the population took part in the aid work and 7 per cent claimed to have an acquaintance who had participated (TÁRKI OMNIBUSZ October 2015). This phenomenon may not seem extraordinary in itself, but considering that it happened in a country characterised by xenophobic attitudes (see the results of the international surveys presented in Bernát et al., 2015), a weak civic environment, and in a society with a low level of trust in general (TÁRKI, 2013; Boda–Medve–Bálint, 2012), we believe it is worth being studied.

Based on the quantitative findings of TÁRKI’s time series on xenophobia a growing part of the Hungarian adult population can be considered xenophobic, and a diminishing part can be classified as xenophilic. (See the main results and trends of the representative surveys in Chapter 1). The weakness of the civil society can be observed in a number of areas from low citizen participation in public affairs to a general ignorance of political news. In this study, we focus our attention on voluntary work, as the people active in the observed groups mostly defined themselves as helpers and volunteers, and their work can be considered aid work.

In the following, we consider people who take part in helping activities as *volunteers* along three criteria: (1) their activity is based on their own free will (2) with the aim of helping others or for the common good and (3) without financial reimbursement (UN, 2000; Czike–Bartal, 2004). Some researchers also add the criteria that volunteer work is necessarily done within a formal organisation (Wilson, 2000). We have not applied these criteria, as the groups we have studied are volunteer-based grassroots groups, and this criteria would exclude them from being considered as volunteers; we therefore decided to use a broader definition.

The tendency to focus more on informal types of volunteering can be perceived in many recent studies as this form of helping others is more widespread in Hungary; 28 per cent of the adult Hungarian population helps individually outside of an organisational context (KSH, 2012). However, the beneficiaries of these activities are most likely family members, friends, or acquaintances, and rarely strangers. We believe this does not reflect volunteer work as such, but a system of favors. This also indicates that Hungarians are not trusting of either each other, or official institutions, etc. (TÁRKI, 2013).

Even though volunteer work is generally associated with the altruistic attitude of helping without expecting anything in return, studies show that egoistic aims such as achieving social standing or maintaining a positive self-image may also have a part in motivating volunteers (Batson et al., 1983). In the recent literature these two-dimensional models were replaced by multi-dimensional models that analyze the effects of social norms, value systems and social psychological factors simultaneously (Esmond-Dunlop, 2004; Bartal-Kmetty, 2011). In our research, we have aimed to explore motivations other than the will to help people in need, based on the volunteers' narratives.

We also have to consider the highly politicised context of the voluntary work during the summer and fall of 2015. The government clearly rejected the refugees and asylum seekers and even ran a media campaign antagonizing them, thus the work of the volunteers was unavoidably politicised as being against the government's anti-immigration policy. In the complex situation that developed the helpers may be considered both as volunteers and as activists (Kende, 2015). Therefore we have also examined how the participants identified themselves, what individual and group identities had formed, whether these identities had gone through the process of politicisation (Simon-Klandermas, 2001), and how these identities might influence the participants' future participation in collective action.

In our qualitative research, we aimed to explore the role of volunteers in the refugee crisis, the social groups that joined in the aid work and their motivations, the types of work done, and finally, we ask the question whether these experiences may turn into long lasting civic commitment.

The present paper is organised as follows: We start by describing the interviewees as well as our methodology and recruitment process. Then we describe what we discovered: how one became a volunteer, how the volunteers described the operation of the grassroots organisations, the motivational structures we discovered based on an analysis of the interviewees'

narratives, and the formation (or the lack thereof) of their collective identities. At last, we try to answer the question whether these events can be considered as lone civil actions, or the beginning of a long-lasting commitment on the part of the volunteers. In the last chapter, we discuss our conclusions drawn from the study.

3.2 METHODOLOGY

In the qualitative phase of our study, we conducted three focus groups (with 21 participants altogether) and conducted 16 individual interviews in three cities, namely Budapest, Debrecen and Szeged, in the autumn of 2015. We chose these cities based on their important roles during the refugee crisis. Szeged is the closest city to the Hungarian-Serbian border, and Budapest was the gateway to the West, as all railway lines from Hungary to Western countries start there. Since Hungary can be considered a transit country, the refugees heading to Western European countries had to cross Budapest. As for Debrecen, it was the only major city with a refugee camp at the time, and therefore many refugees had arrived to the city. During the focus groups, it became clear that the leaders and the citizens of the three cities all had different views on the refugee crisis which influenced their aid work in different ways (see more on that in Chapter 2 of the present report).

Both the focus groups and the individual interviews were based on a structured guideline focusing on the following topics: becoming a volunteer, main tasks and duties, cooperation and conflicts, motivation structures and future plans about volunteering.

3.2.1 THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS

We aimed to recruit volunteers who were active throughout the summer in the work of Facebook-based grassroots relief groups, either as leaders or ordinary “helpers”. The method of the recruitment was partly based on our personal channels and snowball sampling. The selection of the focus groups’ participants was carried out in a different way. In Szeged, we contacted the local leader of the MigSzol Group, and the focus group was organised by him (he contacted the participants and choose the location). In Debrecen, one of the active members of the volunteer group connected us with the local leader of Migration Aid Debrecen. With the participants suggested by this leader, we decided on a location and date via Facebook, as all participants mainly used Facebook for their communication within the aid group anyway. In

Budapest, our method was to recruit participants from all the railway stations, thus covering the whole Migration Aid Budapest group.

Therefore, we obtained a rather heterogeneous group of respondents as far as their roles in the relief work were concerned. The pool of our interviewees included those who worked as administrators, organisers, warehouse workers, and a significant number of them that worked on the railway stations, border crossing points, and provided social help and information services on the field. The diversity of the sample ensured that we would receive a more complete picture of the volunteers' personal motivations, their path leading to volunteering and the time before their decision to start volunteering.

In case of the focus groups, due to the nature of the method, we should consider the possible effects of group dynamics and the distortions that may affect our results. In the cases of the groups of Szeged and Debrecen, we noticed established role structures; these people took part in the focus group as people with specific roles in their teams, which might have influenced their opinions. In the case of the Budapest focus group, we worked with a more heterogeneous group, therefore we believe the role structures had a smaller biasing effect on our results. During the focus groups we worked with people who, at the time, were still actively involved in the work of the aid groups. In the case of the individual interviews, 10 people were not involved with the aid work at the time of the interviews.

To sum up the demographics of the participants: 12 men and 25 women were included in the sample. As for age distribution, we had participants from teenagers to seniors, most of our interviewees (17 participants) belonged to the 31 to 40 years olds group, the second most common age group was 41 to 52 (13 people), and the least populous group (with 7 participants) was that of the 16 to 30 years olds.

Of all our interviewees, only one did not have a degree in higher education. This distortion may be caused by the data recording method, as we recruited from our own personal networks and it may also have been caused by the individual interviews due to the snowball method used. The composition of the interviewees by gender, age, education and location of the interview/focus group is summarised in the *Table 3.2.1*.

Table 3.2.1 Summary of the sample

	Date	Location	Average education	Age group	Gender		No. of participants
					Male	Female	
MigSzol Szeged	16.10.2015	Szeged	higher	16–50	4	4	8
Migration Aid Debrecen	20.10.2015	Debrecen	higher	30–40	1	5	6
Migration Aid Budapest	28.10.2015	Budapest	higher	20–52	1	6	7
Individual interviews	02.10.2015– 22.12.2015	Szeged, Budapest	higher	20–50	6	10	16
Total	–	–	–	–	12	25	37

The average length of the interviews was 84 minutes. The results, based on the written and audio records, were analyzed both horizontally and vertically following the guideline (Vicsek, 2006).

Even though we cannot unconditionally generalise our results of such a small sample to the target population, as we are examining a relatively small target population (i.e. refugee aid volunteers), we may consider our results as the basis of a hypothesis regarding the whole of target population (Sim, 1998).

3.3 MOTIVATION, ATTITUDES AND THE ACTIVITY OF THE VOLUNTEERS

3.3.1 BECOMING A VOLUNTEER

According to a large-scale ($N = \text{cca}1500$), but non-representative quantitative survey (Kende, 2015) and the experiences of our interviewees, mostly women and people from various fields of the humanities took active helping roles during the refugee crisis.

The time of the beginning of the aid work mostly correlated with the summer, when the first large groups of refugees appeared at the railway stations, and the volunteers' first encounter with the issue itself fell into three distinct categories: (1) a personal experience with the refugees; (2) volunteering at the invitation of a friend or acquaintance; and (3) gathering information online from a previously organised grass-roots group's Facebook page.

It is important to stress that the whole involvement and dedication process usually took days or weeks, thus it is often difficult to clearly distinguish between various ways of joining up.

“My train came to Keleti Station, back then only a few families were there and I instantly gave them the food I had and after that it was obvious that I would help.” (female, 41, from Budapest, individual volunteer)

“I simply saw them, for example I saw a very tired couple who were barely able to walk on the street and I felt pity for them (...) but it was a newspaper article that made me feel that I have to be there and help others, (...) where they said that a teen girl is running out food and drink and then I felt I need to be there too. So this ‘giving is good’ sentiment is what motivated me.” (female, 49, from Szeged, individual volunteer)

One key question regarding the beginnings of the aid work is how many of our interviewees had any previous experiences in volunteering, either occasionally or regularly. Roughly every third person, 14 out of the 38 interviewees had volunteered previously with another organisation, thus the majority volunteered for the first time during the refugee crisis of 2015 by using their time and often their money to aid vulnerable people.

Of those who had volunteered before, 3 interviewees had worked as human rights activists, and 7 as activists of other social issues, providing aid to vulnerable people, people with disabilities or socially disadvantaged. Most of the helpers, however, had no such experience. Their struggle to get accustomed to their roles on the field was a recurring theme during our interviews. Lacking the appropriate social skills and expertise, the intensity of the work (they had often spent 10–20[!] hours on the field during the busiest days of the crisis), burning out, and the perception of not being understood came up again and again in our discussions.

3.4 THE OPERATION OF THE GRASSROOTS ORGANISATIONS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE VOLUNTEERS

3.4.1 DIVISION OF LABOR WITHIN THE ORGANISATIONS

The grassroots groups that emerged during the refugee crisis had no hierarchy or levels of organisation. At the beginning of the field work, volunteers were involved in multiple types of work, from distributing the occasional donations to providing information up to the more specific tasks of providing legal and medical aid.

Usually, following the satisfaction of the refugees' basic needs, the volunteers took a more organised role with the help of the newly promoted coordinators in the organisations that were being formed. In the organisational framework, volunteers developed two types of tasks: supportive background ("back office") work and field work. Background work included the reception, sorting, and delivery of donations, stockpile management, the administration of Facebook groups and online communication. Field work was mostly based on personal interaction with the refugees, including handing out donations, providing maps, information, legal advice, first aid, helping out with translation, and taking care of children.

These two roles, however, were not always separated. The groups in Budapest (mostly the ones at the train stations) developed higher levels of organisation by creating certain positions with responsibilities and competencies. In smaller cities (like in Debrecen or Szeged) the lack of volunteers led to a less crystallised work distribution/allocation.

In other cases, from the on site solutions of ad hoc problems, to the tasks requiring extensive research at home, everything was often done by everyone. Here, the organisational framework often also meant the organisation of work and delegation of tasks.

"At Ásotthalom [at the Serbian–Hungarian border area], sometimes even in the woods, we ran around with my 14 years old kid and we handed out food, drinks and clothes. But I could only help with my work." (female, 49, from Szeged, individual volunteer)

"We only needed the organisation to tell us when and where the tasks are; beyond that, everyone pretty much worked on their own, knew what to do, and even if they didn't, someone explained it quickly and got it done, and probably the reason why everyone

involved loved it is because of that self-realisation in solving the problem your own way, from handing out water to whatever else.” (male, 48, from Szeged, individual volunteer)

Some managed to find specialised areas where they could provide help beyond the general tasks. A woman (aged 31) for example, based on her own maternal experiences, had gathered baby slings and then distributed them and taught their use to refugee families. Everyone helped when and wherever they could.

“I actually did not help the adult refugees, because an adult can make a choice and a decision, but a child cannot. No child deserves this fate, because they are not responsible for the situation they got into.” (female, 31, individual volunteer)

3.4.2 THE DYNAMICS OF VOLUNTEERING

The dynamics of the volunteer work in the grassroots groups differs considerably from the work of established NGOs (e.g. the Helsinki Committee), or charity organisations (e.g. the Red Cross). The constantly changing situation had led to a fluid organisational structure. Volunteers were often forced to make decisions promptly and those taking upon themselves the responsibility of making the decisions were the ones who became the coordinators – regardless of their skills or education.

When examining the dynamics of volunteer work, we noticed three distinct categories: (1) those who spent more time on the field as the refugee crisis developed; (2) those whose investment of time and work did not significantly change with the number of refugees; and (3) those whose activity decreased with time, mostly for personal reasons (i.e. work, domestic duties, holidays).

Since the immediate fate of the refugees and the arrival of organised help from the government or from larger aid organisations was unpredictable, volunteers felt they had to do everything they could to help those in obvious in needs.

“At first I thought this cannot go on like this for long. Thus I did my best when and wherever I could.” (male, 48, from Szeged, University teacher)

Volunteers all claimed that during the peak days of the crisis they worked on the border of being sleep deprived, and they only went home when they were totally exhausted, only to be back on the field having slept a few hours.

“We lived alongside them, going home only to sleep.” (male, middle aged, Budapest, individual volunteer)

“I have been out there terribly long. I practically spent all my time there, continuously.” (male, 36, Budapest, individual volunteer)

It is obvious from the interviews that there was no time to contemplate the situation and that the number of tasks rose steadily, just like the number of refugees needing legal advice, medical attention, or help in finding lost relatives.

Many of the helpers gave shelter to families in their homes, treated wounds, some even helped them to the border despite being aware of their own legal liability.

“My most intense experience was after the troubles at Röszke, when things got out of control. I hid refugees at the station and drove them to the border in a car. I knew the risks involved. (female, 22, Szeged, individual volunteer)

It is clear that the majority of the helpers (especially the ones from Budapest) quit volunteering almost immediately after events shifted beyond the capital and to the southern border, i.e. once the refugees left the train stations, so did the volunteers. We will further discuss this in the chapter titled *Lone civil action or long lasting commitment?*

Lack of professional competence, and a need for mentoring and supervision came up in a number of interviews. Aid workers felt that they needed the most help with questions of legal matters because, despite receiving advice from professionals with many years of experience, the information did not spread fast enough in the field and sometimes they provided refugees with contradictory instructions. The unpredictable daily shift of legal regulations also meant further problems for volunteers providing information in the field.

3.4.3 CONFLICTS AND COOPERATION

Conflicts and cooperation on the personal level arose mostly around daily tasks. Since individual volunteers in the qualitative sample only participated for a limited amount of time in the life of these grassroots initiatives, they lacked insight into this matter.

Most interviewees did not have a sense of conflicts, as these situations were mostly handled by coordinators. They only reported minor conflicts that arose from miscommunication and tension. The main problems they reported were caused by the low rate of organisation and arose between the people in administration and on the field. Some people claimed that the situation was chaotic both between organisations as well as between organisations and individual volunteers.

“Hungarians like to quarrel, we dissent before we pull together and that is what happened this time as well, we had already hated each other before anything even happened.” (female, 30, Szeged, individual volunteer)

The unclear competencies and different levels of personal involvement also caused conflicts, especially between field activists:

“I had a problem with a fellow volunteer, who got so wrapped up in the news, felt such an urge to satisfy every need instantaneously, that he/she became hysterical. There were many different people here.” (female, 38, Budapest, individual volunteer)

In the focus groups, we had a chance to talk to people who were members of the grassroots organisations or were regularly involved with them.

Members of the Budapest focus group mentioned several conflicts. They stressed the problem of self-appointed leaders, whose positions as coordinators were not necessarily supported by skill or experience. The coordination of donations and volunteers was inadequate according to a number of focus group participants. Overstrain and exhaustion also caused problems, but these were usually well managed. Either the volunteers exercised self-restraint, i.e. they did not go out to the railway station when they felt they were unable to help, or they were sent home by their fellow volunteers. However, there were conflicts that escalated to the point of people regularly getting blocked from the Facebook group.

“This little circle of people who claimed to be the leaders of the aid group has formed.”
(female, 38, Budapest, member since the beginning)

Members of the Debrecen group did not report major personal conflicts. Tension arose from strain, but they managed this by sending the exhausted members of the group home.

“The atmosphere was very intimate. We managed for one and a half months without any strain whatsoever.” (female, 43, founder)

The Szeged group felt important to lay down ground rules, mostly concerning political party neutrality. People who did not observe this rule were to be expelled, as this indeed occurred later. On the personal level they reported that only strain and exhaustion led to conflicts, and this was handled, as in the case of the Budapest and Debrecen groups, by sending exhausted volunteers home.

3.5 MOTIVATIONAL STRUCTURES AMONG VOLUNTEERS

During the focus groups and the interviews, we asked the interviewees to recall three crucial moments of their volunteer work:

1. *when they had decided to help;*
2. *when they first arrived in the field;*
3. *when they met their first refugee.*

Based on their answers, we identified three main motivational structures. While the individual narratives varied, the motivations they outlined clearly defined the type of work the volunteer would do and therefore the context in which they would present it. As mentioned above, the different types of work weren't always completely separated, volunteers often had multiple jobs.

3.5.1 TRADITIONAL MOTIVATIONAL STRUCTURE – “THE GOOD SAMARITAN”

“The first thing I noticed was that people were starving. And if people are starving, we can't let them.” (female, Szeged, 33)

The volunteers in the first group of our classification are the ones whose main motivation was their human desire to help or feeling sorry for the refugees. They perceive asylum seekers as an out-group (Tajfel–Turner, 1979) that they want to help because of their internal motivation. This group exhibited the features of the traditional motivational structure (Czike–Bartal, 2004), which is based on altruistic aims and often religious reasons, and is the most common motivational structure among Hungarian volunteers.

People making up this group are typically middle-aged women who first got into aid work as donors, and later came to do background or field work. In the field their relationship to asylum seekers was characterised by the process of trust-building.

“A message came that infants were arriving. (...) I thought I wasn't going to give anyone a ride. In the end, I took an Afghan family to the refugee camp; mother, father and two kids. We didn't speak a common language. The father was completely untrusting. So was I. I showed them where we were going on the map. Then I saw that the mother was breastfeeding the small one in the back seat. They only calmed down when we reached the camp.” (female, 32, Debrecen, member since the beginning)

Volunteers that practice their religions—whether they be Christians, Jews or Muslims—all mentioned the role of their religion's values as a reason to help the asylum seekers:

“If you recall, all this began during the Ramadan. Us Muslims have to pay a so-called 'tax' during the Ramadan to those in need. I was happy that, for the first time in my life, I was able to pay the tax directly to people in need.” (female, 46, Budapest, member since July)

“I wanted to show that our culture is helpful and that it protects people. I was raised religious and it was thought in my family that we have to help.” (female, 41, Budapest, individual volunteer)

Since these groups' main aim was to help those in need, in some cases helpers decided to help only a specific group (e.g. mothers, or families, or Syrians):

"With the first wave, we knew for a 100 per cent that they are from Syria and Afghanistan, but later on many arrived from India and Pakistan too, where I do not believe are big problems and who I don't think really need my help; I think they should go home."
(female, 20, from Szeged, individual volunteer)

This helper paid more attention to helping families and children, because she felt that they were the ones who actually needed her help.

3.5.2 INVOLVEMENT AND A SENSE OF DUTY – "THE COUNTRYMAN"

In the second group volunteers claimed that their main reason to help was personal involvement. They referred to themselves as being involved because of their own experiences as migrants or having family members in the sending countries. For example a Syrian man who moved to Hungary 30 years ago, or the Hungarian wife of an Arabic man were parts of this group. Unlike the first group, they considered the asylum seekers to be part of their in-group (Tajfel–Turner, 1979). Members of this group had no previous experience of volunteering.

"Quite a lot of my fellow countrymen arrived, and I felt it was my duty to help." (male, 51, Szeged, Syrian)

"I've never seen them as refugees, but as my family members. My husband is Arabic, my children are half-Arabic. (...) If they (the refugee kids) were crying, I embraced them, listened to them." (female, 33, Debrecen, volunteering since August)

In their volunteer work they usually acted as interpreters because of their language skills, two of them, being doctors, also helped with healthcare. They think that among the volunteers, interpreters developed the closest relationships with the asylum seekers as the common language provided a basis for trust-building. The asylum seekers asked them what they couldn't share with the other volunteers. In extreme cases, they became part of the families' hardest moments:

“The kid was very sick, they called me to interpret in the hospital. Unfortunately, he died, so I had to help arrange an Arabic funeral for him. I watched him dying. The father asked me to stay there.” (female, 49, member since the beginning)

3.5.3 POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS – “THE ACTIVIST”

Members of the third group were first motivated primarily by a feeling of outrage at the official policy regarding asylum seekers. Outrage is considered the main trigger for participation in collective actions by many scholars (e.g. Castells, 2012). Their helping behavior was contextualised by the Hungarian political field. Before first going to the field, they typically took a stand against the government’s communication either online (e.g. sharing anti-governmental Facebook posts) or in political action (e.g. destroying government propaganda billboards).

“I found the things that happen in this country outrageous, and I was very happy that others thought so, too.” (female, 42, Debrecen)

These volunteers generally took part in operative work such as coordinating the volunteer groups or liaising with the official institutions (e.g. police, Hungarian State Railway, Office of Immigration and Nationality). Personal encounters with the asylum seekers were usually episodic, and were focused on the official processes and not the refugees as people.

“We had our list already written when we went to the Mayor. We went through the list relatively quickly and they checked every box. We got wooden houses, water, washbasins, toilets (with cleaning), container for the trash, warehouse and Wi-Fi.” (female, 35, founder)

“There was a continuous struggle with Volán (regional bus company). We’d go to the bus, they didn’t let them get on. Route number, driver’s name, bus’s license plate number, then off to Segner square to see the officer in charge. We went there 3–4 times a day.” (female, 43, Debrecen, founder)

Naturally, the individual volunteers often had multiple emotions regarding the refugees, and we can’t always clearly see whether their desire to help or their feeling of outrage was stronger; e.g.:

“I wanted to show that our culture is helpful and that it protects people. I was raised religiously and it was thought in my family that we have to help. As for the billboard campaign, I was against it, I thought it was ‘not in my name’” (female, Budapest, individual volunteer).

Table 3.5.2 Summary: Motivational structures of volunteers

Motivational structures	1. Altruistic motivation	2. Involvement	3. Political motivation
Main emotion(s)	Solidarity	Duty, sadness	Outrage
Type of work	<i>Donation, background work.</i> If needed: Field work	<i>Fieldwork:</i> Interpreting, medical aid	<i>Operative tasks,</i> coordinating groups, communication with officials
Connection to asylum seekers	<i>Aid is the main connection.</i> In field work, the main motive is trust-building.	<i>Closest relationship</i> many contacts – the main reason is the language, trust is the main motive	<i>Ends with the helping work</i> less personal contact and experience because of the different type of work
Narrative	Various	Emotion-based	Objective, reflected

Source: Own classification, Tóth, 2016 (based on Czike–Bartal, 2004; Castells, 2012).

Borders were not always clear as at the beginning of the refugee crisis volunteers had to take part in multiple types of work. The different positions were only developed later. We can presume that their motivations (and their skills) led the volunteers to the most fitting positions.

The above grouping is not based on a large scale sample; however, it may be considered as a framework to better understand the motivational structures of the target population, and can be used in further research.

3.6 COLLECTIVE IDENTITY FORMATION – GRASSROOTS AS MOVEMENTS FOR SOCIAL CHANGE?

As mentioned in the introduction, the volunteer work was done in a strongly politicised situation, in which doing aid work also meant taking a stand against the official government policy.

The grassroots groups Migration Aid, MigSzol Szeged and “Segítsünk együtt a menekülteknek!” (*Let’s Help Refugees Together!*) could, in the time of their formation, be defined as opinion-based McGarty et al., 2009, the members of which didn’t agree with Hungary’s official refugee

policy. These ad-hoc organisations that had grown out of individual actions eventually developed a fluid organisational structure. Every organisation had a local core, the members of which strongly identified themselves with the organisation. In the focus groups we spoke with helpers who either had a semi-official position in the organisation (“founder”, “leader”) or could be considered core members. During the focus groups, the participants referred to themselves as members of their respective groups, which lets us presume the existence of a strong group identity. In Budapest one of participants switched from one organisation to another; during the meeting he was mostly representing the group he was currently a member of (Let’s help refugees together!), and even underlined the importance of the community feeling he had experienced with this group. However, we cannot forget about the possible distortions of the focus group method. As no personal interviews were done with the focus groups participants, we cannot claim that every one of them does indeed identify themselves the same way as during the focus groups.

As for the individual interviews, most of our interviewees didn’t identify themselves as members of a specific group. During their aid work many of them have switched groups and roles as well, which led to a lack of strong group identity. They took part in the aid work, but they didn’t take on any serious roles.

The core members seem to have undergone the process of collective identity politicisation (Simon–Klandermas, 2001). During the time of the refugee crisis their Migration Aid or MigSzol identity took precedence over their other collective identities. The groups’ conflicts with officials and locals led to a strong identification with the group. They described continuous power struggles at the stations with the officials and politicians. The highly politicised nature of the situation led to the phenomenon that volunteers were seen as activists by the general public.

“Helpers,—not only in Debrecen, but nationwide—all had confrontations with their environment, family, acquaintances, colleges...” (female, 43, Debrecen, founder)

However, they kept away from taking on political roles and tried to focus on the aid work. They most often referred to their group as “civic collective action” or “helping organisation” and not as a movement.

The volunteers who based their participation on helping didn’t consider themselves as activists, and saw their actions in a humanitarian framework. Even though volunteers with political

motivations referred to themselves as activists, or at least, supporters of the opposition, even in their case this seems to have been overshadowed by the aid aspect of the work.

“Some said that the group’s founders are trying to establish their own political careers, but that isn’t true.” (male, 36, founder, Szeged)

In the civic actions of the last few years a tendency of being “politics-free” – by what they generally mean “free of party politics” – can be observed. Activists try to act outside the existing political field, keeping opposition parties as far away as possible. The biggest conflicts inside the organisation stemmed from the ignorance of this principle. This tendency that we might call “politics-free politics” can be encountered in the grassroots groups as well.

“(Hungarian opposition party) Demokratikus Koalíció (Democratic Coalition) showed up at the woodhouse, saying that they would like to distribute some donations alongside us – that they had forgotten to tell us about in advance. However, they had published it as a press event. B. held his hand out and, well, the local DK president ran into a slap.” (male, 36, founder, Szeged)

3.7 LONE CIVIL ACTION OR LONG LASTING COMMITMENT?

Seeing the “humanitarian miracle” of the summer, the question whether it was a short term burst of activity or whether we can count on this level of self-organised volunteering in the future comes up. To be able to predict who is more likely to keep on volunteering, we need to understand what resources aid providers need in their work.

Those who volunteered during the refugee crisis seemed to share a number of characteristics that facilitated their involvement: first and maybe foremost they had free time, and the personal capacity to perform certain tasks; a large amount of family support; they possessed infrastructure (i. e. owning a vehicle). Generally speaking, better-off people were more likely to become long time volunteers.

Many had flexible working hours or were between jobs, thus they had the time to help out. Beyond this, almost every interviewee stressed how important it was to them to provide instantaneous aid for instantaneous needs, which was a very spectacular way of helping.

“As long as I had other business to take care of, I did not go out to help, even though there were refugees there already. It would be nice to provide an ideology for this, but the truth is I simply had the time and the capacity and I felt I could do something useful.” (female, 44, from Budapest, individual volunteer)

Typically, the individual interviewees were no longer volunteers nor donors, but the organisations they had worked for still existed. At the same time, the interviewees all claimed that they would provide just as much help in a similar situation not only to refugees, and in an even more organised manner.

Some stressed that refugees were in a peculiar situation, “*we did not need to find solutions for their whole lives*”, they only needed short term help.

For this reason, many wondered how much of this experience would remain with the volunteers, and how difficult it would be to activate them again.

Almost everyone agreed that it was a very good thing that these organisations had formed and that civilians had become able to provide systematic and continuous help in so many different fields and ways. Many people opened up towards homeless and minority care, and towards NGOs specialised on refugee aid abroad (e. g. Greece, Italy):

“It’s not a bad thing that these small helping organisations developed. Even if they break up, they will continue to help others in small communities.” (female, 31, from Budapest, individual volunteer)

Considering the organisation “good” or “useful” will not necessarily be the basis of the future commitment. We may presume that those who claim to identify strongly with their group will engage more likely in further activities. The focus group participants, who were typically more strongly identified with the groups, were still active and planned to keep on working in the refugee field. Whereas among the individual volunteers, the tendency seemed to be that they mostly didn’t identify themselves as members of any of the newly emerged groups and 11 of the 16 people were not active as volunteers any more at the time of the interviews. While they claimed it was possible that they would take part in volunteer activities in the future, they didn’t have defined plans or ideas about continuing the volunteer work.

3.8 CONCLUSION

In conclusion our findings seem to indicate that during the refugee crisis many were able to take part in the aid work because of the complexity of the situation. The majority of our interviewees did not have previous volunteer experiences, therefore we presume that the crisis had a strong mobilizing effect, and thus could mobilise many who were previously passive and had not taken part in any collective actions. We identified three main motivational structures: some had mainly altruistic motivations, others were mainly driven by outrage about the political situation, and yet others were first or second generation immigrants and their relatives who felt they had to get involved. As for the political aspect of the crisis we found that the majority helps in all three motivational structures identified themselves as volunteers, denied the importance of their political motivations, and they considered the aid work as the most important aspect of their work.

Considering the future mobilisation of the volunteers, our conclusion is that the allocation of the available resources, as well as the individual and group identities that had been formed may have the biggest effect on future involvement. Those who typically more strongly identified with the groups were still active, and planned to keep on working in the refugee field. Therefore we may presume that the newly formed volunteer identities and the new social networks have the greatest effect on future involvement. Most of our interviewees identified the job they had done as aid work, and planned to concentrate on helping the vulnerable and/or children in the future in the framework of their grassroots organisations or other official NGOs. At the time of the data collection some of the grassroots groups were already officially recognised, which shows the commitment of the members. (See more about the organisations at Chapter 2).

4 ONLINE MEDIA COVERAGE OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS AND GRASSROOTS GROUPS DURING THE MIGRATION CRISIS IN HUNGARY

BY JUDIT BARTA AND FRUZZSINA MÁRTA TÓTH

„As for the special meeting next week in Brussels, he [Viktor Orbán, Hungarian Prime Minister] said, that the issue of migration is a like a burst pipe. You can watch which room is being flooded, but it will not solve the problem. The supply of the migration flow must be stopped. A robust business sector has developed around bringing migrants into Europe; this human trafficking must be prevented.” (Blikk.hu, 18 Sept. 2015)⁷⁰

4.1 INTRODUCTION

A large volume of migrants from the Middle East reached Hungary in the spring of 2015. When we examine the media coverage of the activities of the aid organisations participating in the migration crisis, it is important to note that the Hungarian government started an intensive media campaign not long before the first big wave of migrants arrived. A billboard campaign was launched that warned Hungarians in advance of the migrants who allegedly come to take away their jobs and do not respect their culture. That campaign aimed at turning the public against the looming danger and politicised in advance the crisis situation, which inevitably stirred intense emotions – fear, solidarity, empathy and insecurity in the people. The task of the media in the digital networked environment (Castells–Parks–van der Haak, 2012) is not as straightforward as it used to be in the broadcasting era. Nevertheless informing, explaining and giving context is still a relevant expectation from mainstream media.

This study seeks to explore how some chief actors, namely organisations providing aid to the refugees: (1) new grassroots groups; (2) official charity and humanitarian organisations; (3) established NGOs with a focus on the asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants; and (4) international human rights organisations were represented in the Hungarian online media during the peak of the crisis. These organisations are presented in detail in the Methodology

⁷⁰ Percről percre! Horvátország felől támad az újabb menekült-hullám! Blikk.hu, 18 Sept. 2015. <http://www.blikk.hu/aktualis/politika/percrol-percre-horvatorszag-felol-tamad-az-ujabb-menekult-hullam/5b00kty>

Chapter. We conducted a computer-assisted content analysis of 267 articles published in selected major mainstream online news sites from 1 June to 30 September 2015. Our study comprises of 3 chapters. In the first chapter we review some of the current and related research in the field, in the second one we present our methodology, the construction of the database and the method used, and in the final one we discuss our results followed by an Appendix with the graphs and diagrams that we use in our discussion.

4.2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH IN THE FIELD

Bernáth and Messing (2015) analysed the Hungarian offline and online media's reports on the migration crisis right after the launching of the massive governmental campaign that tried to tune the public against the refugees. The starting point of their investigation was the Prime Minister's speech on the 11th of January, 2015, when he expressed his opinion on immigration reacting on the Charlie Hebdo attack. As the authors claim it was here that the thematization of the migration as a threat was laid down by the government. They found that the framing of the migration issue as a security risk dominated the media reports in the first few months and they identified the criminal, health and the security framings that were applied predominantly. The authors also pointed out the news media's "unprofessionalism" in conflating the different legal terms, such as migrants, refugees, immigrants, illegal immigrants, economic immigrants, which they attributed to the tank-like communication campaign of the government and the marginalization of the expert NGOs focusing on refugees from the public sphere.

Dagdelen-Tóth (2016) conducted a network analysis on Facebook during the peak of the migration crisis from the 1st of June until the 30th of September, analysing the Facebook posts of the fan pages of all the political parties of pro- and anti migration organisations. They observed the followers' behaviour (via likes) to see what posts triggered the biggest popularity and how many cross-likes were performed, and also the narratives that were put forward. They found that when the government closed the green border, the Hungarian extreme right party, Jobbik overwhelmingly won the online voting game on Facebook by getting a tsunami of likes, plus the personal Facebook page of Viktor Orbán proved to be more successful than the governing party Fidesz's social media page during the whole crisis. They also observed that there was a great overlap between the followers of the refugee supporting organisations and that of the democratic opposition parties, which together with the results of the cross-likes also indicates the deep political division of the society.

Not only the society, but the Hungarian media is also greatly polarised. After the transitions, the Hungarian media system similarly to other Central and Eastern European countries followed the Mediterranean or Polarised Pluralist Model (Hallin–Mancini, 2011), which means that the media reflects the political divisions. Since 2010, when the new media laws were adopted, this politicisation has been aggravated by a prevalent soft censorship, still relevant today. (Polyák–Nagy, 2015). A prominent example of the soft censorship operating in the media, especially in the public media, during the migration crisis was that refugee children were „forbidden” on screen in the public service television channel M1. Distorted and not transparent allocation of government advertising, government appointed supervisory agencies have since 2001 undermined the pluralism of media and created a chilling effect (ibid.). The operation of the public news agency (MTI), managed by MTVA (Media Service Support and Asset Management Fund) results in a streamlined news provision that news outlets can use for free for their reports.

In new media studies, an apt term to describe online newsmaking is „liquid journalism” coined by Mark Deuze, who adopted Zygmund Bauman’s liquid modernity concept to journalism. Liquid modernity means that conditions change faster than actions could crystallise into routines and habits. The migrant crisis gives a condensed picture of this liquid era, where everything is in a flux and in rapid movement. In the network era, nation states no longer hold the same relevance as they did half a century ago and citizenship changes its meaning as well. Liquid journalism, according to Deuze (2008) means that the journalists are not striving to provide objective news to a „general public”, but serve as facilitators of the conversation society has with itself, taking into account that news consumers are news providers as well and act as monitorial citizens, who are critical and select their own news sources. For journalists it means an immersion in social media, constant edits and remixes of content and embracing convergence. Looking at the overall Hungarian news coverage of the migrant crisis, these features were apparent. Constant minute by minute update- types of news dominated certain phases of the crisis and a large number of videos and photos were made in the transit zones, or following the refugees on their march to the borders. On the field reports, interviews with migrants and interventional journalism were all present during the crisis.

In media studies, agenda setting (McCombs–Show, 1995 [1972]) and framing (Herman–Chomski, 1988) are two classical analytical constructs that we employ in our study, both of which are concerned with the selection and filtering of themes and interpretations that appear in the news. Framing is more concerned with rhetorical and discursive strategies found in the news items. In the networked media environment agenda setting is less power-based than it was in

the broadcasting era, as social media can enhance the capacity of powerless organisations to serve as agenda setters or framers.

4.3 METHODOLOGY

4.3.1 THE ORGANISATIONS ANALYSED IN THE STUDY

We analysed the media representation of the organisations that helped refugees during the crisis in the summer and early autumn of 2015. Many helping organisations and civilian groups joined the aid work in this period, which can be divided into 4 major groups: (1) official (established) Hungarian charity/aid organisations; (2) volunteer based grassroots groups; (3) established NGOs with a focus on the asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants; and (4) international organisations (e.g. UNICEF and UNHCR).

The major charity organisations in Hungary that were also involved in the migrant crisis are the Hungarian Red Cross, Hungarian Baptist Aid, the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta, Caritas Hungarica and the Hungarian Interchurch Aid. They are all members of the Hungarian Caritative Council, which was founded by the state in 2000. These organisations mainly get their funding from their international head organisations or the Hungarian government, because they are taking over social services from the state.

The lack of visible provision of humanitarian aid by the official charity organisations, contributed to the formation of the grassroots groups. The three major groups that emerged from the beginning of the refugee crisis were: Migration Aid (MA), MigSzol Szeged (MigSzol) (Migrant Solidarity Group Szeged) and *Let's help refugees together!* (SEM). These volunteer groups started as Facebook groups and gained several hundred members in a few days and several thousands in a few weeks, then started field work at the train stations of different Hungarian cities where the refugees showed up (travelling to camps, travelling towards Western Europe, meeting relatives, friends, smugglers, etc.). The volunteer-based grassroots' fieldwork involved distributing food and drink, helping with information, ensuring the necessities for hygiene and basic health care. Firstly MigSzol Szeged was formed (25 June, Szeged is the closest city to the Serbian–Hungarian border) then MA in Budapest (29 June) and a few days later the *Let's help refugees together!* Facebook group was founded. MA quickly became a nationwide network of volunteers. Its volunteers were present in almost all cities where refugees had to cross: Buda-

pest, Debrecen, Békéscsaba, Cegléd, etc. These groups had no organisational network, officials or legal framework at that time, which was developed much later, in the autumn of 2015.

Established NGOs with refugee focus, such as Menedék – Hungarian Association for Migrants used their existing infrastructure. The Helsinki Committee (Helsinki) was the main organisation providing legal help to the refugees. International organisations as UNHCR and IOM (International Organisation for Migration) got included in this study because of their major role at the international level that might have had some impact on the Hungarian scene of the migration flow.

See more on the organisations involved in Chapter 2.

4.3.2 ONLINE MEDIA DATABASE

Given the huge media attention to this unprecedented migration crisis, where thousands of articles were published, our research is limited in scope. We focus on selected online media outlets during specific phases which were important in the lives of the aid organisations participating in the crisis. We have two main reasons to focus on the online media representation of these organisations. First of all, the new organisations which played a major role during the summer of 2015 had been formed on social media (basically on Facebook as it has a dominant position over the other social media sites in Hungary) and had generated their content mainly in the online space. Secondly, studies show that online media is more and more prominent in the news consumption habits of Hungarians.

In order to study the picture the online media painted about the NGOs, we first created a database from news published on Hungarian sites. To construct this database, we used the search engine *news.google.hu* that works on the principle of displaying the articles generating the biggest readership. This method ensured that we could code articles that were definitely read by a wide audience, and thus could have had an effect on public discourse during the refugee crisis.

To create our database we chose **five milestones** based on events that either attracted peak media attention during the migration crisis or were important with regard to the organisations.

- (1) 25–30 June – The formation of the new voluntary grassroots to help the refugees: MigAid, MigSzol Szeged, Let's Help the Refugees Together!

- (2) 05–12 August – The opening of the transit zones at the Budapest railway stations between August 25 and 28. Negotiations on the establishment of a new central transit zone in Verseny utca in Budapest replacing the transit zones operating at various railway stations. Migrant break out at Röszke (Serbian border).
- (3) 02–05 September – The march to the Hungarian–Austrian border. Statement of Cardinal Péter Erdős on the uncertain legal situation, which he says prevents the Catholic Church from helping migrants in the crisis.
- (4) 15–19 September –The battle at Röszke. Penal code modification. The physical and legal closing of the Hungarian–Serbian border; the migration routed shifted to the Croatian border.
- (5) 21–23 September – The repercussions of the Orbán address, which claims that “The government has given financial support to the NGOs to provide help for the immigrants.” The grassroots exclaim against this statement, as they have not received any state funds and they provided far the most help.

Starting off from *news.google.hu* we gathered those articles around these events that mentioned at least one organisation from our list. The database we created contains 276 articles.

From Chart Ann4.1 (in Annex 4) it is apparent that hvg.hu gave the biggest coverage to the organisations during the crisis. Origo.hu and index.hu lagged behind but were in the top four. According to the criteria of liquid journalism (Deuze, 2008) 444.hu and index.hu can be defined as such portals that are the forerunners of this journalism style by publishing many videos and following the events almost in real-time. As we did not include videos (due to methodological reasons) it might to some extent distort our sample, given that these two portals, 444.hu and index.hu made a lot of video content during the crisis taking advantage of the convergence afforded by the internet. So that can also be the cause why hvg.hu got the biggest proportion of articles in our sample (instead of index.hu or 444.hu).

We selected two milestones (the second and the fourth) for our computer-assisted content analysis. It was during the fourth milestone that the Hungarian government’s legal amendment on illegal border crossing came into effect. The Parliament on the 4th of September 2015 accepted the bill CXL on “the modification of certain laws connected to massive immigration”.

At the same time the penalties for human trafficking were made more severe.⁷¹ During this milestone, the volunteer-based activist groups were not allowed to enter the transit zones at the Southern border, and hence the agenda setting capacities of the new grassroots decreased considerably. At the same time, these two milestones were the most heterogeneous from our database with respect to media coverage. So these were our considerations behind selecting these two highly different phases for the content analysis.

When selecting the news sites for coding the articles, we applied the following criteria. First we included index.hu and origo.hu that have the widest readership among the online news portals. Secondly we selected two portals that have an oppositional stance, namely hvg.hu and nol.hu. Hirado.hu was included as belonging to the public service media, while magyarhirlap.hu and mno.hu are pro-government online newspapers. Given the local impact of the migration crisis at the Southeastern part of Hungary (where the asylum seekers entered Hungary from Serbia) and the Northwestern region (where they left the country towards Austria), we considered it important to include portals that were more local in their focus and the other outlets also relied on their contents when events took place in their areas. These were kislelkes.hu and delmagyar.hu. Lastly nlcafe.hu and blikk.hu as tabloid news outlets were also included as having a considerable outreach.

4.3.3 CONTENT ANALYSIS

The articles were coded using the content analysis software Atlas.ti⁷². Besides identifying the topics of the articles such as transit zones, border fence, refugee tragedy or aggression of refugees, etc., we coded the news types, such as opinion, report, interview, article or newsfeed. Newsfeed is a format, where the updates follow each other chronologically and very swiftly almost in real-time. Under the category of report we understood articles where the journalist goes to the place of the event and records his or her interviews, conversations with the stakeholder or witnesses, and adds his or her personal impressions. The codes: agenda source, framing and reference to the migrants are related as the source of the agenda, who is quoted the most often or whose thematizations are used also imply the framing of the issues talked about. The code 'reference to the refugees' signalled the actual term used such as migrant, illegal migrant, asylum seeker or economic migrant. We considered the agenda of an organi-

⁷¹ <http://birosag.hu/media/aktualis/tajekoztato-egy-es-torvenyeknek-tomeges-bevandozlas-kezelesevel-osszefuggo>

⁷² The coding process supplemented by the network views (that display the co-occurrence of codes) showed us what were the top agendas, framings and topics in the observed news outlets for the two milestones that we examined in depth.

sation or institutions to be present if (1) an important member of the organisation/institution was interviewed; (2) content was used from the organisation's/institution's web or social media site; (3) the article quoted an earlier statement of the organisation/institution. Typical framings were Humanitarian, Crime, Healthcare, Security Policy and Budget. We also coded the terms used to refer to the grassroots organisation (MigSzol Szeged and Mig Aid), whether they called them helpers, volunteers or political activists. We also coded the media sources that the articles quoted to see the volume of firsthand reporting, the proportion of foreign media sources and what outlets the journalists of each paper used the most often. Besides that we examined whose problem the migration crisis at large or its certain aspects were according to the journalist or the sources mentioned in the article (the most frequent ones were the refugees, the local residents, local councils, Hungary [the government], or the EU, or other countries) and who is responsible for solving it.

4.4 RESULTS OF THE CONTENT ANALYSIS

Before highlighting the main findings of the content analysis, we provide some general statistics about the sample of the articles.

As it's visible from Chart Ann4.2 (in Annex 4), even though the first milestone is important from the organisations' point of view since the new grassroots groups were formed during this phase, they didn't get much media coverage yet. MA, which became the most well-known grassroots organisation is only mentioned once in the first milestone. MigSzol Szeged was the first grassroots group to emerge during the crisis, and it was mentioned 5 times in the articles of nlcafe.hu, hvg.hu and 444.hu. Helsinki Committee was mentioned the most often, 7 times.

The second milestone is characterised by the opening of the transit zones, which happened at the beginning of August. Among all organisations MA got the biggest media coverage, because it negotiated with the local government in Budapest and ran the aid work in the transit zones. MigSzol and the Red Cross were also frequently mentioned, the latter one started its aid program in August to help refugee families. In the third milestone next to MA, UNHCR became the second most mentioned organisation. Since the third milestone is linked to the refugees' march to the border international politics and asylum policies got more coverage in the media. Media outlets often referred to UNHCR in international questions related to the refugee crisis. There is no difference in this respect between the left-wing or right-wing newspapers, UNHCR is mentioned in hirado.hu, valasz.hu, delmagyar.hu, 444.hu and atv.hu. In the fourth milestone,

it was the Helsinki Committee that was quoted the most often in the media, mainly because the battle at Röszke and the new penal code modification were such issues that as human rights NGO they felt compelled to react on in public. Finally, in the fifth milestone it is apparent that all the organisations are mentioned less than before, as the governmental political agenda is so dominant that it does not really leave room for their coverage, plus the migration flow is successfully diverged outside the borders.

From here on we discuss the results of the content analysis based on the second and the fourth milestones. We focus on our key codes – agenda setters, framings and topics, and examine the differences between the two milestones.

During the opening of the transit zones, MA managed to serve as the main agenda setter as Chart App4.1 shows (see in Appendix 4). The spokesperson of the grassroots group was often interviewed and the group's Facebook page was closely monitored by some of the online outlets. MA only applied humanitarian framings in its agendas. The main topics they articulated were the transit zones, hygiene and healthcare. MA volunteers were frequently interviewed in the field, not surprisingly since it was only them, who worked with the refugees at the railway stations. Volunteers often underlined the responsibility of the local government regarding the transit zones. The spokesperson of the organisation, Zsuzsanna Zsohár appeared several times in the media to represent the agenda of the MA.

„From now the capital city will help the work of the volunteers of the Migration Aid – said Zsuzsa Zsohár, spokesperson of the organisation on her Facebook page.” (origo.hu, 05.08.2015).

MA as a self-organised group didn't have any clear organisational structure, hierarchy or official framework from the beginnings until autumn, i.e. during the rush hours of their activity. In the articles it was referred to as a civic/helping/aid organisation or simply an organisation. The volunteers had been referred to mostly as civilians or volunteers but also as activists, even though they clearly denied the existence of any political motivation. As for the description of the migrants, we cannot find any prominent labels: migrants were referred to mainly as refugees or migrants, sometimes asylum seekers and occasionally immigrants as well. References may vary by media source and topic.

As Chart App4.2 (in Appendix 4) shows, Helsinki also succeeded in becoming an agenda setter during the transit zone phase. It provided three framings effectively, the Crime, the Law and

the Humanitarian frames. Calling the migrants asylum seekers in the articles was a result of their expert-agenda work related to asylum policy and legal issues. Mostly the program manager for refugee issues (Gábor Gyulai) was interviewed, and the questions mainly focused on legal and asylum policy issues or human trafficking issues.

Their crime frame is related to the crime frame of the governmental agenda (to be discussed in the next section), but they represent the refugees' interests, providing them with legal help against the criminalisation that the government had put forward. After Máté Kocsis (mayor of 8th District of Budapest, where most asylum seekers showed up on public areas and also a prominent member of the governing party) had accused the migrants of aggression and destruction of the local parks, Helsinki Committee sued him at the court of human rights, as the following quote from index.hu shows.

„They build tents, they make fires in the park, they litter, they go crazy, they steal, they stab, they destroy. There have never been so much human feces on public property – wrote the mayor of the eighth district in a post, among other things. (...) The Helsinki Committee refers to the law on equal treatment, that prohibits harassment i.e. behaviours that create a threatening, hostile, shaming atmosphere. In the lawsuit, they demand to ‘publicly apologise to the asylum seekers whose dignity was wronged’ and to have Kocsis admit: he wronged the human dignity of the migrants, and thus the applicable Hungarian laws.” (index.hu, 11.08.2015).

Even though our sample consists of articles where at least one aid organisation was present, we found that the Hungarian government's agenda was the third prominent one during the opening of the transit zones (Chart App4.3 in Appendix 4). Within their crime framing, topics such as illegal immigration, human trafficking and illegal border crossing came up, and consequently, migrants started to be referred to as illegal immigrants in the news reports. As for their budget framing, established charity organisations such as Red Cross, Interchurch Aid, Baptist Aid and the Charity Service of Malta were mostly mentioned among the aid organisations – these are the member organisations of the Caritative Council and are partially funded by the government. New organisations such as MA or MigSzol are usually mentioned as “civic formations”, not as organisations and they are rarely named. The risk of an epidemic was brought up in the governmental agenda's healthcare framing as a threatening scenario. The most prominent sources of the governmental agenda were M1, and MTI. Both are part of the public media, and as we mentioned in the introduction due to structural reasons, they can be regarded as governmental media. The transit zones were operated by the local governments

in the different towns hence the humanitarian framework in this phase became associated with the local governments at least in the governmental agenda. The migrants here are variably called migrants or refugees in the articles.

In the fourth milestone, at the time of the closing of the Serbian border and the Röszke battle, the governmental agenda acquires a supreme role in the media, and the NGOs and grassroots considerably lose their agenda setting role. Menedék and Helsinki express their discontent with the modified penal code that made illegal border crossing a crime, but this is just a short-term action. In this phase not only governmental politicians, but government bodies, such as the police and penal county and district courts also release many statements, i.e. serve as agenda setters. Hungarian governmental politicians are frequently interviewed in German media on the severe migration policies adopted, that MTI frequently puts on its wire service. Within the crime frame, the aggression of the refugees gets a prominent role, while migrants are more and more often referred to as illegal immigrants and border offenders (see Chart App4.4 in Appendix 4).

The public service media (Kossuth Rádió and M1 television channel) and Hír TV were the major media sources that the online media used for reporting on the governmental agenda. The Hungarian government in this phase was in constant conflict with the Balkan governments – the Croatian and the Serbian one, and the Croatian police transporting the refugees to the Hungarian border was also put in a crime frame by the government, stating that the Croatian police committed a crime by „crossing the Hungarian border with the illegal immigrants”. Pro-governmental news outlets repeatedly quote the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade that *it is a lie* that the Hungarian and the Croatian ministries agreed on this move. Furthermore, Viktor Orbán uses this incident to strengthen the army presence at the border and to frame the migration crisis as a security threat.

“7:35 – Neither the Serbians, nor the Croatians help us, we must solve the situation ourselves: we can only rely on ourselves! – said Orbán Viktor in Kossuth Rádió. (...) We must do the same as in Röszke: protect the Hungarian borders. The fence is built on a stretch of 41 km. The army and the police will be transferred to this area by the government.” (mno.hu, 19 September)

“Hungary will block Croatia’s joining of the Schengen zone, said Antal Rogán in Inforadio. (...) If it does not want to protect the borders, it is immature to enter.” (mno.hu, 19 September)

Lack of negotiations was resented by Hungarian politicians, while the closing of the Serbian–Hungarian border that forced the migrants to change their route towards Croatia was regarded as an arbitrary step by the Croatian government. Red Cross, the Hungarian Interchurch Aid and the Maltese Charity Service did not put forward any agendas by themselves, they were just mentioned as receivers of the newly allocated budget of 200 million HUF and Red Cross workers are sometimes interviewed by index.hu or other portals about the refugees or they were asked to give an estimate of how many more refugees can be expected from Greece.

As Chart App4.4 shows the migrant crisis being a European problem frequently emerges on the governmental agenda mostly to be employed as a defence for their policy.

International politics also becomes a prominent agenda setter (initiated by ministers from Germany, Denmark, Slovenia, Croatia, Sweden) during the closing of the Hungarian–Serbian border in the Hungarian news portals in our sample, mostly through the MTI news. The major frames in their agenda are the (1) humanitarian and the (2) security policy, while the discussed topic is the border fence. Mild approval from German politicians on Orbán's solution and stark criticism from German and Balkan politicians all appear in the reports.

“Returning refugees at the border does not contribute to the permanent solution of the refugee crisis – said the spokesperson of the German government on Friday in Berlin.” (kisalföld.hu)

“The behaviour of Hungary in the refugee crisis was a shock reaction that can be considered as extreme, but it pinpointed at the problem – said Mitterlehner Austrian deputy chancellor in the Saturday edition of the newspaper Salzburger Nachrichten.” (kisalföld.hu)

“According to the Serbian prime minister, Hungary does not treat migrants in a European manner.” (hirado.hu)

“The deployment of force and armed patrolmen and the pushing back of the innocent victims of the war to the minefields in the Balkans is not an acceptable behaviour from a EU member state – says a press release by the Greek Foreign Ministry.” (index.hu)

Comparing the two milestones, the government as agenda setter acquires a prominent role, and crime framings start to dominate the news reports in the fourth milestone. The health

frame disappears almost completely. The grassroots MA and Migszol only rarely get in the news, SEM does only once in our sample. While MA during the transit zones played a chief role and had its spokesperson interviewed repeatedly, during the 4th milestone, simple volunteers are interviewed from the organisation, and it is reported only how they try to take food and clothes to refugees stuck in Serbia. Established charity organisations take the floor at the transit zones, but they do not seek to set their own government independent agendas.

4.5 FRAMING

“He emphasised that we can talk about one of the biggest challenges of the EU, *as it not a refugee crisis, but a massive migration* that will not end in the foreseeable future, because it has an inexhaustible supply.” (Péter Szijjártó, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, kisalföld.hu)

A dominant framing within the second milestone was healthcare (see Chart App4.5 in Appendix 4), and the agenda setters for this frame were the experts, the volunteers and the government. Experts of the healthcare field (doctors, representatives from the National Public Health Officer Service) were frequently interviewed. Within the experts' agenda the main topics were the hygienic circumstances at the refugee camps or at the transit zones and their possible effects on the refugee's health. Based on blood tests of the refugees experts excluded the possibility of any risk of epidemics caused by the refugee crisis. News about the negative blood tests based on an article by delmagyar.hu appeared in index.hu, blikk.hu and hirado.hu. As for the governmental agenda, the healthcare framing—regardless to the negative blood tests presented by the experts—is mostly associated with the risk of epidemics and the migrants are referred (similarity to the crime framing of the government) as illegal immigrants. Within the healthcare framing the activity of the aid organisations is frequently mentioned, because volunteer doctors were also helping out at the transit zones and interviewed alongside other volunteers.

After the battle at Röszke, in our fourth milestone, the two top framings were the humanitarian and the criminal ones (see Chart App4.6 in Appendix 4). The main agenda setters for the humanitarian frame are UNICEF, the Hungarian government and international politics. (Croatian politicians and other countries, like Sweden). UNICEF is appalled by the footages of the Röszke battle showing children in the crossfire and calls on the Hungarian government to respect their rights. The Croatian politicians compare their humanitarian management of the migration

flow to the Hungarian's security approach, while other countries such as Sweden criticise the building of the barbed wire fence. The Hungarian government declares the 200 million HUF allocation to the three charity organisations. While mostly it pushed the "illegal immigrant" agenda, the refugee children, and the elderly were promised to be taken care of by the refugee centres. The perspective of the refugees also appeared as a frame that pro-government portal such as hirado.hu, kisalföld.hu and delmagyar.hu very rarely, almost never used in their coverage. [Index.hu](http://index.hu) was the most prominent in conducting interviews with the refugees themselves. [Hvg.hu](http://hvg.hu) more often talked with the representatives of the grassroots, and gave room to the agenda of the human rights organisations, such as Helsinki or Menedék (see Chart App4.7 in Appendix 4). Comparing the two milestones, the government as agenda setter acquires a prominent role, and crime framings start to dominate the news reports in the fourth milestone. The health frame disappears almost completely. The grassroots MA and Migszol only rarely get in the news, SEM does only once in our sample. While MA during the transit zones played a chief role and had its spokesperson interviewed repeatedly, during the 4th milestone, simple volunteers are interviewed from the organisation, and it is reported only how they try to take food and clothes to refugees stuck in Serbia. Established charity organisations take the floor at the transit zones, but they do not seek to set their own government independent agendas.

"Others payed a thousand, but we wanted a secure boat. Then, when we went down to the dock, we could see that it was nothing like a yacht, it was the same crap dinghy. But it was too late then – he said. From Kosz they set sail for Athens for 50 EUR legally and the journey from there to Magyarkanizsa was without any obstacles." (index.hu)

The presence of the crime frame has been mentioned before, but the topic of human trafficking (also discussed by oppositional portals or by index.hu) was supplemented by constant briefs on how many illegal immigrants were caught and brought into justice in the courts via MTI news.

"The Szeged County Prosecution Office initiated the bringing to justice 13 new migrants for the crime of prohibited crossing of the closed border." (hirado.hu)

"Anyone, who attacks the border, commits a terrorist crime – said Tamás Menczer, the chief of press of the Ministry for Foreign Trade and Foreign Affairs." (kisalföld.hu)

The Hungarian media also reported frequently on migrants illegally trying to cross the Slovenian–Croatian border and Slovenian police striking back at them. Right after the battle at Röszke on the 17th of September, the Helsinki Committee released an expert statement admitting the aggression of the refugees, but blaming the Hungarian police for escalating the situation.

“According to the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, it was predictable right from the beginning at the border, that the tension will increase in the crowd, swelling up at the border, left without proper care, especially given that from the crowd amounting to 1000 people, 60–70 manage to submit their asylum request, and the police should also have prepared for the situation.” (hvg.hu)

Looking at the different framings helped us see the discursive strategies of the agenda setters. We found that during the transit zones, even within the health frame, refugees are labelled as illegal immigrants by governmental agenda setters. In the fourth milestone, the humanitarian frame is applied both by the government and by the oppositional media. Index.hu, origo.hu and hvg.hu are the only outlets that present the perspectives of the refugees as individuals with agency and not as passive subjects of criminal proceedings or as members of larger groups that are moved along the western Balkan and through Hungary to Western Europe.

4.5.1 MEDIA SOURCES

As mentioned in the introduction, the public media and the state news agency MTI is totally centralised and the content is streamlined to fit the governmental agenda. MTI and connected MTVA television channels as news sources were prominent in the media coverage of the crisis, although hvg.hu, index.hu and origo.hu also prepared many first-hand reports. Nevertheless, a lack of media pluralism is confirmed by this current study, as the oppositional and independent outlets did not have enough munitions to counter the governmental framing of the migrant crisis.

A nice illustration of how the personnel of the public news agency are linked to the government is a Facebook post of the former president of MTI during the fourth milestone.

“– Croatia! Thanks! – said the former director of the MTI. We transported weapons to the war of independence. We welcomed the refugees from Drávaszög. We fought with all our might for the EU accession. You were boasting to solve it. And in the end you

flooded my homeland with refugees. Croatia, thank you! – wrote Csaba Belényesi, the former director of MTI on Facebook.”⁷³ (hvg.hu, 18 September)

To say a few words about portals less mentioned in our report, we observed that the pro-governmental portal mno.hu in its media sources used most dominantly the television channels Hír TV, M1, as well as MTI. Blikk.hu relied heavily on M1, and it covered the migration crisis in a highly pro-government manner. Nlcafe.hu on the other hand, frequently interviewed the volunteers of MA expressing solidarity with the migrants, applying a humanitarian frame. As a tabloid, it focused on emotional coverage, so its photo gallery that got in our sample was very aesthetic and emotionally appealing. Hvg.hu wrote many first-hand articles, just as nol.hu. Nol.hu was the most heterogeneous in terms of story types, writing opinion pieces, reports and interviews as well. Index.hu was the most prolific in producing video content whose analysis unfortunately is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless it can be said that it lacked any judgemental attitude and reflected a naive curiosity and solidarity towards the refugees, with whom the reporters frequently talked and joked if the situation allowed.

4.6 CONCLUSION

Using the search engine news.google.hu we created a database of online articles on five core events (3–4 days each) of the migration crisis. Our basis for the selection was that at least one aid organisation should be mentioned in the article. Although the migration crisis as a dramatic event comparable to a natural disaster constituted a breaking news story for several months attracting intense media attention and generating articles in the scale of a hundred thousand, we could retrieve only 276 articles in 34 Hungarian online news websites. That in itself reveals that the grassroots, and the NGOs, the charity organisations and the refugee organisations were not major actors in the crisis. We examined the distribution of the news outlets in our database, and we found that hvg.hu had the highest number of articles, followed by 444.hu, origo.hu and index.hu. Although hvg.hu was indeed keen on covering the crisis and was eager to amplify the agendas of Migration Aid and of the Helsinki Committee, we suppose that 444.hu and index.hu got a lower count because we did not include videos in our sample.

In order to gain a better insight on the actual portrayal of the organisations within the articles and to see how their agendas came across and what were the context where they appeared,

⁷³ http://hvg.hu/itthon/20150918_Nem_birnak_a_menekultaradattal_a_horvatok/4?isPrintView=False

we conducted a content analysis focusing on two milestones. Even though we focused on those articles where aid organisations were present, we found that the Hungarian Government's agenda was the third most prominent one even during the opening of the transit zones where Migration Aid was particularly active. During this period volunteers were present nonstop at the train stations nationwide, and they could easily be interviewed and therefore could set their own agendas, which were mainly humanitarian, as volunteers were focusing on the well-being of the refugees. Alongside the volunteers refugees had also been often interviewed but mostly by the media outlets *index.hu*, *hvg.hu* or *origo.hu* and never by the public media such as *hirado.hu* or the right-wing *magyarhirlap.hu*. The most successful agenda-setters among the NGOs and grassroots were Migration Aid (with humanitarian framework) and the Helsinki Committee. The least visible ones were the established charity organisations, such as Baptist Aid or the Maltese Charity Service. Charity organisations were often mentioned together in a governmental and/or critical framework (condemning them for being passive during the crisis).

During the battle at Röszke and the closing of the Serbian border, refugees were gathered in a relatively small place and far away from the cities where volunteers were present. Government agendas that focused on describing refugees as criminals, terrorist threats, carrying the risk of epidemics or on underlining their aggression regained their leading role. These topics were reinforced by the government, which declared a state of emergency in several counties and the enactment of the modification of the penal code making illegal border crossing a crime. In such a context, the humanitarian frame gained a new content. Migrants were more and more frequently labeled as illegal immigrants. A major reason behind this overwhelming victory of the crime frame is that the public media is centralised (and covering a range of TV and radio channels and the central news agency of Hungary) and the agenda could be artificially controlled. In that context, the activities of the three established charities, the Red Cross, the Hungarian Interchurch Aid and the Maltese Charity Service served as a carrier of the humanitarian agenda that provided a sort of justification to the crime agenda that were pushed on all fronts. The quote from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade at the beginning of the Frame section illustrates the governmental communication agenda well – taking away the refugee status of the migrants and reframing the migration as a looming threat in order to serve as the defenders of the nation state.

The three established charity organisations did not construct any agenda by themselves, were mostly mentioned in articles with a government agenda as receivers of the 200 million HUF for

service provision to the migrants crossing the country or as Hungarian organisations helping in the refugee camps in Hungary and abroad.

The Helsinki Committee was the only NGO that was allowed to enter the official state transit zones at the Southern border at the Serbian and the Croatian border and it was active in raising its voice against the new penal code. Its expert legal opinion and activism on the field got some media attention but its role as a major agenda setter proved to be transient as well.

ANNEX 4 COMPLEMENTARY DATA FOR MILESTONES FOR CHAPTER 4

Chart Ann4.6.1

The distribution of the media outlets in the five milestones





Chart Ann4.6.2
Organisations per milestones



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APPENDIX

APPENDIX 1 THE NATIONAL CONSULTATION AND POSTER CAMPAIGN FOR CHAPTER 1.3⁷⁴



Dear Hungarian Citizen!

We, Hungarians made our decision in 2010, that we will discuss every important issue with each other before making our decisions. This is the reason why we have held national consultations about the new constitution, about social safety and about improving the situation of pensioners. We begin now a national consultation on the question of economic immigration for the same reasons.

As you can certainly recall, Europe was shaken by an unprecedented act of terror at the beginning of this year. Innocent people were killed cold bloodedly and with a frightening brutality in Paris. We were all shocked by what have happened. However, this inconceivable monstrosity also demonstrated that Brussels and the European Union can not handle the immigration issue appropriately.

Economic immigrants cross the border illegally, pretending to be refugees while, in reality, they seek social allowances and jobs. Only in the past few months the number of economic immigrants has increased twenty times in Hungary. This is a new type of threat, that we need to stop.

Since Brussels has failed in handling immigration, Hungary has to follow it's own way responding to the threat. We will not let economic migrants endangering Hungarian people's jobs and livelihoods.

We have to decide on how Hungary should defend itself against illegal border crossings. We have to decide on how to limit the dramatically growing number of economic immigrants.

I ask you with due respect, to get in touch with us, tell also us what is your opinion about the questions asked, fill out the questionnaire and return it to us. I count on your opinion.

Greetings: Viktor Orbán

⁷⁴ Source: <http://www.slideshare.net/Johanwesterholm/national-consultation>

**NATIONAL CONSULTATION
on immigration and terrorism**

Published by the Prime Minister's Office

Please complete this questionnaire.

1] We hear different views on increasing levels of terrorism. How relevant do you think the spread of terrorism (the bloodshed in France, the shocking acts of ISIS) is to your own life?

Very relevant Relevant Not relevant

2] Do you think that Hungary could be the target of an act of terror in the next few years?

There is a very real chance It could occur Out of the question

3] There are some who think that mismanagement of the immigration question by Brussels may have something to do with increased terrorism. Do you agree with this view?

I fully agree I tend to agree I do not agree

4] Did you know that economic migrants cross the Hungarian border illegally, and that recently the number of immigrants in Hungary has increased twentyfold?

Yes I have heard about it I did not know

5] We hear different views on the issue of immigration. There are some who think that economic migrants jeopardise the jobs and livelihoods of Hungarians. Do you agree?

I fully agree I tend to agree I do not agree

6] There are some who believe that Brussels' policy on immigration and terrorism has failed, and that we therefore need a new approach to these questions. Do you agree?

I fully agree I tend to agree I do not agree

7] Would you support the Hungarian Government in the introduction of more stringent immigration regulations, in contrast to Brussels' lenient policy?

Yes, I would fully support the Government

I would partially support the Government

I would not support the Government

8] Would you support the Hungarian government in the introduction of more stringent regulations, according to which migrants illegally crossing the Hungarian border could be taken into custody?

Yes, I would fully support the Government
I would partially support the Government
I would not support the Government

9] Do you agree with the view that migrants illegally crossing the Hungarian border should be returned to their own countries within the shortest possible time?

I fully agree I tend to agree I do not agree

10] Do you agree with the concept that economic migrants themselves should cover the costs associated with their time in Hungary?

I fully agree I tend to agree I do not agree

11] Do you agree that the best means of combating immigration is for Member States of the European Union to assist in the development of the countries from which migrants arrive?

I fully agree I tend to agree I do not agree

12] Do you agree with the Hungarian government that support should be focused more on Hungarian families and the children they can have, rather than on immigration?

I fully agree I tend to agree I do not agree



Source: <https://www.google.hu/search?q=Ha+Magyarorsz%C3%A1gra+j%C3%B6ssz&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewjP2dukuszLAhWCHpoKHe9KD6sQsAQIGg&biw=1280&bih=864>



Source: <https://www.google.hu/search?q=Ha+Magyarorsz%C3%A1gra+j%C3%B6ssz&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewjP2dukuszLAhWCHpoKHe9KD6sQsAQIGg&biw=1280&bih=864>

APPENDIX 2 LIST OF FOCUS GROUPS AND INTERVIEWS FOR CHAPTER 2

Focus groups with new grass-root organisations (October 2015)

1. MigSzol Szeged 16 October 2015, 8 participants
2. Migration Aid Debrecen, 20 October 2015, 6 participants
3. Migration Aid Budapest, 28 October 2015, 7 participants

INTERVIEWS (OCTOBER 2015 – JANUARY 2016)

Interviews with leaders of new grassroots organisations

1. Segítségünk Együtt a Menekülteknek (Help Let's Help ng the Refugees Together) leader, Szilárd Kalmár, 12 November 2015, Budapest
2. Migration Aid spokesperson, Zsuzsanna Zsohár, 19 November 2015 (short interview), Budapest

Individual interviews with volunteers of new grassroots organisations

3. Segítségünk Együtt a Menekülteknek (Let's Help the Refugees Together), volunteer, woman, aged 36, 20 November 2015, Budapest
4. Segítségünk Együtt a Menekülteknek (Let's Help the Refugees Together) and Migration Aid, woman, aged 30, 2 October 2015, Budapest
5. Segítségünk Együtt a Menekülteknek (Let's Help the Refugees Together) woman, aged 38, 30 October 2015, Budapest
6. MigSzol Szeged, woman, aged 49, 28 October 2015, Szeged
7. MigSzol Szeged, man, aged 43, 29 October 2015, Szeged
8. MigSzol Szeged, man, aged 36, 29 October 2015, Szeged

9. Segítsünk Együtt a Menekülteknek (Let's Help the Refugees Together) and Migration Aid, woman, aged 60, 18 November 2015, Budapest

10. Migration Aid, woman, aged 40, 9 November 2015, Budapest

Interviews with leaders of established NGOs and charity (church) organisations

11. Magyar Máltai Szeretetszolgálat (Hungarian Maltese Charity), executive vice-president, Lajos Győri-Dani, 3 November 2015, Budapest

12. MigSzol Migráns Szolidaritás (Migrant Solidarity), co-founder, Annastina Kallius, 3 November 2015, Budapest

13. Menedék – Migránsokat Segítő Egyesület (Menedék – Hungarian Association for Migrants), director, András Kováts, 4 November 2015, Budapest

14. Magyarországi Evangéliumi Testvérközösség – Oltalom Egyesület (Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship – Oltalom Charity Society), president, Gábor Iványi, 4 November 2015, Budapest

15. Magyarországi Evangélikus Egyház (The Evangelical-Lutheran Church in Hungary), asylum officer Attila Mészáros, Head of Diaconia Department, Annamária Buda, 4 November 2015, Budapest

16. Menhely Alapítvány (The Shelter Foundation) dr. Péter Győri, Chairman of the Board (and also the deputy director of Budapest Methodological Centre of Social Policy and Its Institutions (BMSZKI), the homeless care institutions operated by the Municipality of Budapest, 5 November 2015, Budapest

17. Magyar Vöröskereszt (Hungarian Red Cross), vice-president, Gábor Nagy, 18 November 2015, Budapest

18. Magyar Helsinki Bizottság (Hungarian Helsinki Committee), project leader, Anikó Bakonyi, 11 December 2015, Budapest

19. Magyar Ökumenikus Segélyszervezet (Hungarian Interchurch Aid), project leaders, Dóra Révfalvi, Adrienn Baracsi, 26 January, Budapest

Other interview:

20. index.hu, Head of Department Politics, Attila Tóth-Szenesi, 20 November 2015, Budapest

21. Interview with a former senior UNHCR official. 17 January 2016

PUBLIC EVENTS OR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF ORGANISATIONS TALKING ABOUT THEIR ACTIVITY DURING THE REFUGEE CRISIS

1. Menedék Workshop, 20 October 2015, venue: Gólya, Budapest – participant: dr. Tamás Fabinyi, bishop of The Evangelical-Lutheran Church in Hungary. <https://www.facebook.com/events/999756306746645/>
2. Coffee to go, Migration: “Acceptance in this country and beyond our borders”, organised by and venue provided by: the Hungarian Maltese Charity, participants: Gellért Ghyczy, methodological officer at Baptist Charity, Lajos Győri-Dani, executive vice-president at Hungarian Maltese Charity; Gábor Nagy, vice-president at Hungarian Red Cross, Luca Solymoskővi, officer at Jesuit Refugee Service, 3 November 2015, Budapest. <https://www.facebook.com/events/1714923415394314/>
3. “The man with tattoo – Immigration through the eyes of volunteers”, Keleti Csoport (Keleti Group – volunteers of Migration Aid at Keleti Railway Station). Organised by and venue provided by Zöld Terasz (Green Terrace) and moderated by Balázs Szűcs, Párbeszéd Magyarországért Párt (Dialogue for Hungary Party); participants: three leaders of the Keleti Group (Baba, Sugárka Kelemen, Maja), 26 November 2015, Budapest.
4. Teszik? Teszik! Civil segítők a menekültválságban. Hanuka Proaktív series. (Do they act? They do act! Civilian actors as helpers in the refugee crisis.) Moderated by Szilvia Krizsó, participants are: Judit Mogyorósi volunteer doctor at Migration Aid, Márk Zoltán Kékesi, founder and leader of MigSzol Szeged; Szilárd Kalmár, leader at Segítsünk Együtt a Menekülteknek (Helping the Refugees Together), and András Kováts, director at Menedék – Hungarian Association for Migrants. Organised by and venue provided by Balint Jewish Community House (Bálint Zsidó Közösségi Ház), 9 December 2015, Budapest. <https://www.facebook.com/events/897929096961053/912454155508547/>

APPENDIX 4 CHRONOLOGIES AND AGENDAS FOR MILESTONES FOR CHAPTER 4

CHRONOLOGY FOR MILESTONE 2

Opening of the transit zones

- ❖ 5 August – the local government of Budapest and Migration Aid volunteers agree on the opening of the transit zones at three railway stations in Budapest, Facebook-post by Máté Kocsis (mayor of the 8th district, Budapest) claims that refugees are destroying local parks and are highly aggressive towards each other and towards peaceful Hungarian citizens
- ❖ 6 August – demonstration against the refugee camp planned in Martonfa
- ❖ 8 August – opening of the first transit zone at the Keleti station; no risk of epidemics according to the experts
- ❖ 11 August – the Helsinki Committee plans to take Máté Kocsis to the Court, seriously injured 4 year old Syrian boy, who got viral in the international media is claimed to be treated in a Hungarian hospital, the Afghan Consulate to Budapest closes
- ❖ 12 August – Red Cross starts a humanitarian aid program for refugees; opening of the second transit zone at the Nyugati station
- ❖ 14 August – opening of the third transit zone
- ❖ 25 August – István Tarlós, mayor of Budapest announces the possible closing of the transit zones
- ❖ 26 August – Refugee babies born in Budapest; announcing new possible location for a transit zone

CHRONOLOGY FOR MILESTONE 4

Battle at Röszke, the closing of the Hungarian–Serbian border, the closing of the Hungarian–Croatian border, penal code modification

- ❖ 8 September – refugees break out from the transitory hotspot at Röszke. The footage of the camerawoman, Petra László working for a right-wing paper, who tripped a running Syrian refugee father with his son goes viral in international media.

- ❖ 15 September – midnight: the border is officially closed at Röszke (Serbian–Hungarian border).
- ❖ 16 September – the government decides to give HUF 200 million to three charity organisations they agreed with (The Red Cross, Interchurch Aid and Maltese Charity Organization), and only these are allowed to enter the transit zones as well as the representatives of the UN.
- ❖ Helsinki Committee and Menedék – Hungarian Association for Migrants and Migrant Solidarity Group release a statement where they criticize the new legislation on illegal border crossing and the implementation of the law on the basis that refugees do not get fair treatment and the jurisdiction does not comply with EU regulations, plus Serbia is falsely claimed as a safe third country, where refugees are returned. A Facebook group “Lawyers for the rule of law” is created, and more than 100 people sign their petition against the modified penal code.
- ❖ 16 September – Battle at Röszke–Horgos. Refugees start a fight against the Hungarian police strikes back with force.
- ❖ 17 September – Helsinki Committee releases a legal statement on the battle at Röszke blaming the Hungarian police and government for the escalation of the situation and creating such uncertainty that confused the migrants.
- ❖ 18 September Croatian–Hungarian border is closed. M5 highway is closed.
- ❖ The refugees’ route change – instead of using Hungary as a transit country they go towards Croatia and from there to Slovenia, which is part of the Schengen Zone (they aim for the following towns in Serbia and Croatia: Sid, Tovarnik, Pélmonostor, Beremend, Gyékényes, Magyarbóly, where aid workers help them).
- ❖ The government declares a state of emergency in 6 counties: Csongrád, Bács-Kiskun, Baranya, Somogy, Zala, Vas.
- ❖ The EU bodies put forward the quota solution to handle the migration crisis, the Hungarian government is firmly against it.

Chart Ann4.1 AGENDA_Migration Aid




Chart Ann4.2 AGENDA_Helsinki Committee




Chart Ann4.3 Agenda_Government_Politician 2. milestone




Chart Ann4.4 Agenda_Government_Politician 4. milestone




Chart Ann4.5 Framing: Healthcare




Chart Ann4.6 Framing: Humanitarian




Chart Ann4.7 Topic_Refugee march

